Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 211 of the 214 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (K. H. Onishi & R. Baillargeon, 2005; L. Surian, S. Caldi, & D. Sperber, 2007). Nonhuman animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behavior (e.g., J. Call & M. Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., I. A. Apperly, D. Samson, & G. W. Humphreys, 2009). The authors interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. They propose that the success of infants and nonhuman animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans, this capacity persists in parallel with a later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory-of-mind abilities.
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“Contrary to this assumption, pragmatic reasoning, such as the derivation of implicatures, reasoning about an interlocutor and general Theory of Mind, is typically believed to bear a cognitive cost and be effortful and slow [61,82].”
From The role of pragmatic mechanisms in referential communication and categorization: An emergent communication model (2026) · cites this paper as [82]
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Self-citationRepresentation in Cognitive Science
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How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
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Metadata
- Authors
- Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A.
- Affiliations
- University of Birmingham (GB)
- University of Warwick (GB)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 953-970
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2100694823
- Cited by
- 1,261
- References
- 214
- Citations by year
- 2026: 58 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 126 · 2023: 102 · 2022: 93 · 2021: 93 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 84 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 77 · 2015: 75 · 2014: 61 · 2013: 66 · 2012: 36
- FWCI
- 54.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- belief reasoning, theory of mind, false belief tasks, cognitive development, numerical cognition, cognitive flexibility, cognitive efficiency, infants, non-human animals, social cognition
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Animals, Child, Child, Preschool, Culture, Defense Mechanisms, Humans, Infant, Judgment, Problem Solving, Self Concept, Social Behavior, Socialization, Personal Construct Theory
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