Beyond stimulus cues and reinforcement signals: A new approach to animal metacognition.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Some metacognition paradigms for nonhuman animals encourage the alternative explanation that animals avoid difficult trials based only on reinforcement history and stimulus aversion. To explore this possibility, we placed humans and monkeys in successive uncertainty-monitoring tasks that were qualitatively different, eliminating many associative cues that might support transfer across tasks. In addition, task transfer occurred under conditions of deferred and rearranged feedback-both species completed blocks of trials followed by summary feedback. This ensured that animals received no trial-by-trial reinforcement. Despite distancing performance from associative cues, humans and monkeys still made adaptive uncertainty responses by declining the most difficult trials. These findings suggest that monkeys' uncertainty responses could represent a higher-level, decisional process of cognitive monitoring, though that process need not involve full self-awareness or consciousness. The dissociation of performance from reinforcement has theoretical implications concerning the status of reinforcement as the critical binding force in animal learning.
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Citations
Cites
Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry
Flavell, J. H. (1979) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.34.10.906 · Cited by 11,282 · cited 1×
“Extensive research on uncertainty monitoring and metacognition has explored these phenomena (Benjamin et al., 1998; Brown et al., 1983; Flavell, 1979; Hart, 1965; Koriat, 1993, 2007; Koriat et al., 2006; Metcalfe, 2000; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Nelson, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; Serra & Dunlosky, 2005).”
Metamemory: A Theoretical Framework and New Findings
Nelson, T. O. (1990) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60053-5 · Cited by 2,583
Elements of psychophysics, 1860.
Fechner, G. T. (1948) · Readings in the history of psychology. · doi:10.1037/11304-026 · Cited by 1,307
How do we know that we know? The accessibility model of the feeling of knowing
Koriat, A. (1993) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.100.4.609 · Cited by 895
Self‐awareness and the emergence of mind in primates
Gallup, G. G. (1982) · American Journal of Primatology · doi:10.1002/ajp.1350020302 · Cited by 793
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610 · cited 1×
“Therefore, we caution that the present results do not require one to elevate what animals are doing to the full status of human metacognition with all the trimmings (see also Carruthers, 2009; Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, & Smith, 2009; Proust, 2009; Smith et al., 2008).”
Metacognition and consciousness
Koriat, A. (2007) · The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816789.012 · Cited by 554
A review of the tip-of-the-tongue experience
Brown, A. S. (1991) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.204 · Cited by 517
Rhesus monkeys know when they remember
Hampton, R. R. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.071600998 · Cited by 493 · cited 3×
“Recent research has suggested that nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) also have a capacity for metacognition or cognitive monitoring (Beran, Smith, Redford, & Washburn, 2006; Call & Carpenter, 2001; Foote & Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Shields, Smith, & Wa…”
The Missing Link in CognitionOrigins of self-reflective consciousness
Terrace, H. S., & Metcalfe, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.001.0001 · Cited by 417
Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys
Kornell, N., Son, L. K., & Terrace, H. S. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01850.x · Cited by 341 · cited 3×
“One persistent methodological concern is that researchers have rewarded animal participants directly for their uncertainty responses (e.g., Foote & Crystal, 2007; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Kornell et al., 2007; Hampton, 2001; SudaKing, 2008; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008).”
The uncertain response in the bottlenosed dolphin (Tursiops truncatus).
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Self-citationThe comparative study of metacognition: Sharper paradigms, safer inferences
Smith, J. D., Beran, M. J., Couchman, J. J., & Coutinho, M. V. C. (2008) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/pbr.15.4.679 · Cited by 151 · cited 9×
“Some theorists of animal metacognition have suggested that animals avoid difficult trials based on reinforcement history and stimulus aversion—not based on monitored uncertainty (Smith et al., 2008). Some have even argued that all existing demonstrations of uncertainty monitoring by animals have a low-level, associati…”
InfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
Fletcher, L., & Carruthers, P. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0413 · Cited by 83
Carruthers, P., & Williams, D. M. (2022) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105117 · Cited by 71
“…Those who study metacognitive processes in animals often cite the Nelson & Narens model with approval (e.g., Smith et al., 2003, Smith et al., 2006; Couchman et al., 2010), so one can assume that when the animals in question are claimed to have metacognitive capacities, it is generally some…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Couchman, J. J., Coutinho, M. V. C., Beran, M. J., & Smith, J. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Psychology
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 356-368
- ISSN
- 0093-4127 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2087
- 0735-7036
- OpenAlex
- W2022930092
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 8.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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