The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making.
Open accessAbstract
A single coherent framework is proposed to synthesize long-standing research on 8 seemingly unrelated cognitive decision-making biases. During the past 6 decades, hundreds of empirical studies have resulted in a variety of rules of thumb that specify how humans systematically deviate from what is normatively expected from their decisions. Several complementary generative mechanisms have been proposed to explain those cognitive biases. Here it is suggested that (at least) 8 of these empirically detected decision-making biases can be produced by simply assuming noisy deviations in the memory-based information processes that convert objective evidence (observations) into subjective estimates (decisions). An integrative framework is presented to show how similar noise-based mechanisms can lead to conservatism, the Bayesian likelihood bias, illusory correlations, biased self-other placement, subadditivity, exaggerated expectation, the confidence bias, and the hard-easy effect. Analytical tools from information theory are used to explore the nature and limitations that characterize such information processes for binary and multiary decision-making exercises. The ensuing synthesis offers formal mathematical definitions of the biases and their underlying generative mechanism, which permits a consolidated analysis of how they are related. This synthesis contributes to the larger goal of creating a coherent picture that explains the relations among the myriad of seemingly unrelated bia…
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“Measures in accordance with (b), which are intended to maintain an awareness of the automation bias, seem out of place: it introduces a concrete psychological aspect that sticks out from the more technical and operational aspects outlined in the other provisions, especially considering that automation bias is just one of many relevant biases (e.g., hindsight bias, confidence bias [36, 66]), heuris”
From On the Quest for Effectiveness in Human Oversight: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2024) · cites this paper as [36]
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“Kahneman and Tversky (1982) referred to these modes of judgment as singular and distributional, respectively, and argued that frequency estimates usually provide more accurate results than estimates based on singular belief assessments (see also Tversky and Koehler, 1994).”
ResultRational choice and the structure of the environment.
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Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1900061x · Cited by 892
Bias in algorithmic filtering and personalization
Bozdag, E. (2013) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-013-9321-6 · Cited by 649
“Because the mind’s information processing capacity is biologically limited (for example, we possess neither infinite nor photographic memory), we get the feeling of being overwhelmed by the number of choices and end up with ‘‘bounded rationality’’ (Hilbert 2012).”
BackgroundCognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility
Leary, M. R., Diebels, K. J., Davisson, E. K., Jongman-Sereno, K. P., Isherwood, J. C., Raimi, K. T., Deffler, S. A., & Hoyle, R. H. (2017) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167217697695 · Cited by 539
“Much of what people believe to be true is incomplete, biased, or worse, totally incorrect (Gilovich & Griffin, 2010; Hilbert, 2012).”
BackgroundThe evolution of decision rules in complex environments
Fawcett, T. W., Fallenstein, B., Higginson, A. D., Houston, A. I., Mallpress, D. E. W., Trimmer, P. C., & McNamara, J. M. (2014) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.012 · Cited by 263
Team Reflexivity as an Antidote to Team Information-Processing Failures
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“Research on individual information processing failures has a long history in organization studies (for a recent review see Hilbert, 2012), while the area of TIP failures is receiving more research attention in the last decades.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hilbert, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Southern California (US)
- Corresponding author
- Hilbert, Martin
- ORCID
- Hilbert, Martin
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012-03
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 211-237
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W1990584714
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 130
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 7.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- escholarship.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-sa
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- cognitive biases, decision-making, conservatism, illusory correlation, subadditivity, confidence bias, information theory, integrative framework
- MeSH terms
- Decision Making, Female, Humans, Information Theory, Judgment, Male, Memory, Models, Psychological, Probability, Set, Psychology, Stochastic Processes
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