Is that what Bayesians believe? Reply to Griffiths, Chater, Norris, and Pouget (2012).
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Griffiths, Chater, Norris, and Pouget (2012) argue that we have misunderstood the Bayesian approach. In their view, it is rarely the case that researchers are making claims that performance in a given task is near optimal, and few, if any, researchers adopt the theoretical Bayesian perspective according to which the mind or brain is actually performing (or approximating) Bayesian computations. Rather, researchers are said to adopt something more akin to what we called the methodological Bayesian approach, according to which Bayesian models are statistical tools that allow researchers to provide teleological explanations of behavior. In our reply we argue that many Bayesian researchers often appear to be make claims regarding optimality, and often appear to be making claims regarding how the mind computes at algorithmic and implementational levels of descriptions. We agree that some Bayesian theorists adopt the methodological approach, but we question the value of this approach. If Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience are only designed to provide insights into teleological questions, we expect that many readers have misunderstood, and hence there is a pressing need to clarify what Bayesian theories of cognition are all about.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [51]
Citations
Cites
Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion
Ernst, M. O., & Banks, M. S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415429a · Cited by 4,844
The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588
The Adaptive Character of Thought
Massaro, D. W., Friedman, D., & Anderson, J. R. (1991) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1423253 · Cited by 2,174
How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction
Tenenbaum, J. B., Kemp, C., Griffiths, T. L., & Goodman, N. D. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1192788 · Cited by 1,815
Bayesian inference with probabilistic population codes
Ma, W. J., Beck, J. M., Latham, P. E., & Pouget, A. (2006) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1790 · Cited by 1,457
Motion illusions as optimal percepts
Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson, E. H. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0602-858 · Cited by 1,076
(2009) · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-29678-2 · Cited by 900
Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control
Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.003 · Cited by 867
Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10003134 · Cited by 533
Bayesian Brain: Probabilistic Approaches to Neural Coding
(2006) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262042383.001.0001 · Cited by 511
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026450 · Cited by 436 · cited 2×
“(2006), this does not rule out the claim that collections of neurons compute in a Bayesian-like fashion” (Bowers and Davis, 2012, p. 404). There is one way in which a Bayesian theory of neural computation might have stronger support: that is, if Bayesian theories are characterized so broadly as to encompass almost any…”
BackgroundResultSelf-citationThe Bayesian reader: Explaining word recognition as an optimal Bayesian decision process.
Norris, D. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.2.327 · Cited by 412
Anderson, J. R. (1991) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00070801 · Cited by 383
Feldman, N. H., Griffiths, T. L., & Morgan, J. L. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0017196 · Cited by 268
Probability matching as a computational strategy used in perception
Wozny, D. R., Beierholm, U. R., & Shams, L. (2010) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871 · Cited by 265
Bayesian models: the structure of the world, uncertainty, behavior, and the brain
Vilares, I., & Kording, K. (2011) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.05965.x · Cited by 214
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Norris, D., & Pouget, A. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026884 · Cited by 192
Chater, N., Oaksford, M., Hahn, U., & Heit, E. (2010) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.79 · Cited by 127
Faisal, A. A., & Wolpert, D. M. (2009) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.90974.2008 · Cited by 117
Representations of uncertainty in sensorimotor control
Orbán, G., & Wolpert, D. M. (2011) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2011.05.026 · Cited by 82
Lewandowsky, S., Griffiths, T. L., & Kalish, M. L. (2009) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01045.x · Cited by 69
The imaginary fundamentalists: The unshocking truth about Bayesian cognitive science
Chater, N., Goodman, N. D., Griffiths, T. L., Kemp, C., Oaksford, M., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000239 · Cited by 42
Population Codes: Theoretic Aspects
Ma, W. J., & Pouget, A. (2009) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-008045046-9.01401-7 · Cited by 12
Cited by
Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
Rahnev, D., & Denison, R. N. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18000936 · Cited by 342
Deep problems with neural network models of human vision
Bowers, J. S., Malhotra, G., Dujmović, M., Llera Montero, M., Tsvetkov, C., Biscione, V., Puebla, G., Adolfi, F., Hummel, J. E., Heaton, R. F., et al. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002813 · Cited by 204
Self-citationGross, S., & Flombaum, J. (2017) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12144 · Cited by 138
Rate–distortion theory and human perception
Sims, C. R. (2016) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.03.020 · Cited by 122
Cognitive Penetration and Attention
Gross, S. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00221 · Cited by 89
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Bristol (GB)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 423-426
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2171943502
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 2 · 2020: 5 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 3
- FWCI
- 2.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- cognitive modeling
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Humans, Mental Processes, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.