Autobiographical memory and sense of self.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 234 of the 236 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Despite a strong intuitive and theoretical tradition linking autobiographical memory and sense of self, there are few coherent, testable models that exemplify how these constructs relate. Without any clear theoretical starting point, research efforts have been fragmented, with many different fields of psychology operating in relative isolation, using different methodological approaches and a confusing array of self-related terminology. We attempt to bridge the widening gap between theory and research by proposing a novel framework for sense of self and memory. This simple model delineates sense of self along 2 dimensions: the subjective versus objective and the present versus temporally extended aspects of sense of self. The 4 resulting components of sense of self are argued to relate to autobiographical memory in important, but very different, ways. Subjective sense of self provides a crucial precondition for episodic memory, which in turn is a prerequisite for phenomenological continuity. Autobiographical memory, and particularly its semanticized forms, are important for the formation and maintenance of a mental representation of the objective self in the present moment and across time. This model does not represent a new theoretical direction for the study of sense of self and memory; to the contrary, it is deeply grounded in the theoretical work of the past few decades. Its novelty is that it translates this theoretical groundwork into a form that is readily accessible for researchers. We review evidence for our model and suggest ways that it may provide a roadmap for future research efforts.
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“The content of self-generated thoughts suggests that they serve an adaptive purpose by allowing individuals to prepare for upcoming events,33 form a sense of self-identity and continuity across time,30,34 and navigate the social world.35–37”
From The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance (2014) · cites this paper as [34]
Citations
Cites
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The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease
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“Buckner et al. (2008) suggested that episodic memories may provide the building blocks that are flexibly used by the default network to perform these various “self-projection” functions, allowing the self to exist beyond the present moment.”
BackgroundRyle, G. (2006) · Theories of Mind · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,809
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 2×
“Although there is some agreement that explicit self-recognition demonstrates self-awareness (Craig, 2009; Gallup, 1982; Keenan et al., 2005, 2004), failure of self-recognition does not, alone, demonstrate a lack of self-awareness.”
BackgroundEpisodic memory: from mind to brain
Tulving, E. (2002) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114 · Cited by 4,950 · cited 6×
“A major hypothesis arising from the work of Tulving and colleagues is that episodic memory relies on a self-aware conscious state called “autonoetic consciousness” (Stuss, Rosenbaum, Malcolm, Christiana, & Keenan, 2005; Tulving, 2002, 2005; Vandekerckhove, 2009; Wheeler, 2004; Wheeler et al., 1997).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist
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“Within Conway’s self-memory theory (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the life story is understood as the highest level of organization for autobiographical memory; but it can also be seen as providing integration, at the highest and most complex cognitive level, of both…”
BackgroundInfluentialPublic and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0076760 · Cited by 3,703
The Dynamic Self-Concept: A Social Psychological Perspective
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“2010; Zahavi, 2005) and our mental representation of self, comprising all the things that we perceive and know about ourselves (content of self; D’Argembeau, et al., 2008; Kihlstrom et al., 2003; L’Ecuyer, 1992; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman, 2004).”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Cited by
Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., Smallwood, J., & Spreng, R. N. (2014) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.12360 · Cited by 2,102
Episodic memory and beyond: the hippocampus and neocortex in transformation
Moscovitch, M., Cabeza, R., Winocur, G., & Nadel, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143733 · Cited by 1,062
“As noted, the VPC is also linked with the PFC (Prebble et al. 2013), another region that is associated with ToM (Mitchell 2009) and whose damage, or disconnection, can lead to reduced recollection and deactivation of the VPC (Levine et al.”
Barrett, L. F., & Satpute, A. B. (2013) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2012.12.012 · Cited by 642
Lane, R. D., Ryan, L., Nadel, L., & Greenberg, L. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14000041 · Cited by 552
Smallwood, J., & Andrews-Hanna, J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00441 · Cited by 433
“More broadly, mental www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 441 | 3 time travel about the past and future provides us with a sense of self-identity and continuity across time (Tulving, 1985; Prebble et al., 2013).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Prebble, S. C., Addis, D. R., & Tippett, L. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Auckland (NZ)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2013-07
- Volume
- 139
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 815-840
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W1969890464
- Cited by
- 466
- References
- 236
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 36 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 12
- FWCI
- 45.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- ResearchSpace (University of Auckland) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- University of Auckland
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Literature and Literary Theory › Autobiographical and Biographical Writing
- Keywords
- autobiographical memory, selfhood, subjective self, episodic memory, semantic memory, self-representation, temporal continuity, self-concept
- MeSH terms
- Age Factors, Consciousness, Humans, Memory Disorders, Models, Psychological, Research Design, Self Concept, Time Perception, Functional Neuroimaging, Memory, Episodic
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.