Cited by 4,089Identity, Memory, and TherapyMemory Processes and InfluencesCognitive Functions and Memory

The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system

Conway, Martin A., Pleydell-Pearce, Christopher W.·2000·Psychological Review

Abstract

The authors describe a model of autobiographical memory in which memories are transitory mental constructions within a self-memory system (SMS). The SMS contains an autobiographical knowledge base and current goals of the working self. Within the SMS, control processes modulate access to the knowledge base by successively shaping cues used to activate autobiographical memory knowledge structures and, in this way, form specific memories. The relation of the knowledge base to active goals is reciprocal, and the knowledge base "grounds" the goals of the working self. It is shown how this model can be used to draw together a wide range of diverse data from cognitive, social, developmental, personality, clinical, and neuropsychological autobiographical memory research.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/0033-295x.107.2.261

Cites

235 of 235 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The authors hypothesized that brain areas selectively active during episodic memory recall would mediate self-schema and mental time travel.

    “We further hypothesized that brain areas selectively active during episodic memory recall would mediate specific aspects of remembering one's own past experiences including those related to self-schema (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Gallagher, 2000) and mental time travel (Tulving, 2002).”

    From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000

  • The paper says episodic memory can be divided into component processes such as subjective time, self-processing, imagery, semantic retrieval, multimodal detail, and familiarity.

    “Thus episodic memory recall can be conceptually divided into a number of component processes including a sense of subjective time (Tulving, 2002), self-processing (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), visual imagery (Rubin et al., 2003), narrative structure (Rubin et al., 2003), retrieval of semantic information (Wheeler et al., 1997) and multi-modal details (Wheeler et al., 2000; Gottfried et al., 2004), and feelings of familiarity (Wagner et al., 2005).”

    From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000

  • The introduction states that episodic recollection is usually treated as a reconstructive process rather than a perfect replay.

    “Recollection of this type of memory is widely accepted to be a reconstructive process”

    From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000

  • Real memories are reconstructed along very similar lines to the way imagined events are constructed.

    “Given this, it would seem reasonable to propose that real memories are reconstructed along very similar lines to the way imagined events are constructed, dovetailing with the idea that memory is (re)constructive in nature (Bartlett, 1932; Schacter et al., 1998; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin et al., 2003; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007).”

    From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000

  • Using rich imaginary memories as a well-matched comparison task allowed isolation of processes specific to episodic memory, such as use of self-schema, sense of familiarity, and mental time travel.

    “Moreover, by utilising rich imaginary memories as a well-matched comparison task we were able to isolate processes specific to episodic memory, such as the use of self-schema (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Gallagher, 2000), a sense of familiarity and mental time travel (Tulving, 2002).”

    From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000

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Authors
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W.
Affiliations
At Bristol (GB)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2000
Volume
107
Issue
2
Pages
261-288
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2143068456
Cited by
4,089
References
240
Citations by year
2026: 195 · 2025: 180 · 2024: 219 · 2023: 173 · 2022: 192 · 2021: 228 · 2020: 203 · 2019: 199 · 2018: 222 · 2017: 208 · 2016: 193 · 2015: 220 · 2014: 182 · 2013: 199 · 2012: 197
FWCI
86.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Functions and Memory
Keywords
autobiographical memory, memory construction, knowledge base, memory retrieval
MeSH terms
Age Factors, Brain, Cues, Emotions, Humans, Functional Laterality, Memory, Self Concept, Stress Disorders, Post-Traumatic

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