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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose based reasoning as a cognitive default

Kelemen, Deborah, Rottman, Joshua, Seston, Rebecca·2013·Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Abstract

Teleological explanations account for objects and events by reference to a functional consequence or purpose. Although they are popular in religion, they are unpopular in science: Physical scientists in particular explicitly reject them when explaining natural phenomena. However, prior research provides reasons to suspect that this explanatory form may represent a default explanatory preference. As a strong test of this hypothesis, we explored whether physical scientists endorse teleological explanations of natural phenomena when their information-processing resources are limited. In Study 1, physical scientists from top-ranked American universities judged explanations as true or false, either at speed or without time restriction. Like undergraduates and age-matched community participants, scientists demonstrated increased acceptance of unwarranted teleological explanations under speed despite maintaining high accuracy on control items. Scientists' overall endorsement of inaccurate teleological explanation was lower than comparison groups, however. In Study 2, we explored this further and found that the teleological tendencies of professional scientists did not differ from those of humanities scholars. Thus, although extended education appears to produce an overall reduction in inaccurate teleological explanation, specialization as a scientist does not, in itself, additionally ameliorate scientifically inaccurate purpose-based theories about the natural world. A religion-consistent default cognitive bias toward teleological explanation tenaciously persists and may have subtle but profound consequences for scientific progress.

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Allen, C., Bekoff, M., & Lauder, G. V. (1998). Nature's purposes: Analysis of function and design in biology . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  2. Aristotle (1930). Physica . W. D. Ross (Ed.) Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. (Original work published c. 350 BC)
  3. Dunbar, K., Fugelsang, J., & Stein, C. (2007). Do naïve theories ever go away? Using brain and behavior to understand changes in concepts. In M. Lovett & P. Shah (Eds.), Thinking with data (pp. 193-206). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
  4. Keil, F. C. (1992). The origins of an autonomous biology. In M. Gunnar & M. Maratsos (Eds.), Modularity and constraints in language and cognition: The Minnesota symposia (pp. 103-137). Hilldale, NJ: Erlbaum.
  5. Libarkin, J. C., & Anderson, S. W. (2006). The Geoscience Concept Inventory: Application of Rasch analysis to concept inventory development in higher education. In X. Liu & W. J. Boone (Eds.), Applications of Rasch measurement in science education (pp. 45-73). Fort Dodge, IA: JAM Publishers.

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Metadata

Authors
Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R.
Affiliations
Boston University (US)
Corresponding author
Kelemen, Deborah
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Published
2013
Volume
142
Issue
4
Pages
1074-1083
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W2322579942
Cited by
429
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 81 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 34 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 9
FWCI
116.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • John Templeton Foundation
  • National Science Foundation (DRL-1007984, DGE-0741448)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Evolution and Science Education
  • Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
teleological reasoning, physical scientists, cognitive biases, scientific explanation, humanities scholars, scientific specialization
MeSH terms
Adult, Cognition, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose based reasoning as a cognitive default. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/a0030399
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Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R. (2013). Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose based reasoning as a cognitive default. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030399

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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