The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
When is a crowd wise?
Open accessAbstract
Numerous studies and anecdotes demonstrate the "wisdom of the crowd," the surprising accuracy of a group's aggregated judgments. Less is known, however, about the generality of crowd wisdom. For example, are crowds wise even if their members have systematic judgmental biases, or can influence each other before members render their judgments? If so, are there situations in which we can expect a crowd to be less accurate than skilled individuals? We provide a precise but general definition of crowd wisdom: A crowd is wise if a linear aggregate, for example a mean, of its members' judgments is closer to the target value than a randomly, but not necessarily uniformly, sampled member of the crowd. Building on this definition, we develop a theoretical framework for examining, a priori, when and to what degree a crowd will be wise. We systematically investigate the boundary conditions for crowd wisdom within this framework and determine conditions under which the accuracy advantage for crowds is maximized. Our results demonstrate that crowd wisdom is highly robust: Even if judgments are biased and correlated, one would need to nearly deterministically select only a highly skilled judge before an individual's judgment could be expected to be more accurate than a simple averaging of the crowd. Our results also provide an accuracy rationale behind the need for diversity of judgments among group members. Contrary to folk explanations of crowd wisdom which hold that judgments should ideally be independent so that errors cancel out, we find that crowd wisdom is maximized when judgments systematically differ as much as possible. We re-analyze data from two published studies that confirm our theoretical results.
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Cites
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers
Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2004) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0403723101 · Cited by 2,103
How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect
Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F., & Helbing, D. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1008636108 · Cited by 1,017
Why are Gambling Markets Organised so Differently from Financial Markets?
Levitt, S. D. (2004) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00207.x · Cited by 377
Cited by
Using the Delphi expert consensus method in mental health research
Jorm, A. F. (2015) · Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1177/0004867415600891 · Cited by 765
Identifying Expertise to Extract the Wisdom of Crowds
Budescu, D. V., & Chen, E. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.1909 · Cited by 360
Self-citationMannes, A. E., Soll, J. B., & Larrick, R. P. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0036677 · Cited by 255
Expert appraisal of criteria for assessing gaming disorder: an international Delphi study
Castro‐Calvo, J., King, D. L., Stein, D. J., Brand, M., Carmi, L., Chamberlain, S. R., Demetrovics, Z., Fineberg, N. A., Rumpf, H., Yücel, M., et al. (2021) · Addiction · doi:10.1111/add.15411 · Cited by 236
Using the Delphi Method to Establish Expert Consensus: A Practical Guide
Jorm, A. (2025) · Advancing Methods for Interdisciplinarity in the Social Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-8357-4 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Davis-Stober, C. P., Budescu, D. V., Dana, J., & Broomell, S. B.
- Venue
- Decision
- Published
- 2014-04
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 79-101
- ISSN
- 2325-9965 (ISSN-L)
- 2325-9973
- OpenAlex
- W1965828932
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 11.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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