Cited by 377Sports Analytics and PerformanceFinancial Markets and Investment StrategiesDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Why are Gambling Markets Organised so Differently from Financial Markets?

Levitt, Steven D.·2004·The Economic Journal

Abstract

The market for sports gambling is structured very differently from the typical financial market. In sports betting, bookmakers announce a price, after which adjustments are small and infrequent. Bookmakers do not play the traditional role of market makers matching buyers and sellers but, rather, take large positions with respect to the outcome of game. Using a unique data set, I demonstrate that this peculiar price‐setting mechanism allows bookmakers to achieve substantially higher profits. Bookmakers are more skilled at predicting the outcomes of games than bettors and systematically exploit bettor biases by choosing prices that deviate from the market clearing price.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00207.x

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5 of 5 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The seminal findings of Kuypers [13] and Levitt [23] imply that sportsbooks may sometimes deliberately propose values that deviate from their estimated median to entice a preponderance of bets on the side that maximizes excess error.

    “The seminal findings of Kuypers [13] and Levitt [23], however, imply that sportsbooks may sometimes deliberately propose values that deviate from their estimated median to entice a preponderance of bets on the side that maximizes excess error.”
  • The stratifications showing the trend of point spread overestimating median margin of victory were home favorites, agreeing with the idea that sportsbooks are exploiting the public's bias for wagering on the favorite.

    “Indeed, the stratifications showing this trend were home favorites, agreeing with the idea that the sportsbooks are exploiting the public’s bias for wagering on the favorite [23].”
  • The bias away from even-money bets is consistent with Levitt's hypothesis that odds makers shade the odds, shifting even games to slight favorite/underdog games.

    “This bias away from even-money bets is consistent with Levitt's hypothesis that odds makers shade the odds, shifting even games to slight favorite/underdog games.”

    From Weak Form Efficiency in Sports Betting Markets (2023) · cites this paper as Levitt 2004

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Authors
Levitt, S. D.
Affiliations
American Bar Foundation (US)
Corresponding author
Levitt, Steven D.
Venue
The Economic Journal
Published
2004-04-01
Volume
114
Issue
495
Pages
223-246
ISSN
  • 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0297
OpenAlex
W3121231812
Cited by
377
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 27
FWCI
23.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Economic Journal (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Sports Analytics and Performance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
sports betting, bookmakers, price setting mechanisms, market making, outcome prediction, market clearing price, gambling market

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