Belief in the law of small numbers.
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Abstract
People have erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance. In particular, they regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics. The prevalence of the belief and its unfortunate consequences for psychological research are illustrated by the responses of professional psychologists to a questionnaire concerning research decisions. Apparently, most psychologists have an ex-aggerated belief in the likelihood of successfully replicating an obtained finding. The sources of such beliefs, and their consequences for the conduct of scientific inquiry, are what this paper is about. Our thesis is that people have strong intuitions about random sampling; that these intuitions are wrong in fundamental respects; that these intuitions are
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“implemented an analysis optimization phase (one-third of the sample) followed by a final testing phase (two-thirds of the sample) on independent data for result validation33”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [33]
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Improving the Meta-Analytic Assessment of Effect Size Variance With an Informed Bayesian Prior
Steel, P., Kammeyer‐Mueller, J. D., & Paterson, T. A. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206314551964 · Cited by 34
“Given that this underestimation bias largely disappears for larger metaanalyses, with all techniques becoming functionally equivalent at 50 studies, premature statements of homogeneity appear to be an instance of “belief in the law of small numbers” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).”
BackgroundA Comparison of Fire Weather Indices with MODIS Fire Days for the Natural Regions of Alaska
Ziel, R. H., Bieniek, P. A., Bhatt, U. S., Strader, H., Rupp, T. S., & York, A. (2020) · Forests · doi:10.3390/f11050516 · Cited by 34
“The apparently lower likelihood for the BUI range above 160 is perplexing, though it is explained by the small sample bias [33] that results from very few days having BUI values at the highest range.”
BackgroundCaddick, Z. A., & Feist, G. J. (2021) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2021.1994009 · Cited by 34
“…beliefs and evidence and reasoning rationally, they are nevertheless not immune to biased or non-optimal reasoning (Druckman & McGrath, 2019; Evans, 2002; Feist, 2006; Gorman, 1992; Koslowski, 1996; Mercier & Heintz, 2014; Thagard, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Tweney, 1998; West et al., 2012).”
MODELLING COGNITIVELY BOUNDED RATIONALITY: AN EVALUATIVE TAXONOMY
Mallard, G. (2011) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2010.00673.x · Cited by 34
Boysen, G. A. (2015) · Teaching of Psychology · doi:10.1177/0098628315569922 · Cited by 33
Small sample failure of random assignment: A further examination.
Strube, M. (1991) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-006x.59.2.346 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 1971-08
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 105-110
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W1976624377
- Cited by
- 3,246
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 115 · 2024: 131 · 2023: 91 · 2022: 116 · 2021: 164 · 2020: 118 · 2019: 145 · 2018: 132 · 2017: 108 · 2016: 105 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 124 · 2013: 103 · 2012: 92
- FWCI
- 10.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- law of small numbers, representativeness heuristic, random sampling, cognitive biases
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.