Belief in the law of small numbers.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
People have erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance. In particular, they regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics. The prevalence of the belief and its unfortunate consequences for psychological research are illustrated by the responses of professional psychologists to a questionnaire concerning research decisions. Apparently, most psychologists have an ex-aggerated belief in the likelihood of successfully replicating an obtained finding. The sources of such beliefs, and their consequences for the conduct of scientific inquiry, are what this paper is about. Our thesis is that people have strong intuitions about random sampling; that these intuitions are wrong in fundamental respects; that these intuitions are
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“implemented an analysis optimization phase (one-third of the sample) followed by a final testing phase (two-thirds of the sample) on independent data for result validation33”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [33]
Citations
Cites
The statistical power of abnormal-social psychological research: A review.
Cohen, J. (1962) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0045186 · Cited by 1,824 · cited 2×
“In an ingenious study of research practice, Cohen (1962) reviewed all the statistical analyses published in one volume of the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, and computed the likelihood of detecting each of the three sizes of effect.”
BackgroundMethodConservatism in human information processing
Edwards, W. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.026 · Cited by 1,004
(1964) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2013-0-12392-6 · Cited by 735
Melton, A. W. (1964) · Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) · Cited by 501
Response preferences: A review of some relevant literature.
Tune, G. S. (1964) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0048618 · Cited by 160
Classical statistical hypotheses testing within the context of Bayesian theory.
Overall, J. E. (1969) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0026860 · Cited by 27
Cited by
Items 701–800 of 1,006
Examining the Effect of Information Order on Expert Judgment
Adelman, L., Tolcott, M. A., & Bresnick, T. A. (1993) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1993.1059 · Cited by 49
A power‐analytic examination of contemporary communication research
Chase, L. J., & Tucker, R. K. (1975) · Speech Monographs · doi:10.1080/03637757509375874 · Cited by 49
An Analysis of the Use of Statistical Testing in Communication Research
Katzer, J., & Sodt, J. (1973) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1973.tb00947.x · Cited by 50
Developing a Creative-Cognitive Model of Entrepreneurial Alertness to Business Opportunities
Puhakka, V. J. (2011) · Journal of Management and Strategy · doi:10.5430/jms.v2n4p85 · Cited by 63
“The result is that cognitive information processing is biased because individuals use these as mental short-cuts (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).”
BackgroundAssessing usefulness of 4D BIM tools in risk mitigation strategies
Sloot, R. N. F., Heutink, A., & Voordijk, H. (2019) · Automation in Construction · doi:10.1016/j.autcon.2019.102881 · Cited by 48
Dynamic Probabilistic Selling When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations
Huang, T., & Yin, Z. (2020) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0894 · Cited by 49
Forecast Rationality in Small Firms
Cassar, G., & Gibson, B. (2007) · Journal of Small Business Management · doi:10.1111/j.1540-627x.2007.00213.x · Cited by 52
The public, the media and agricultural biotechnology
Brossard, D., Shanahan, J., & Nesbitt, T. (2007) · CABI eBooks · doi:10.1079/9781845932046.0000 · Cited by 51
Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
Gilovich, T., & Savitsky, K. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.036 · Cited by 46
Koslowski, B., Okagaki, L., Lorenz, C., & Umbach, D. M. (1989) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1130923 · Cited by 48
A WITHIN SETTING EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE SITUATIONAL SPECIFICITY HYPOTHESIS IN PERSONNEL SELECTION
SCHMIDT, F. L., & HUNTER, J. E. (1984) · Personnel Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1984.tb01453.x · Cited by 48
Newton's Third Rule of Philosophizing: A Role for Logic in Historiography
Finocchiaro, M. A. (1974) · Isis · doi:10.1086/351218 · Cited by 48
Lack of mirror use by pigs to locate food
Gieling, E. T., Mijdam, E., van der Staay, F. J., & Nordquist, R. E. (2014) · Applied Animal Behaviour Science · doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2014.02.016 · Cited by 48
“It has been shown that small sample sizes increase the chance of false positive findings (already discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1971)).”
BackgroundHedge Fund Flows and Performance Streaks: How Investors Weigh Information
Baquero, G., & Verbeek, M. (2021) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4067 · Cited by 50
The gambler's fallacy and gender
Suetens, S., & Tyran, J. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.017 · Cited by 47
“The gambler’s fallacy is the false belief in a negative correlation between independent trials of a random process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971).”
Students' Appreciation of Expectation and Variation as a Foundation for Statistical Understanding
WATSON, J. M., Callingham, R. A., & Kelly, B. A. (2007) · Mathematical Thinking and Learning · doi:10.1080/10986060709336812 · Cited by 47
Daniel Kahneman et l'analyse de la décision face au risque
Gollier, C., Hilton, D., & Raufaste, É. (2003) · Revue d économie politique · doi:10.3917/redp.133.0295 · Cited by 58
Statistical Significance and Replicability: Why the Former Does not Presage the Latter
Sohn, D. (1998) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354398083001 · Cited by 46
Perspectives on Diagnostic Failure and Patient Safety
Croskerry, P. (2012) · Healthcare Quarterly · doi:10.12927/hcq.2012.22841 · Cited by 58
Cognitive schema and naturalistic decision making in evidence-based practices
Falzer, P. R. (2004) · Journal of Biomedical Informatics · doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.02.002 · Cited by 54
Wright, W. F. (1980) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.1980.tb01139.x · Cited by 58
Behavioral Economics, History of
Nagatsu, M. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.03053-1 · Cited by 59
Stock Market Investors: Who Is More Rational, and Who Relies on Intuition?
Hon-Snir, S., Kudryavtsev, A., & Cohen, G. (2012) · International Journal of Economics and Finance · doi:10.5539/ijef.v4n5p56 · Cited by 46
“The availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)) refers to the phenomenon of determining the likelihood of an event according to the easiness of recalling similar instances.”
BackgroundThe Lingering Effects of Our Past Experiences: The Sunk‐Cost Fallacy and the Inaction‐Inertia Effect
Tykocinski, O. E., & Ortmann, A. (2011) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00369.x · Cited by 48
Algorithm Aversion as an Obstacle in the Establishment of Robo Advisors
Filiz, I., Judek, J. R., Lorenz, M., & Spiwoks, M. (2022) · Journal of risk and financial management · doi:10.3390/jrfm15080353 · Cited by 53
Creativity enhancement methods for adults: A meta-analysis.
Haase, J., Hanel, P. H. P., & Gronau, N. (2025) · Psychology of Aesthetics Creativity and the Arts · doi:10.1037/aca0000557 · Cited by 60
Strategic Capacity Management When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations
Huang, T., & Liu, Q. (2015) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.12420 · Cited by 46
Sherman, S. J., Cialdini, R. B., Schwartzman, D. F., & Reynolds, K. D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.006 · Cited by 58
About the reflective thought also known as the critical thinking
Consultores, L. &. B., & León, F. R. (2014) · Propósitos y Representaciones · doi:10.20511/pyr2014.v2n1.56 · Cited by 50
Los sesgos cognitivos en la toma de decisiones
de Kohan, N. C. (2008) · International journal of psychological research · doi:10.21500/20112084.968 · Cited by 91
STATISTICAL COGNITION: TOWARDS EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE IN STATISTICS AND STATISTICS EDUCATION
Marom, T., Fidler, F. M., & Cumming, G. (2008) · Statistics Education Research Journal · doi:10.52041/serj.v7i2.468 · Cited by 50
“Statistical cognition therefore integrates the three lines of research we believe are needed for effective EBP.”
BackgroundPsychological factors on irrational financial decision making: Case of day‐of‐the week anomaly
Brahmana, R. K., Hooy, C., & Ahmad, Z. (2012) · International Journal of Ethics and Systems · doi:10.1108/08288661211277317 · Cited by 63
A Look at the Literature (And Other Resources) on Teaching Statistics
Becker, B. J. (1996) · Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics · doi:10.2307/1165256 · Cited by 46
Clinical judgements: Research and practice
Bell, I., & Mellor, D. J. (2009) · Australian Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00050060802550023 · Cited by 52
Daniel Kahneman: on redefining rationality
Maital, S. (2004) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2003.12.006 · Cited by 52
Messier, W. F., Kachelmeier, S. J., & Jensen, K. L. (2001) · Auditing A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/aud.2001.20.1.81 · Cited by 46
Self-Confidence and SearchPreprint
Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.956394 · Cited by 46
Things you Wanted to Know about Bias in Evaluations but Never Dared to Think
Camfield, L., Duvendack, M., & Palmer‐Jones, R. (2014) · IDS Bulletin · doi:10.1111/1759-5436.12112 · Cited by 49
“One common bias is a tendency to see a pattern where there isn’t, an example of which is the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1971), which causes people to over-interpret noticeable effects.”
BackgroundApt Imaginings: Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind
Gilmore, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190096342.001.0001 · Cited by 53
To trust or not to trust? Interpretations in qualitative research
Neusar, A. (2014) · Human Affairs · doi:10.2478/s13374-014-0218-9 · Cited by 49
Do Children and Adults Take Social Relationship Into Account When Evaluating People’s Actions?
Marshall, J., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2020) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.13390 · Cited by 45
“Importantly, we also replicated this effect in Study 2—which is one of the major ways to increase the reliability and validity of an effect (e.g., Francis, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).”
BackgroundPractical challenges and methodological flexibility in prior elicitation.
Stefan, A. M., Evans, N. J., & Wagenmakers, E. (2020) · Psychological Methods · doi:10.1037/met0000354 · Cited by 55
Criscuolo, P., Dahlander, L., Grohsjean, T., & Salter, A. J. (2021) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2020.1413 · Cited by 50
“…of people to overestimate the likelihood that a short sequence will be representative of the general population of sequences or to underestimate the likelihood that the order in which things will happen is random (Laplace 1814, Tversky and Kahneman 1971, Rabin 2002, Rabin and Vayanos 2010).”
BackgroundGraeber, T. W. (2020) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvac052 · Cited by 56
Broadening behavioral decision research: Multiple levels of cognitive processing
Medin, D. L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1999) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03212961 · Cited by 49
“Tversky and Kahneman (1971) showed that people expect future observations to be like past ones - even when they have little data on which to make such predictions.”
BackgroundAn Observational Study of Bail Decision-Making
Allan, A., Allan, M. M., Giles, M. J., Drake, D. G., & Froyland, I. D. (2005) · Psychiatry Psychology and Law · doi:10.1375/pplt.12.2.319 · Cited by 45
“Under such conditions people tend to use mental short cuts (Davis & Davis, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 1974) and focus on a minimum of information, usually one or two factors (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999).”
BackgroundThe persistence of cognitive illusions
Diaconis, P. W., & Freedman, D. (1981) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00009122 · Cited by 47
Remarks on Support Theory: Recent Advances and Future Directions
Brenner, L. A., Koehler, D. J., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.029 · Cited by 48
Determinants of consensus estimates: Attribution, salience, and representativeness.
Zuckerman, M., Mann, R. W., & Bernieri, F. J. (1982) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.42.5.839 · Cited by 47
Behavioral Finance: An IntroductionPreprint
Baltussen, G. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1488110 · Cited by 59
Dumont, F., & Lecomte, C. (1987) · Professional Psychology Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/0735-7028.18.5.433 · Cited by 57
Kareev, Y. (2005) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.112.1.280 · Cited by 44
Heuristics and Public Policy: Decision Making Under Bounded Rationality
Dhami, S., al‐Nowaihi, A., & Sunstein, C. R. (2018) · Studies in Microeconomics · doi:10.1177/2321022219832148 · Cited by 54
Holding on to the Losers: Finnish Evidence
Lehenkari, M., & Perttunen, J. (2004) · Journal of Behavioral Finance · doi:10.1207/s15427579jpfm0502_5 · Cited by 63
“situations (prospect theory under certainty, Tversky and Kahneman [1991]), and to prospects with more than two out-”
BackgroundShort selling around the 52-week and historical highs
Lee, E.-J., & Piqueira, N. S. (2016) · Journal of Financial Markets · doi:10.1016/j.finmar.2016.03.001 · Cited by 45
“6 This is somewhat in line with Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Tversky and Kahneman (1971), who argue that investors expect trends to continue or to be reversed on a case-by-case basis.”
Politzer, G., & Macchi, L. (2000) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/bf02512230 · Cited by 50
“In an experiment conducted by Tversky & Kahneman (1971) , the subjects were asked whether the number of days on which the percentage of male babies born was more than 60% was greater in a small (15 births a day) or a larger hospital (45 births a day).”
MethodKoballa, T. R. (1986) · Journal of Research in Science Teaching · doi:10.1002/tea.3660230506 · Cited by 44
Burgman, M. A. (2000) · Emu - Austral Ornithology · doi:10.1071/mu0002s · Cited by 44
On the Evolution of Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception
Krebs, D. L., Denton, K. L., & Higgins, N. C. (1988) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3760-0_4 · Cited by 46
A Note on Accepting the Null Hypothesis
Corcos, D. M., Agarwal, G. C., & Gottlieb, G. L. (1985) · Journal of Motor Behavior · doi:10.1080/00222895.1985.10735362 · Cited by 44
Violations of dominance in decision-making
Kourouxous, T., & Bauer, T. (2019) · BuR - Business Research · doi:10.1007/s40685-019-0093-7 · Cited by 49
Organizational learning: Understanding cognitive barriers and what organizations can do about them
Balarezo, J., Foss, N. J., & Nielsen, B. B. (2023) · Management Learning · doi:10.1177/13505076231210635 · Cited by 49
“In this process, individuals often collect only small, biased samples because of time and/or attention constraints (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971).”
Perception and identification of random events.
Zhao, J., Hahn, U., & Osherson, D. N. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance · doi:10.1037/a0036816 · Cited by 49
“First, people may hold a mistaken belief that random sources provide an equilibrium process, whereby equiprobable outcomes must balance out and hence runs must self-correct, thus giving rise to the gambler's fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Gilovich et al., 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).”
BackgroundBayesian-Assisted Inference from Visualized Data
Kim, Y., Kayongo, P., Grunde-McLaughlin, M., & Hullman, J. R. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics · doi:10.1109/tvcg.2020.3028984 · Cited by 52
“ian:1.68, IQR:0.04, KLD: 49.7), similar to Kim et al.’s [43] observations for a small sample (n=158) and much larger (n=750k) sample. Conceptual models of bias like belief in the law of small numbers [63] attempt to explain diverse experimental evidence on belief updating. Our results and those of Kim et al. [43] are…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialDiagnostic bias in organizational consultation
Armenakis, A. A. (1990) · Omega · doi:10.1016/0305-0483(90)90048-e · Cited by 43
On “knowing your partner”: Dangerous illusions in the age of AIDS?
Swann, W. B., Silvera, D. H., & PROSKE, C. U. (1995) · Personal Relationships · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6811.1995.tb00084.x · Cited by 44
“Although people generally have trouble forming objectively accurate images of one another (for reviews, see Hogarth, 1975; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Swann, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1974 ), lie detection seems to be an area of particular weakness.”
BackgroundPsychology-based Models of Asset Prices and Trading VolumePreprint
Barberis, N. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3177616 · Cited by 95
“Tversky and Kahneman (1971) propose that people have an incorrect belief in a law of small numbers: they think, incorrectly, that even a small sample of data will reflect the properties of the model that generated it.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe career decision-making competence: a new construct for the career realm
Ceschi, A., Costantini, A., Phillips, S. D., & Sartori, R. (2016) · European journal of training and development · doi:10.1108/ejtd-07-2016-0047 · Cited by 52
A Review of Consumer Judgment and Choice
Johnson, M. D., & Puto, C. P. (1987) · Cornell Peter and Stephanie Nolan School of Hotel Administration (Cornell University) · Cited by 62
Jackson, B. R. (2008) · Clinics in Laboratory Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.cll.2007.12.009 · Cited by 44
Bleed or Blowup? Why Do We Prefer Asymmetric Payoffs?
Taleb, N. N. (2004) · Journal of Behavioral Finance · doi:10.1207/s15427579jpfm0501_1 · Cited by 42
“Tversky and Kahneman (1971) wrote “We submit that people view a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to a population in all essential characteristics.””
BackgroundCohen, P. R. (1982) · Evaluation and Program Planning · doi:10.1016/0149-7189(82)90076-3 · Cited by 49
Wycena papierów wartościowych na rynku kapitałowym w świetle finansów behawioralnych
Szyszka, A. (2007) · Cited by 53
Crawford, J. R., Garthwaite, P. H., Denham, A. K., & Chelune, G. J. (2012) · Psychological Assessment · doi:10.1037/a0027699 · Cited by 45
“It is well known that our subjective estimates of such probabilities are not very accurate and are prone to systematic biases (Beach & Braun, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971); for example, we typically underestimate the magnitude of differences expected by chance and we may overweight some variables…”
BackgroundStatistical Inference in Games
Salant, Y., & Cherry, J. (2020) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta17105 · Cited by 51
“Vul and Pashler (2008) provided partial support for this independence assumption.”
Behavioral economics in information systems research: Critical analysis and research strategies
Arnott, D. R., & Gao, S. (2021) · Journal of Information Technology · doi:10.1177/02683962211016000 · Cited by 48
Number preferences in lotteries
Wang, T. V., van Loon, R. J. D. P., van den Assem, M. J., & van Dolder, D. (2016) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500003089 · Cited by 49
Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy
Kanwisher, N. (1989) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002789033004004 · Cited by 46
Psychological Essentialism: Diversity and the Religious Experience
Young, S. (2015) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-8772-1.ch004 · Cited by 41
Expectation versus variation: Students’ decision making in a chance environment
WATSON, J. M., & Kelly, B. A. (2004) · Canadian Journal of Science Mathematics and Technology Education · doi:10.1080/14926150409556620 · Cited by 41
Is There Too Little Theory in Development Economics Today
Mookherjee, D. (2005) · Cited by 41
Representativeness in Foreign Policy Judgments
Jervis, R. L. (1986) · Political Psychology · doi:10.2307/3791253 · Cited by 48
Biased Beliefs About Random Samples: Evidence from Two Integrated Experiments
Benjamin, D. J., Moore, D., & Rabin, M. (2017) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w23927 · Cited by 41
Modeling, Replicating, and Predicting Human Behavior: A Survey
Fuchs, A., Passarella, A., & Conti, M. (2023) · ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems · doi:10.1145/3580492 · Cited by 50
“A simple example is the Gambler’s Fallacy, which demonstrates how humans tend to believe that a sequence of lips from a fair coin should be self-correcting [69, 147].”
BackgroundDeveloping Reasoning about Samples
WATSON, J. M. (2004) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/1-4020-2278-6_12 · Cited by 40
“These studies were based on the three survey items in Figure 1 and the interview protocol in Figure 2. The analysis of Watson et al. (1995) also included a fourth part of the interview protocol with a sampling task comparing expected average values from samples with given population averages ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1971…”
MethodThe statistical crisis in science: how is it relevant to clinical neuropsychology?
Gelman, A., & Geurts, H. M. (2017) · The Clinical Neuropsychologist · doi:10.1080/13854046.2016.1277557 · Cited by 45
“The quote from Kahneman is, in retrospect, ironic given his celebrated work such as reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1971), finding that research psychologists were consistently over-stating the statistical evidence from small samples.”
ResultEffects of Data Noise on Statistical Judgement
Harvey, N. (1997) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/135467897394383 · Cited by 40
O papel das heurísticas no julgamento e na tomada de decisão sob incerteza
Tonetto, L. M., Kalil, L., Melo, W. V., Schneider, D. D. G., & Stein, L. M. (2006) · Estudos de Psicologia (Campinas) · doi:10.1590/s0103-166x2006000200008 · Cited by 41
Past and Future American Psychological Association Guidelines for Statistical Practice
Finch, S., Thomason, N., & Cumming, G. (2002) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354302126005 · Cited by 40
A deficit in perceptual matching in the left hemisphere of a callosotomy patient
Funnell, M. G., Corballis, P. M., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (1999) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/s0028-3932(99)00033-0 · Cited by 38
“This experiment could be considered a genuine replication despite the lack of statistical significance [ 31 ].”
Ecology, statistics, and the art of misdiagnosis: The need for a paradigm shift
Germano, J. D. (1999) · Environmental Reviews · doi:10.1139/a99-014 · Cited by 46
“• rarely attribute a deviation of results from expectations to sampling variability, because they will find a causal “explanation” for any discrepancy; they rarely recognize sampling variation in action (Tversky and Kahneman 1971, p. 109).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPatterns, Prototypes, and Predictions: An Exploratory Study
Eggleton, I. R. C. (1976) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490447 · Cited by 40
Lagattuta, K. H., & Sayfan, L. (2013) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.12082 · Cited by 40
Jessup, R. K., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2011) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.6421-10.2011 · Cited by 43
“…non-independence between sequential outcomes, consistent with the belief that the probability of obtaining a reward decreases after recent reinforcement; consequently, they increase their probability of choosing an action that was not recently rewarded (Estes, 1964; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971).”
BackgroundTraining Robust Decision Making in Immersive Environments
Patterson, R., Pierce, B. J., Bell, H. H., Andrews, D. H., & Winterbottom, M. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making · doi:10.1518/155534309x12599553478836 · Cited by 44
“In large part, the inspiration for this field comes from Kahneman and Tversky (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1981, 1983), who investigated the probabilistic thinking used by humans.”
BackgroundGuo, X., McAleer, M. J., Wong, W., & Zhu, L. (2017) · The North American Journal of Economics and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.najef.2017.08.001 · Cited by 39
“Readers may refer to Matsumura, Tsui, and Wong (1990) and the references therein cites for more information about the standard and rational Bayesian approaches.”
BackgroundRationality: Why Social Context Matters
Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.003.0009 · Cited by 40
Which heuristics can aid financial-decision-making?
Forbes, W. P., Hudson, R. S., Skerratt, L., & Soufian, M. (2015) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2015.07.002 · Cited by 51
“So after a poor run my "luck must change" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, Rabin, 2002) In a very similar way K&T often attribute base-rate neglect to the operation of the representativeness heuristic.”
BackgroundA computerized treatment of dyslexia: Benefits from treating lexico-phonological processing problems
Tijms, J., & Hoeks, J. (2004) · Dyslexia · doi:10.1002/dys.283 · Cited by 39
Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges
Rachlinski, J. J., Wistrich, A. J., & Guthrie, C. (2007) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE · doi:10.1628/093245607780181865 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 1971-08
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 105-110
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W1976624377
- Cited by
- 3,246
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 115 · 2024: 131 · 2023: 91 · 2022: 116 · 2021: 164 · 2020: 118 · 2019: 145 · 2018: 132 · 2017: 108 · 2016: 105 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 124 · 2013: 103 · 2012: 92
- FWCI
- 10.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- law of small numbers, representativeness heuristic, random sampling, cognitive biases
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.