Belief in the law of small numbers.
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Abstract
People have erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance. In particular, they regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics. The prevalence of the belief and its unfortunate consequences for psychological research are illustrated by the responses of professional psychologists to a questionnaire concerning research decisions. Apparently, most psychologists have an ex-aggerated belief in the likelihood of successfully replicating an obtained finding. The sources of such beliefs, and their consequences for the conduct of scientific inquiry, are what this paper is about. Our thesis is that people have strong intuitions about random sampling; that these intuitions are wrong in fundamental respects; that these intuitions are
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“implemented an analysis optimization phase (one-third of the sample) followed by a final testing phase (two-thirds of the sample) on independent data for result validation33”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [33]
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White, P. (1980) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.87.1.105 · Cited by 163
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 1971-08
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 105-110
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W1976624377
- Cited by
- 3,246
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 115 · 2024: 131 · 2023: 91 · 2022: 116 · 2021: 164 · 2020: 118 · 2019: 145 · 2018: 132 · 2017: 108 · 2016: 105 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 124 · 2013: 103 · 2012: 92
- FWCI
- 10.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- law of small numbers, representativeness heuristic, random sampling, cognitive biases
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.