The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overrepresentation of extreme events in decision making reflects rational use of cognitive resources.
Open accessAbstract
People's decisions and judgments are disproportionately swayed by improbable but extreme eventualities, such as terrorism, that come to mind easily. This article explores whether such availability biases can be reconciled with rational information processing by taking into account the fact that decision makers value their time and have limited cognitive resources. Our analysis suggests that to make optimal use of their finite time decision makers should overrepresent the most important potential consequences relative to less important, put potentially more probable, outcomes. To evaluate this account, we derive and test a model we call utility-weighted sampling. Utility-weighted sampling estimates the expected utility of potential actions by simulating their outcomes. Critically, outcomes with more extreme utilities have a higher probability of being simulated. We demonstrate that this model can explain not only people's availability bias in judging the frequency of extreme events but also a wide range of cognitive biases in decisions from experience, decisions from description, and memory recall. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Cites
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“Although overestimation has been previously explained by high “availability” of salient memories (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), our theory specifies what exactly the availability of events should correspond to—namely their importance distribution q̃ (Equation 13)—and why this is useful.”
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“Hence, an event’s extremity may sway people’s decisions by increasing their propensity to remember it, and this is clearly distinct from extremity’s potential effects on the subjective utility of anticipated outcomes (Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1984, 1986).”
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“The proposed learning mechanism is similar to the Pearce-Hall model of classical conditioning (Pearce & Hall, 1980) in that both update the strength of a stimulus-reward association by an amount proportional to the absolute value of a reward prediction error.”
THE AMYGDALA MODULATES THE CONSOLIDATION OF MEMORIES OF EMOTIONALLY AROUSING EXPERIENCES
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Cited by
Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1900061x · Cited by 892
Self-citationRational Inattention: A Review
Maćkowiak, B., Matějka, F., & Wiederholt, M. (2023) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20211524 · Cited by 356
Lessons for artificial intelligence from the study of natural stupidity
Rich, A. S., & Gureckis, T. M. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0038-z · Cited by 94
Satisficing: Integrating Two Traditions
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A theory of learning to infer.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., & Hsu, M.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2018-01
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-32
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2766577284
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 11.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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