The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge.
Abstract
People frequently overestimate their understanding-with a particularly large blind-spot for gaps in their causal knowledge. We introduce a metacognitive approach to reducing overestimation, termed reflecting on explanatory ability (REA), which is briefly thinking about how well one could explain something in a mechanistic, step-by-step, causally connected manner. Nine experiments demonstrated that engaging in REA just before estimating one's understanding substantially reduced overestimation. Moreover, REA reduced overestimation with nearly the same potency as generating full explanations, but did so 20 times faster (although only for high complexity objects). REA substantially reduced overestimation by inducing participants to quickly evaluate an object's inherent causal complexity (Experiments 4-7). REA reduced overestimation by also fostering step-by-step, causally connected processing (Experiments 2 and 3). Alternative explanations for REA's effects were ruled out including a general conservatism account (Experiments 4 and 5) and a covert explanation account (Experiment 8). REA's overestimation-reduction effect generalized beyond objects (Experiments 1-8) to sociopolitical policies (Experiment 9). REA efficiently detects gaps in our causal knowledge with implications for improving self-directed learning, enhancing self-insight into vocational and academic abilities, and even reducing extremist attitudes.
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“In a series of studies, people overestimated their self- reported knowledge of a policy less after writing a detailed explanation of how that policy works, thereby recognizing that their knowledge of the policy was less complete than they originally thought (overcoming the 'illusion of understanding') 63,121,122 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [122]
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Cited by
Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility
Porter, T., Elnakouri, A., Meyers, E. A., Shibayama, T., Jayawickreme, E., & Grossmann, I. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00081-9 · Cited by 248
Information without knowledge: the effects of Internet search on learning
Fisher, M., Smiley, A. H., & Grillo, T. L. H. (2021) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658211.2021.1882501 · Cited by 71
“…to each subsequent sub-topic in Phase 1, participants in both conditions received the following instructions: “ carefully re fl ect on your ability to explain to an expert, in a step-by-step, causally-connected manner, with no gaps in your story [current sub-topic] ” (Johnson et al., 2016).”
BackgroundInfluentialJohnson, D. R. (2017) · Journal of Environmental Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2017.04.008 · Cited by 44
Self-citationHow causal information affects decisions
Zheng, M., Marsh, J. K., Nickerson, J. V., & Kleinberg, S. (2020) · Cognitive Research Principles and Implications · doi:10.1186/s41235-020-0206-z · Cited by 45
Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion
Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2020) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500008135 · Cited by 23
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, D. R., Murphy, M. P., & Messer, R. M.
- Affiliations
- Washington and Lee University (US)
- ORCID
- Johnson, Dan R.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2016-05
- Volume
- 145
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 573-588
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2318991334
- Cited by
- 30
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 3.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Washington and Lee University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- metacognition, causal knowledge, causal complexity, self-assessment, explanation generation, self-directed learning, self-insight, extremist attitudes
- MeSH terms
- Prohibitins, Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Aged, 80 and over, Attitude, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Thinking, Knowledge, Comprehension, Young Adult
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- Johnson, D. R., Murphy, M. P., & Messer, R. M. (2016). Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000161
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