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Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge.

Johnson, Dan R., Murphy, Meredith P., Messer, Riley M. · 2016 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Abstract

People frequently overestimate their understanding-with a particularly large blind-spot for gaps in their causal knowledge. We introduce a metacognitive approach to reducing overestimation, termed reflecting on explanatory ability (REA), which is briefly thinking about how well one could explain something in a mechanistic, step-by-step, causally connected manner. Nine experiments demonstrated that engaging in REA just before estimating one's understanding substantially reduced overestimation. Moreover, REA reduced overestimation with nearly the same potency as generating full explanations, but did so 20 times faster (although only for high complexity objects). REA substantially reduced overestimation by inducing participants to quickly evaluate an object's inherent causal complexity (Experiments 4-7). REA reduced overestimation by also fostering step-by-step, causally connected processing (Experiments 2 and 3). Alternative explanations for REA's effects were ruled out including a general conservatism account (Experiments 4 and 5) and a covert explanation account (Experiment 8). REA's overestimation-reduction effect generalized beyond objects (Experiments 1-8) to sociopolitical policies (Experiment 9). REA efficiently detects gaps in our causal knowledge with implications for improving self-directed learning, enhancing self-insight into vocational and academic abilities, and even reducing extremist attitudes.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/xge0000161

Cites

35 of 35 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Johnson, D. R., Murphy, M. P., & Messer, R. M.
Affiliations
Washington and Lee University (US)
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Published
2016-05
Volume
145
Issue
5
Pages
573-588
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W2318991334
Cited by
30
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 3
FWCI
3.12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Washington and Lee University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
metacognition, causal knowledge, causal complexity, self-assessment, explanation generation, self-directed learning, self-insight, extremist attitudes
MeSH terms
Prohibitins, Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Aged, 80 and over, Attitude, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Thinking, Knowledge, Comprehension, Young Adult

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/xge0000161
The paper
Johnson, D. R., Murphy, M. P., & Messer, R. M. (2016). Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000161

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.