Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate-those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason. Third, individuals' behavioral responses towards signals of emotion and reason depend on their own decision mode: those who rely on emotion tend to conditionally cooperate (that is, cooperate only when they believe that their partner has cooperated), whereas those who rely on reason tend to defect regardless of their partner's signal. These findings shed light on how different decision processes, and lay theories about decision processes, facilitate and impede cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Cites
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“Furthermore, rationalist theories of moral judgment suggest that moral decisions are ultimately an outcome of intentional reflection and deliberation (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969), and many have argued that prosocial behavior requires the deliberative extension of self-control (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000).”
Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making
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Self-citationSocial Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
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Cited by
Reliance on emotion promotes belief in fake news
Martel, C., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications · doi:10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3 · Cited by 470
Self-citationThe Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity
Dias, N., & Lelkes, Y. (2022) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12628 · Cited by 338
Integrating Empathy and Interpersonal Emotion Regulation
Zaki, J. (2020) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050830 · Cited by 259
Reliance on emotion promotes belief in fake news
Martel, C., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/a2ydw · Cited by 49
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Metadata
- Authors
- Levine, E. E., Barasch, A., Rand, D., Berman, J. Z., & Small, D. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2018-05
- Volume
- 147
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 702-719
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2601797273
- Cited by
- 128
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 31.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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