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Cited by 436

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system

Gerhardt, Ilja, Liu, Qin, Lamas-Linares, Antía, Skaar, Johannes, Kurtsiefer, Christian, Makarov, Vadim·2011·Nature Communications
DOI 10.1038/ncomms1348
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Crossref · 10.1038/ncomms1348

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  • This quantum state joining process is probabilistic and requires an ancilla state, with a success probability of 1/32, or 1/8 if a suitable feed-forward is used.

    “This process is probabilistic and requires an ancilla state, with a success probability of 1/32, or 1/8 if a suitable feed-forward is used.”

    From Two-photon interference: the Hong–Ou–Mandel effect (2021) · cites this paper as [120]

  • Quantum state joining has been achieved experimentally for the polarization state of two photons, transferring the information onto a third single photon by exploiting that a single particle can occupy different spatial modes and polarizations.

    “Experimentally, quantum state joining has been achieved for the polarization state of two photons, in which the information was transferred onto a third single photon by exploiting the fact that a single particle can occupy different spatial modes and polarizations [120].”

    From Two-photon interference: the Hong–Ou–Mandel effect (2021) · cites this paper as [120]

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Research works printed but not linked: 29

  1. Bennett, C. H., Bessette, F., Brassard, G., Salvail, L. & Smolin, J. Experimental quantum cryptography. J. Cryptology 5, 3–28 (1992). · DOI
  2. Stucki, D. et al. High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250 km of ultra low loss fibres. New J. Phys. 11, 075003 (2009). · DOI
  3. Gottesman, D., Lo, H.- K., Lütkenhaus, N. & Preskill, J. Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices. Quant. Inf. Comp. 4, 325–360 (2004).
  4. Scarani, V. et al. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301–1350 (2009). · DOI
  5. Vakhitov, A., Makarov, V. & Hjelme, D. R. Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography. J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023–2038 (2001). · DOI
  6. Xu, F., Qi, B. & Lo, H.- K. Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system. New J. Phys. 12, 113026 (2010). · DOI
  7. Félix, S., Gisin, N., Stefanov, A. & Zbinden, H. Faint laser quantum key distribution: eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses. J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2009–2021 (2001). · DOI
  8. Nauerth, S., Fürst, M., Schmitt-Manderbach, T., Weier, H. & Weinfurter, H. Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography. New J. Phys. 11, 065001 (2009). · DOI
  9. Kurtsiefer, C., Zarda, P., Mayer, S. & Weinfurter, H. The breakdown flash of silicon avalanche photodiodes—backdoor for eavesdropper attacks? J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2039–2047 (2001). · DOI
  10. Makarov, V., Anisimov, A. & Skaar, J. Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems. Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006), erratum: ibid. 78, 019905 (2008). · DOI
  11. Lamas-Linares, A. & Kurtsiefer, C. Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel. Opt. Express 15, 9388–9393 (2007). · DOI
  12. Zhao, Y., Fung, C.- H. F., Qi, B., Chen, C. & Lo, H.- K. Quantum hacking: experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems. Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008). · DOI · Paper page
  13. Sauge, S., Lydersen, L., Anisimov, A., Skaar, J. & Makarov, V. Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light. Preprint at arXiv:0809.3408 [quant-ph] (2008). · arXiv
  14. Lydersen, L. et al. Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination. Nat. Photon. 4, 686–689 (2010). · DOI · Paper page
  15. Wiechers, C. et al. After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem. New J. Phys. 13, 013043 (2011). · DOI
  16. Marcikic, I., Lamas-Linares, A. & Kurtsiefer, C. Free-space quantum key distribution with entangled photons. Appl. Phys. Lett. 89, 101122 (2006). · DOI
  17. Ling, A. et al. Experimental quantum key distribution based on a Bell test. Phys. Rev. A 78, 020301 (2008). · DOI
  18. Peloso, M. P., Gerhardt, I., Ho, C., Lamas-Linares, A. & Kurtsiefer, C. Daylight operation of a free space, entanglement-based quantum key distribution system. New J. Phys. 11, 045007 (2009). · DOI
  19. Kerckhoffs, A. La cryptographie militaire. J. des Sci. Militaires IX, 5–38 (1883).
  20. Makarov, V. & Hjelme, D. R. Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems. J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691–705 (2005). · DOI
  21. Lütkenhaus, N. Estimates for practical quantum cryptography. Phys. Rev. A 59, 3301–3319 (1999). · DOI
  22. Lydersen, L., Makarov, V. & Skaar, J. Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography. Phys. Rev. A 83, 032306 (2011). · DOI
  23. Fung, C.- H. F., Tamaki, K., Qi, B., Lo, H.- K. & Ma, X. Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch. Quant. Inf. Comp. 9, 131–165 (2009).
  24. Marøy, Ø., Lydersen, L. & Skaar, J. Security of quantum key distribution with arbitrary individual imperfections. Phys. Rev. A 82, 032337 (2010). · DOI
  25. Scarani, V. & Kurtsiefer, C. The black paper of quantum cryptography: real implementation problems. Preprint at arXiv:0906.4547v1 [quant-ph] (2009). · arXiv
  26. Rarity, J. G., Gorman, P. M. & Tapster, P. R. Secure key exchange over 1.9 km free-space range using quantum cryptography. Electron. Lett. 37, 512 (2001). · DOI
  27. Hughes, R. J., Nordholt, J. E., Derkacs, D. & Peterson, C. G. Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night. New J. Phys. 4, 43 (2002). · DOI
  28. Kurtsiefer, C. et al. A step towards global key distribution. Nature 419, 450 (2002). · DOI
  29. Ursin, R. et al. Free-space distribution of entanglement and single photons over 144 km. Nat. Phys. 3, 481–486 (2007). · DOI · Paper page

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Metadata

Authors
Gerhardt, I., Liu, Q., Lamas-Linares, A., Skaar, J., Kurtsiefer, C., & Makarov, V.
Venue
Nature Communications
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2011-06-14
Volume
2
Issue
1
ISSN
2041-1723
DOI
10.1038/ncomms1348
Cited by
436
References
2
Language
en
Licence

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