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Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination

Lydersen, Lars, Wiechers, Carlos, Wittmann, Christoffer, Elser, Dominique, Skaar, Johannes, Makarov, Vadim·2010·Nature Photonics
DOI 10.1038/nphoton.2010.214
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Crossref · 10.1038/nphoton.2010.214

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  • If the maximally mixed polarization state is created by using one photon from a maximally entangled singlet state, then 2/3 of the time the other photon in the singlet state will have the orthogonal polarization of the cloned states, and 1/3 of the time the same polarization, effectively implementing an optimal universal NOT gate.

    “Suppose we created the maximally mixed polarization state by using one of the photons from a maximally entangled singlet state.Then 2/3 of the time, the other photon in the singlet state will have the orthogonal polarization of the cloned states, and 1/3 of the time the same polarization.This effectively implements an optimal universal NOT gate [118,119]-itself a non-unitary operation.”

    From Two-photon interference: the Hong–Ou–Mandel effect (2021) · cites this paper as [119]

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Research works printed but not linked: 25

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  2. Lo, H.-K. & Chau, H. F. Unconditional security of quantum key distribution over arbitrarily long distances. Science 283, 2050–2056 (1999). · DOI
  3. Shor, P. W. & Preskill, J. Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441–444 (2000). · DOI · Paper page
  4. Scarani, V. et al. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301–1350 (2009). · DOI
  5. Stucki, D. et al. High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250 km of ultra low loss fibres. New J. Phys. 11, 075003 (2009). · DOI
  6. Gottesman, D., Lo, H.-K., Lütkenhaus, N. & Preskill, J. Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices. Quant. Inf. Comp. 4, 325–360 (2004).
  7. Fung, C.-H.F., Tamaki, K., Qi, B., Lo, H.-K. & Ma, X. Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch. Quant. Inf. Comp. 9, 131–165 (2009).
  8. Lydersen, L. & Skaar, J. Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws. Quant. Inf. Comp. 10, 60–76 (2010).
  9. Lamas-Linares, A. & Kurtsiefer, C. Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel. Opt. Express 15, 9388–9393 (2007). · DOI
  10. Nauerth, S., Fürst, M., Schmitt-Manderbach, T., Weier, H. & Weinfurter, H. Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography. New J. Phys. 11, 065001 (2009). · DOI
  11. Lütkenhaus, N. Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000). · DOI
  12. Hwang, W. Y. Quantum key distribution with high loss: toward global secure communication. Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003). · DOI
  13. Scarani, V., Acin, A., Ribordy, G. & Gisin, N. Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations. Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004). · DOI
  14. Qi, B., Fung, C.-H.F., Lo, H.-K. & Ma, X. Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems. Quant. Inf. Comp. 7, 73–82 (2007).
  15. Makarov, V., Anisimov, A. & Skaar, J. Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems. Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006); erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008). · DOI
  16. Zhao, Y., Fung, C.-H.F., Qi, B., Chen, C. & Lo, H.-K. Quantum hacking: experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key- distribution systems. Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008). · DOI · Paper page
  17. Cova, S., Ghioni, M., Lotito, A., Rech, I. & Zappa, F. Evolution and prospects for single-photon avalanche diodes and quenching circuits. J. Mod. Opt. 51, 1267–1288 (2004). · DOI
  18. Makarov, V. & Hjelme, D. R. Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems. J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691–705 (2005). · DOI
  19. Makarov, V., Anisimov, A. & Sauge, S. Quantum hacking: adding a commercial actively-quenched module to the list of single-photon detectors controllable by Eve. Preprint at < http://arXiv:quant-ph/0809.3408v2 >.
  20. Makarov, V. Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light. New J. Phys. 11, 065003 (2009). · DOI
  21. Takesue, H. et al. Differential phase shift quantum key distribution experiment over 105 km fibre. New J. Phys. 7, 232 (2005). · DOI
  22. Stucki, D., Brunner, N., Gisin, N., Scarani, V. & Zbinden, H. Fast and simple one-way quantum key distribution. Appl. Phys. Lett. 87, 194108 (2005). · DOI
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  24. Boneh, D. Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. Notices Am. Math. Soc. 46, 203–213 (1999).
  25. Scarani, V. & Kurtsiefer, C. The black paper of quantum cryptography: real implementation problems. Preprint at < http://arXiv:quant-ph/0906.4547v1 >.

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Metadata

Authors
Lydersen, L., Wiechers, C., Wittmann, C., Elser, D., Skaar, J., & Makarov, V.
Venue
Nature Photonics
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2010-08-29
Volume
4
Issue
10
Pages
686-689
ISSN
  • 1749-4885
  • 1749-4893
DOI
10.1038/nphoton.2010.214
Cited by
1,005
References
1
Language
en
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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