Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Visual illusions and mental imagery are non-physical sensory experiences that involve cortical feedback processing in the primary visual cortex. Using laminar functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in two studies, we investigate if information about these internal experiences is visible in the activation patterns of different layers of primary visual cortex (V1). We find that imagery content is decodable mainly from deep layers of V1, whereas seemingly ‘real’ illusory content is decodable mainly from superficial layers. Furthermore, illusory content shares information with perceptual content, whilst imagery content does not generalise to illusory or perceptual information. Together, our results suggest that illusions and imagery, which differ immensely in their subjective experiences, also involve partially distinct early visual microcircuits. However, overlapping microcircuit recruitment might emerge based on the nuanced nature of subjective conscious experience.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Andersson, J. L. R., Skare, S., & Ashburner, J. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00336-7 · Cited by 3,469
Visual field maps in human cortex.
Wandell, B. A., Dumoulin, S. O., & Brewer, A. A. (2007) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2007.10.012 · Cited by 1,231
Goebel, R., Esposito, F., & Formisano, E. (2006) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.20249 · Cited by 1,053
A cellular mechanism for cortical associations: an organizing principle for the cerebral cortex
Larkum, M. (2013) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2012.11.006 · Cited by 755 · cited 1×
“Most feedforward sensory input from the eyes arrives in the middle layers of the primary visual cortex, whereas most feedback input from other brain areas arrives in the deep and super fi cial layers 12,13 .”
BackgroundCortical high-density counterstream architectures
Markov, N. T., Ercsey-Ravasz, M., Van Essen, D. C., Knoblauch, K., Toroczkai, Z., & Kennedy, H. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1238406 · Cited by 616 · cited 5×
“In contrast, short-range feedback axons that connect to nearby regions are located in and target mostly super fi cial layers, with some bifurcations also arriving in deep layers 12,14 – 17 .”
BackgroundInfluentialContextual Feedback to Superficial Layers of V1
Muckli, L., De Martino, F., Vizioli, L., Petro, L. S., Smith, F. W., Ugurbil, K., Goebel, R., & Yacoub, E. (2015) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2015.08.057 · Cited by 423
Self-citationThe functional impact of mental imagery on conscious perception
Pearson, J., Clifford, C. W. G., & Tong, F. (2008) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2008.05.048 · Cited by 409 · cited 6×
“This bias is further increased with longer periods of imagery 10 , and when the stimulus is imagined more vividly in a given trial 34,39 .”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNeural elements for predictive coding
Shipp, S. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01792 · Cited by 340
Motion-induced blindness in normal observers
Bonneh, Y. S., Cooperman, A., & Sagi, D. (2001) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35081073 · Cited by 299
Distinct Roles of the Cortical Layers of Area V1 in Figure-Ground Segregation
Self, M. W., van Kerkoerle, T., Supèr, H., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2013) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2013.09.013 · Cited by 249
Cited by
Visual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: A millimeter-scale 7-T fMRI study
Liu, J., Zhan, M., Hajhajate, D., Spagna, A., Dehaene, S., Cohen, L., & Bartolomeo, P. (2023) · doi:10.1101/2023.06.14.544909 · Cited by 94
Cellular psychology: relating cognition to context-sensitive pyramidal cells
Phillips, W. A., Bachmann, T., Spratling, M. W., Muckli, L., Petro, L. S., & Zolnik, T. (2025) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.09.002 · Cited by 18
“These include high-resolution imaging during WM [103], feature-based attention [104], spatial attention [105], cross-modal in fl uences (see [106]), visual illusions [107,108], memory (with 3T fMRI) [109], mental imagery [108], and motion perception [110].”
Self-citationContext-sensitive conscious interpretation and layer-5 pyramidal neurons in multistable perception
Bachmann, T. (2025) · Brain and Behavior · doi:10.1002/brb3.70393 · Cited by 3
“…number of studies with results sticking to the brain-wise top-down innervation theory of multistable, volatile interpretive account of context-sensitive object perception (Bergmann et al. 2024; Murray and Herrmann 2013; Pang et al. 2021; Seghier and Vuilleumier 2006; von Gal et al. 2023).”
Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans
Dykstra, A. R., Zhu, Y., Fernandez Pujol, C., Zhou, D. W., Jones, S. R., Marvan, T., & Bonaiuto, J. J. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.08.012 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Bergmann, J., Petro, L. S., Abbatecola, C., Li, M. S., Morgan, A. T., & Muckli, L.
- Venue
- Nature Communications
- Published
- 2024-02-02
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1002-1002
- ISSN
- 2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4391466933
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 9.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41467-024-45065-w
- The paper
- Bergmann, J., Petro, L. S., Abbatecola, C., Li, M. S., Morgan, A. T., & Muckli, L. (2024). Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences. Nature Communications. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-45065-w
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.