The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deception and self-deception
Open accessAbstract
There is ample evidence that the average person thinks he or she is more skilful, more beautiful and kinder than others 1,2 and that such overconfidence may result in substantial personal and social costs 3-8. To explain the prevalence of overconfidence, social scientists usually point to its affective benefits, such as those stemming from a good self-image or reduced anxiety about an uncertain future 9-13. An alternative theory, first advanced by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers 14-16, posits that people self-deceive into higher confidence to more effectively persuade or deceive others. Here we conduct two experiments (combined n = 688) to test this strategic self-deception hypothesis. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed that they can earn money if, during a short face-to-face interaction, they convince others of their superior performance. We find that the privately elicited beliefs of the group that was informed of the profitable deception opportunity exhibit significantly more overconfidence than the beliefs of the control group. To test whether higher confidence ultimately pays off, we experimentally manipulate the confidence of the subjects by means of a noisy feedback signal. We find that this exogenous shift in confidence makes subjects more persuasive in subsequent face-to-face interactions. Overconfidence emerges from these results as the product of an adaptive cognitive technology with important social benefits, rather than some deficiency or bias.
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“Espousing the group's beliefs serves as a form of self- persuasion, further convincing people that the views they endorse must be correct, while moving further away from intellectual humility 86-88 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [86]
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Citations
Cites
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Items 201–217 of 217
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0011
The Puzzle of Popular Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0004
The Social Roots of Popular Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0005
Williams, D., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.001.0001
The Social Insensitivity of Clinical Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0010
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0002
Existing Social Accounts of Clinical Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0008
The Social Scaffolding of Popular Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0006
Individualistic Accounts of Clinical Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0007
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.002.0005
Why Do We Call People Delusional?
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0003
The Social Determinants and Focus of Clinical Delusions
Williams, D. R., Wilkinson, S., & Miyazono, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191976360.003.0009
Memory Rehearsal and Belief BiasesPreprint
Conlon, J. J. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7050598
Motivated inference of ambiguous information
Wang, Z., & Zheng, V. J. (2026) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2026.101213
Khatib, M., & Purwar, T. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-07974-9_41
Dando, C. J., Buchanan, T., & Maras, K. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1871792
“Furthermore, people tend to be overly confident, often believing they are ‘good’ at detecting deception even though confidence is not a reliable indicator of accuracy (e.g., Curci et al., 2018; Serra-Garcia and Gneezy, 2021; Schwardmann and Van der Weele, 2019).”
САМООБМАН У СИСТЕМІ ПСИХОЛОГІЧНИХ ЗАХИСТІВ ПРИ ПОСТТРАВМАТИЧНОМУ СТРЕСІ
Косьянова, О. Ю., & Лисенко, С. (2026) · Science and Education · doi:10.24195/2414-4665-2026-3-5
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwardmann, P., & van der Weele, J.
- Affiliations
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Schwardmann, Peter
- Venue
- Nature Human Behaviour
- Published
- 2019-07-29
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1055-1061
- ISSN
- 2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121342465
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 12
- FWCI
- 42.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Nature Human Behaviour (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Open access LMU (Ludwid Maxmilian's Universitat Munchen) (submittedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Universitätsbibliothek der LMU
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (452-17-004)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Deception detection and forensic psychology
- Keywords
- overconfidence, self-deception, persuasion, deception, belief updating, noisy feedback, self-image, cognitive biases, adaptive cognition
- MeSH terms
- Female, Humans, Deception, Male, Self Concept, Young Adult
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