Cited by 176Opinion Dynamics and Social InfluenceComplex Network Analysis TechniquesGame Theory and Voting Systems

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Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions

Stewart, Alexander J., Mosleh, Mohsen, Diakonova, Marina, Arechar, Antonio A., Rand, David G., Plotkin, Joshua B.·2019·Nature

DOI 10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6

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Abstract

People must integrate disparate sources of information when making decisions, especially in social contexts. But information does not always flow freely. It can be constrained by social networks 1-3 and distorted by zealots and automated bots 4. Here we develop a voter game as a model system to study information flow in collective decisions. Players are assigned to competing groups (parties) and placed on an 'influence network' that determines whose voting intentions each player can observe. Players are incentivized to vote according to partisan interest, but also to coordinate their vote with the entire group. Our mathematical analysis uncovers a phenomenon that we call information gerrymandering: the structure of the influence network can sway the vote outcome towards one party, even when both parties have equal sizes and each player has the same influence. A small number of zealots, when strategically placed on the influence network, can also induce information gerrymandering and thereby bias vote outcomes. We confirm the predicted effects of information gerrymandering in social network experiments with n = 2,520 human subjects. Furthermore, we identify extensive information gerrymandering in real-world influence networks, including online political discussions leading up to the US federal elections, and in historical patterns of bill co-sponsorship in the US Congress and European legislatures. Our analysis provides an account of the vulnerabilities of collective decision-making to systematic distortion by restricted information flow. Our analysis also highlights a group-level social dilemma: information gerrymandering can enable one party to sway decisions in its favour, but when multiple parties engage in gerrymandering the group loses its ability to reach consensus and remains trapped in deadlock.

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Synergistic interplay of reputation and extortion in driving cooperation within the Prisoner’s Dilemma
姜罗罗, Ye, J.-K., He, Z.-Y., Chen, Z., Li, W., & Wang, J. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.119305

Authors: Stewart, A. J., Mosleh, M., Diakonova, M., Arechar, A. A., Rand, D. G., & Plotkin, J. B.
Affiliations: University of Houston (US)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
University of Oxford (GB)
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (MX)
University of Pennsylvania (US)
Corresponding author: Stewart, Alexander J.
ORCID: Stewart, Alexander J.
Mosleh, Mohsen
Diakonova, Marina
Arechar, Antonio A.
Rand, David G.
Plotkin, Joshua B.
Venue: Nature
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published: 2019-09-04
Volume: 573
Issue: 7772
Pages: 117-121
ISSN: 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6
OpenAlex: W2972275627
Cited by: 176
References: 29
Citations by year: 2026: 5 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 48 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 6
FWCI: 12.49
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
Locations: Nature (publishedVersion)
PubMed (publishedVersion)
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics: Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords: group decision making, influence networks, Zealots, bots, social dilemmas, democratic legitimacy, information flow, political polarization, online political discussion, United States Congress
MeSH terms: Decision Making, Democracy, Game Theory, Group Processes, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Politics, Truth Disclosure, Bias, Knowledge, Social Networking, Social Media

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Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions

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