Troll and divide: the language of online polarization
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
Abstract
The affective animosity between the political left and right has grown steadily in many countries over the past few years, posing a threat to democratic practices and public health. There is a rising concern over the role that “bad actors” or trolls may play in the polarization of online networks. In this research, we examined the processes by which trolls may sow intergroup conflict through polarized rhetoric. We developed a dictionary to assess online polarization by measuring language associated with communications that display partisan bias in their diffusion. We validated the polarized language dictionary in 4 different contexts and across multiple time periods. The polarization dictionary made out-of-set predictions, generalized to both new political contexts (#BlackLivesMatter) and a different social media platform (Reddit), and predicted partisan differences in public opinion polls about COVID-19. Then we analyzed tweets from a known Russian troll source (N = 383,510) and found that their use of polarized language has increased over time. We also compared troll tweets from 3 countries (N = 79,833) and found that they all utilize more polarized language than regular Americans (N = 1,507,300) and trolls have increased their use of polarized rhetoric over time. We also find that polarized language is associated with greater engagement, but this association only holds for politically engaged users (both trolls and regular users). This research clarifies how trolls leverage polarized language and provides an open-source, simple tool for exploration of polarized communications on social media.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper develops and validates a 205-word dictionary of polarized language and applies it to social media data, finding that state-affiliated trolls from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela use more polarized language than American controls. It also finds that polarized language predicts greater retweet engagement mainly among politically engaged users, though the design cannot establish causality.
Key findings
- The polarization dictionary discriminated polarized from nonpolarized tweets in cross-validation (Mpolarized = 6.70, SD = 9.08, N = 3,696 vs. Mnonpolarized = 4.39, SD = 6.60, N = 1,312; t(3156) = 9.79, P < 0.001, d = 0.27) and generalized to #BlackLivesMatter (d = 0.13), Reddit political communities (d = 0.31), and COVID-19 partisan opinion dynamics (r(48) = 0.45, P = 0.001; lagged 8 days r(40) = 0.67, P < 0.001).
- Russian trolls used significantly more polarized language than American controls (M = 2.37, SD = 5.14, N = 61,413 vs. M = 1.47, SD = 5.35, N = 516,525; t(78,081) = 40.96, P < 0.001, d = 0.17), and politically matched Russian trolls also exceeded politically matched Americans (M = 5.16, SD = 8.00, N = 55,726 vs. M = 2.91, SD = 6.84, N = 55,726; t(108,836) = 50.61, P < 0.001, d = 0.30).
- Iranian and Venezuelan trolls likewise used more polarized language than American controls (Iran: M = 2.15, SD = 4.66, N = 220,628 vs. M = 1.46, SD = 5.26, N = 929,908, d = 0.13; Venezuela: M = 1.80, SD = 4.67, N = 30,987 vs. M = 1.45, SD = 5.25, N = 953,197, d = 0.07; both P < 0.001).
- Polarized language predicted retweets: for every polarized word in a tweet, retweets increased by 72% for Russian trolls (IRR = 1.72, CI [1.64, 1.79], P < 0.0001), and by 39% for politically engaged controls (IRR = 1.39, 95% CI [1.35, 1.48], P < 0.0001), but not for a random American sample (IRR = 1.19, 95% CI [0.80, 1.77], P = 0.390).
Methods
- The authors built a polarization dictionary by combining data-driven exploration, manual pruning, GloVe word embeddings, and manual trimming; the final dictionary contained 205 words and was validated across four contexts: cross-validation, out-of-set #BlackLivesMatter, cross-platform Reddit, and predictive COVID-19 polling.
- The main dataset included 2,306,233 original English tweets: 383,510 by Russian trolls, 329,453 by Iranian trolls, 85,970 by Venezuelan trolls, and 1,507,300 by American controls; troll data came from the Twitter Transparency Report, and additional data were collected via Twitter API 2.0 and academictwitteR.
- Analyses included t-tests comparing polarization scores, weighted linear regressions of monthly polarization over time, hierarchical clustering of dictionary words into Issue and Affective components, and negative binomial generalized linear models predicting retweet counts from polarized language.
Limitations
- The paper states the dictionary was built on data collected in 2015 and on three polarized topics, so it may be biased toward timely 2015 topics and restricted in scope; it includes some terms that may not seem strictly polarized (e.g., “people”), and the authors recommend using it comparatively with a baseline corpus.
- The paper states that early social media accounts identified as trolls may not be authentic—some countries use hacked, purchased, or stolen accounts—so early Venezuelan or Iranian content may not have originated with the nation in question, potentially biasing over-time analyses.
- The paper states the work is primarily quasi-experimental or correlational and cannot draw causal conclusions; it also notes that troll and control time frames were not identical, so trend differences should be treated as tentative, and some post hoc analyses had small sample sizes.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 41 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
The algorithm clustered the dictionary words in a manner somewhat consistent with the theoretical separation between issue and affective polarization.
“We observed that in the highest level of division, the algorithm clustered the words in a manner that is somewhat consistent with the theoretical separation between issue and affective polarization”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The correlation between COVID-19 poll responses and Twitter language was strongest when Twitter language was lagged by 8 days.
“A post hoc analysis revealed that the correlation between poll responses and twitter language was strongest when Twitter language was lagged by 8 days (i.e. pollt0, twittert8) r (40) = 0.67, P < 0.001”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The Civiqs partisan difference score validly measures public opinion polarization about COVID-19.
- Findingown data
Politically oriented Russian trolls use significantly more polarized language than their politically matched American sample.
“Again, we find that politically oriented Russian trolls use significantly more polarized language than their politically matched American sample (Russian trolls: M = 5.16, SD = 8.00, and N = 55,726; American controls: M = 2.91, SD = 6.84, and N = 55,726), t(108,836) = 50.61, P < 0.001, and Cohen's d = 0.30”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: English-language tweets from trolls are most likely aimed at an international or American audience.
- Findingown data
Iranian trolls used less polarized language over time.
“Iranian trolls used less polarized language (b = -0.03), R2 = 0.33, F(1, 85) = 41.06, and P < 0.001”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Russian trolls used far more polarized language as time progressed.
“We found that Russian trolls used far more polarized language as time progressed (b = 0.03), R2 = 0.46, F(1, 69) = 58.85, and P < 0.001”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“Then we analyzed tweets from a known Russian troll source (N = 383,510) and found that their use of polarized language has increased over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
- Findingown data
In #BlackLivesMatter discourse, ingroup bias messages contained more polarized language than messages that diffused between clusters.
“we observed that ingroup bias messages contained more polarized language than messages that diffused between clusters (Mingroup bias = 5.54, SD ingroup bias = 5.68, N = 24,077 and Mdiffused = 4.83, SD diffused = 5.09, N = 670), t (716.06) = 3.58, P < 0.001, Cohen's d’ = 0.13.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Ingroup bias in tweet diffusion is a valid marker of political polarization.
- Findingown data
American control users did not show a significant increase in polarized language over time.
“We did not find the same pattern among American control users, (b = −0.001) R2 = 0.05, F(1, 35) = 1.90, and P = 0.178”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Russian trolls increased their use of polarized language faster than ordinary users.
“This suggests that trolls are increasing the use of polarized language much faster than ordinary users, independent groups correlation comparison z = 5.06, 95% CI [.55, 1.21], and P < 0.001.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The polarization dictionary successfully discriminated between polarized and nonpolarized tweets from the test set.
“Our analysis found that the dictionary successfully discriminated between polarized and nonpolarized tweets from the test set (Mpolarized = 6.70, SD polarized = 9.08, N = 3696 and Mnonpolarized = 4.39, SD nonpolarized = 6.60, N = 1312), t (3156) = 9.79, P < 0.001, Cohen's d’ = 0.27.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Ingroup bias in tweet diffusion is a valid marker of political polarization.
- Findingown data
The rhetoric in political Reddit groups was more polarized than in apolitical Reddit groups.
“A planned comparison between the political groups revealed a significant difference between the control and the other political communities (Mleft = 2.38, SD left = 4.61, N = 17,005; Mright = 2.57, SD right = 5.34, N = 15,859; and Mcontrol = 0.97, SD control = 3.44, N = 16,366), t(49,227) = 34.81, P < 0.001, Cohen's d’ = 0.31.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The Reddit communities selected as political have established ideologies that make them politically polarized.
- Findingown data
Polarized language on social media was positively associated with partisan differences in concern about the COVID-19 pandemic over time.
“We found that polarized language on social media, measured by the mean % of words from our dictionary contained in the tweets, was positively associated with partisan differences in concern about the COVID-19 pandemic over time, r (48) = 0.45, P = 0.001, see Figure 1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The Civiqs partisan difference score validly measures public opinion polarization about COVID-19.
- Findingown data
Venezuelan trolls used more polarized language as time progressed.
“Whereas trolls based in Venezuela used more polarized language as time progressed (b = 0.02), R2 = 0.19, F(1, 91) = 20.91, andP < 0.001”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Russian trolls used significantly more polarized language than the American control sample.
“First, we found that Russian trolls (M = 2.37, SD = 5.14, and N = 61,413) used significantly more polarized language than tweets sent by the control sample (M = 1.47, SD = 5.35, and N = 516,525), t(78,081) = 40.96, P < 0.001, and Cohen's d = 0.17.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: English-language tweets from trolls are most likely aimed at an international or American audience.
- Findingown data
Levels of polarized language in American controls did not increase over time, including between November 2016 and December 2019.
“levels of polarized language in American controls did not increase”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
“levels of polarization did not increase across time, suggesting that polarized discourse among average American users did not grow between November 2016 and December 2019.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
- Findingown data
The effect sizes for issue polarization were substantially larger than for affective polarization.
“(although effect sizes of issue polarization are substantially larger).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Three distinct troll populations, which hold antiAmerican views, used polarized language more than the average American user.
“We developed and validated an open-source linguistic tool to gauge polarized discourse on social media and found that 3 distinct troll populations, which hold antiAmerican views, used polarized language more than the average American user.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Russian and Venezuelan trolls used more polarized rhetoric over time.
“while the language of Russian and Venezuelan trolls have used more polarized rhetoric with time”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In politically engaged controls, there is a positive association between polarized language and retweets; for every polarized word, retweets increase by 39% (IRR = 1.39, 95% CI [1.35, 1.48], P < 0.0001).
“Again, we find that in the politically engaged controls there is a positive association between polarized language and retweets, such that for every polarized word in a tweet, retweets increase by 39%, IRR = 1.39, 95% CI [1.35, 1.48], and P < 0.0001.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In a random sample of Americans, there is no significant association between polarized language and retweets (IRR = 1.19, 95% CI [0.80,1.77], P = 0.390).
“However, in a random sample of Americans we do not find a significant association IRR = 1.19, 95% CI [0.80,1.77], and P = 0.390.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The dictionary consistently detected polarized discourse on Twitter and Reddit on multiple topics.
“showed it consistently detected polarized discourse on Twitter and Reddit on multiple topics”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The association between polarized language and retweets stems directly from political trolls (Political vs. non Political trolls ratio = exp(1.35*1015), 95% CI [exp(5.03*1014), exp(2.2*1015)], P < 0.0001).
“In a planned comparison we find that this effect stems directly from political trolls, Political vs. non Political trolls ratio = exp(1.35*1015), 95% CI [exp(5.03*1014), exp(2.2*1015)], and P < 0.0001”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The dictionary corresponded well to the dynamics of partisan differences in attitudes towards the COVID-19 pandemic.
“corresponded well to the dynamics of partisan differences in attitudes towards the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For every polarized word in a tweet, retweets increase by 72% (IRR = 1.72, CI [1.64, 1.79], P < 0.0001).
“We find that for every polarized word in a tweet, retweets increase by 72%, IRR = 1.72, CI [1.64, 1.79], and P < 0.0001.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The paper developed and validated a dictionary of polarized language used on social media.
“We developed and validated a dictionary of polarized language used on social media.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant interaction between polarized language and troll category on retweet count (χ2(7) = 2223, P < 0.0001).
“Polarized Language * Troll Category: Category: χ2(7) = 2223, P < 0.0001”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The American public has become more polarized over the past few decades.
“A growing body of research suggests that the American public has become more polarized over the past few decades (1, 2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [1] Klein E. 2020. Why we're polarized. London: The Profile Press.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [2] Mason L. 2018. Uncivil agreement: how politics became our identity. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press. 10.7208/chicago/9780226524689.001.0001 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
There is substantial evidence that segregated online communities emerge around politically contentious topics.
“Although recent evidence suggests that general information consumption on social media might not be an echo-chamber for many users (21, 22), there is nevertheless substantial evidence supporting the argument that segregated online communities emerge around politically contentious topics (23, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 20).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 7 sources checked- cites [23] Baumann F, Lorenz-Spreen P, Sokolov I M, Starnini M. 2020. Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks. Phys Rev Lett. 124(4): 048301. 10.1103/PhysRevLett.124.048301 32058741 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [19] Brady W J, Wills J A, Jost J T, Tucker J A, Van Bavel J J. 2017. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 114(28): 7313– 7318. 10.1073/pnas.1618923114 28652356 PMC5514704 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [24] Evans T, Fu F. 2018. Opinion formation on dynamic networks: identifying conditions for the emergence of partisan echo chambers. R Soc Open Sci. 5(10): 181122. 10.1098/rsos.181122 30473855 PMC6227940 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [25] Jasny L, et al. 2018. Shifting echo chambers in US climate policy networks. PloS ONE, 13(9): e0203463. 10.1371/journal.pone.0203463 30216357 PMC6138410 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [26] Starnini M, Frasca M, Baronchelli A. 2016. Emergence of metapopulations and echo chambers in mobile agents. Sci Rep. 6: 31834. 10.1038/srep31834 27572928 PMC5004139 source
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- cites [27] Sunstein C R. 2018. # Republic: divided democracy in the age of social media. Princeton (NY): Princeton University Press.
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- cites [20] Yardi S, Boyd D. 2010. Dynamic debates: an analysis of group polarization over time on Twitter. Bull Sci Technol Soc. 30(5): 316– 327. 10.1177/0270467610380011 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Falsehoods spread farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth on social media, especially for political news.
“Falsehoods appear to spread farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth on social media, especially for political news (30).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [30] Vosoughi S, Roy D, Aral S. 2018. The spread of true and false news online. Science. 359(6380): 1146– 1151. 10.1126/science.aap9559 29590045 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Exposure to out-group partisans may increase polarization.
“Moreover, exposure to out-group partisans may even increase polarization (28).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [28] Bail C A, et al. 2018. Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 115(37): 9216– 9221. 10.1073/pnas.1804840115 30154168 PMC6140520 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Online trolls are attempting to polarize social media users during political discourse.
“Taken together, these data suggest that online trolls are attempting to polarize social media users during political discourse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [37] Arif A, Stewart L G, Starbird K. 2018. Acting the part: examining information operations within# BlackLivesMatter discourse. Proc ACM Hum Comput Interact. 2(CSCW): 20. 10.1145/3274289. source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [38] Broniatowski D A, et al. 2018. Weaponized health communication: Twitter bots and Russian trolls amplify the vaccine debate. Am J Pub Health. 108(10): 1378– 1384. 30138075 PMC6137759 source
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- Interpretationown data
The four sets of analyses provide converging validity for the dictionary, showing its ability to capture political polarization in language across four different contexts.
“Taken together, these 4 sets of analyses (cross-validation, out of set validation, cross-platform validation, and predictive validation) provide converging validity for the dictionary, showcasing its ability to capture political polarization in language across 4 different contexts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Ingroup bias in tweet diffusion is a valid marker of political polarization.
- Rests on an assumption: The Reddit communities selected as political have established ideologies that make them politically polarized.
- Rests on an assumption: NeutralPolitics is a neutral reference of respectful political discourse.
- Rests on an assumption: The Civiqs partisan difference score validly measures public opinion polarization about COVID-19.
- Interpretationown data
Trends in polarized language might be specific to the foreign nation involved.
“Therefore, any trends in polarized language might be specific to the foreign nation involved.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Previous methods for studying polarization are most likely context-dependent, which can undercut replicability.
“These methodologies have several advantages (40, 41) but can be computationally expensive, create a barrier for adoption for behavioral scientists who lack the required technical expertise, and are most likely context-dependent which can undercut replicability (42).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [42] Van Bavel J J, Mende-Siedlecki P, Brady W J, Reinero D A. 2016. Contextual sensitivity in scientific reproducibility. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 113(23): 6454– 6459. 10.1073/pnas.1521897113 27217556 PMC4988618 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
Trolls, including foreign actors, use social media to sow discord among Americans through political polarization.
“We argue that trolls (including foreign actors) use social media to sow discord among Americans through political polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Engagement with political content online is generally associated with high levels of ingroup bias; it is far more likely to be shared within the political ingroup than in the outgroup.
“engagement with political content online is generally associated with high levels of ingroup bias; that is, it is far more likely to be shared within the political ingroup than in the outgroup (18, 19, 16).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [18] Barberá P, Jost J T, Nagler J, Tucker J A, Bonneau R. 2015. Tweeting from left to right: is online political communication more than an echo chamber?. Psychol Sci. 26(10): 1531– 1542. 10.1177/0956797615594620 26297377 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [19] Brady W J, Wills J A, Jost J T, Tucker J A, Van Bavel J J. 2017. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 114(28): 7313– 7318. 10.1073/pnas.1618923114 28652356 PMC5514704 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [16] Cinelli M, De Francisci Morales G, Galeazzi A, Quattrociocchi W, Starnini M. 2021. The echo chamber effect on social media. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 118(9). DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2023301118. PMC7936330 33622786 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
Polarized rhetoric was weaponized by online trolls during political discourse.
“These studies suggest that polarized rhetoric was weaponized by online trolls during political discourse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Polarized language is polarizing.
“We take these results as evidence that polarized language is indeed polarizing”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
One of the key predictors of engagement on Twitter and Facebook in the political context is outgroup animosity.
“1 of the key predictors of engagement on Twitter and Facebook in the political context is outgroup animosity (64).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [64] Rathje S, Van Bavel J J, van der Linden S. 2021. Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 118(26): e2024292118. 34162706 PMC8256037 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The trolls' mission spans several countries.
“We provide novel evidence that this mission spans several countries that hold antiAmerican views.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The countries examined (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) hold anti-American views.
- Premisecitation
Exposure to polarizing attitudes even produced by a small number of agents can have a devastating effect on political compromise in a social network.
“Exposure to polarizing attitudes even produced by a small number of agents can have a devastating effect on political compromise in a social network”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [66] Stewart A J, et al. 2019. Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions. Nature. 573(7772): 117– 121. 10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6 31485058 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Trolls have the ability to influence many of the users on social networks.
“such findings suggest that trolls have the ability to influence many of the users on social networks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Even a small number of agents with aggressive attitudes can have a substantial influence on the majority view (information gerrymandering).
“even a small number of agents with aggressive attitudes can have a substantial influence on the majority view, a process called “information gerrymandering” (66).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [66] Stewart A J, et al. 2019. Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions. Nature. 573(7772): 117– 121. 10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6 31485058 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Study design and conductnone given
The methods are not sufficient to draw causal conclusions about trolls' intent.
“however our methods are not sufficient to draw such causality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 20
- The quote only partly states this claim. 3
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 13
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataPolarized language is associated with greater engagement, but this association only holds for politically engaged users, both trolls and regular users.
“We also find that polarized language is associated with greater engagement, but this association only holds for politically engaged users (both trolls and regular users).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn a post hoc analysis on the same time frame, Russian trolls used far more polarized language as time progressed while American control users did not.
“Again, Russian trolls used far more polarized language as time progressed (b = 0.03), R2 = 0.51, F(1, 17) = 17.48, and P < 0.001 while American control users did not, (b = 0.006), R2 = 0.16, F(1, 17) = 3.14, and P = 0.094”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataPolarized rhetoric was reduced among the Reddit community NeutralPolitics compared with other political communities, although the effect size was very small.
“A planned comparison between the political groups revealed a significant difference in polarized rhetoric between NeutralPolitics and the other political communities (Mleft = 2.38, SD left = 4.61, N = 17,005; Mright = 2.57, SD right = 5.34, N = 15,859; and Mneutral = 2.24, SD neutral = 4.49, N = 9,772), t(42,633) = 4.12, P < 0.001, Cohen's d’ = 0.04.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: NeutralPolitics is a neutral reference of respectful political discourse.
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataIranian trolls used significantly more polarized language than American control samples.
“| Iran | 2.15 (4.66) | 220,628 | 1.46 (5.26) | 929,908 | 2016–11–23–2018–11–28 | 61.32 | 366,496 | 0.13 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: English-language tweets from trolls are most likely aimed at an international or American audience.
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataVenezuelan trolls used significantly more polarized language than American control samples.
“| Venezuela | 1.80 (4.67) | 30,987 | 1.45 (5.25) | 953,197 | 2016–11–23–2018–12–07 | 12.87 | 33,588 | 0.07 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: English-language tweets from trolls are most likely aimed at an international or American audience.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown dataThe Issue subcomponent of the polarization dictionary addresses ideological and policy keywords (e.g., liberal, conservative, socialism, gun-control).
“while the Issue subcomponent addresses ideological and policy keywords (e.g. liberal, conservative, socialism, and gun-control)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationThe Affective component of the polarization dictionary references negative moral-emotional words (e.g., kill, destroy, cheaters) and distinct ethnic and religious groups (e.g., Muslim and Jews).
“the Affective component references instances of negative moral–emotional words (e.g. kill, destroy, and cheaters; (19)), and distinct ethnic and religious groups (e.g. Muslim andJews).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [19] Brady W J, Wills J A, Jost J T, Tucker J A, Van Bavel J J. 2017. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 114(28): 7313– 7318. 10.1073/pnas.1618923114 28652356 PMC5514704 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn all countries examined, tweets sent by trolls used significantly more polarized language than tweets sent by American control samples, both on affective and issue polarization (Ps < 0.005).
“In all the countries we examined, the tweets sent by trolls used significantly more polarized language than tweets sent by American control samples (Ps < 0.005), both on affective and issue polarization”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“We found that state-affiliated trolls from Russia and other countries use more polarized language than a random sample of American users”
- Also stated in: § Study 4: polarized language and engagement · boosted
“Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated a link between polarized language use and troll accounts on social media.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataAfter adding followership as a covariate in the trolls analysis, the association between polarized language and retweets remains significant but the effect size diminishes (IRR = 1.61, 95% CI [1.57, 1.67], P < 0.0001).
“After adding followership in the trolls analysis we find the same pattern of results, however the effect size diminishes: IRR = 1.61, 95% CI [1.57, 1.67], and P < 0.0001”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataTrolls share controversial content and engage in highly polarized issues, but also use higher levels of polarized language as a tool in their discourse.
“we found that trolls share controversial content and engage in highly polarized issues, but that they also use higher levels of polarized language as a tool in their discourse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationRising partisan antipathy, or affective polarization, mirrors these attitudes.
“These attitudes are mirrored in rising partisan antipathy; dislike toward members of the opposing ideology—a phenomenon known as “affective polarization” (3, 4, 5).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [3] Boxell L, Gentzkow M, Shapiro J M. 2020. Cross-country trends in affective polarization (No. 26669). Cambridge (MA): National Bureau of Economic Research. 10.3386/w26669 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [4] Finkel E J, et al. 2020. Political sectarianism in America. Science. 370(6516): 533– 536. 10.1126/science.abe1715 33122374 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [5] Iyengar S, Lelkes Y, Levendusky M, Malhotra N, Westwood S J. 2019. The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Ann Rev Polit Sci. 22(1): 129– 146. 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPrevious methods for studying polarization can be computationally expensive and create a barrier for adoption for behavioral scientists who lack the required technical expertise.
“Previous work studied polarization through network analysis or by exploring topics known to be polarized (39). These methodologies have several advantages (40, 41) but can be computationally expensive, create a barrier for adoption for behavioral scientists who lack the required technical expertise, and are most likely context-dependent which can undercut replicability (42).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [39] Demszky D, et al. 2019. Analyzing polarization in social media: method and application to tweets on 21 mass shootings. Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers), 2970– 3005.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [40] Garimella K, Morales G D F, Gionis A, Mathioudakis M. 2018. Quantifying controversy on social media. ACM Trans Soc Comput. 1(1): 1– 27. 10.1145/3140565 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [41] Guerra P C, Meira W Jr, Cardie C, Kleinberg R. 2013. A measure of polarization on social media networks based on community boundaries. Proceedings of the 7th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM13/paper/viewPaper/6104.
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe Internet Research Agency engaged in online political tactics to sow intergroup conflict and influence US citizens during the 2016 presidential election and British citizens prior to the Brexit vote.
“The IRA has engaged in online political tactics to sew intergroup conflict and influence US citizens during the 2016 presidential election (34) and British citizens prior to the Brexit vote (35).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [34] Badawy A, Ferrara E, Lerman K. 2018. Analyzing the digital traces of political manipulation: The 2016 Russian interference Twitter campaign. Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM). 258– 265.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [35] Llewellyn C, Cram L, Favero A, Hill R L. 2018. Russian troll hunting in a brexit Twitter archive. Proceedings of the 18th ACM/IEEE on Joint Conference on Digital Libraries, 361– 362. 10.1145/3197026.3203876 source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationScholars have made a conceptual distinction between issue polarization (an ideological, policy-based political divide) and affective polarization (dislike, distrust, and general animosity of political partisans toward the other political side).
“Scholars have made the conceptual distinction between issue polarization—an ideological, policy-based political divide, and affective polarization, i.e. dislike, distrust, and general animosity of political partisans toward the other political side (5, 61, 62).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [5] Iyengar S, Lelkes Y, Levendusky M, Malhotra N, Westwood S J. 2019. The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Ann Rev Polit Sci. 22(1): 129– 146. 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [61] Iyengar S, Sood G, Lelkes Y. 2012. Affect, not ideology: a social identity perspective on polarization. Pub Opin Quart. 76(3): 405– 431. 10.1093/poq/nfs038 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [62] Wilson A E, Parker V, Feinberg M. 2020. Polarization in the contemporary political and media landscape. Curr Opin Behav Sci. 34: 223– 228. 10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.07.005 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe polarization dictionary is composed of two subcomponents (Issue and Affective) that roughly map onto the theoretical distinction between issue and affective polarization.
“This distinction is roughly reflected in the dictionary.”
- Also stated in: § Results · boosted
“we showed that the polarization dictionary is composed of 2 subcomponents that map onto theoretical elements of polarization (Issue and Affective).”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“We found that our data-driven dictionary taps into distinct theoretical elements of polarization”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Results · boosted
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationown dataPolarized language is associated with greater traction on social media, but only in political contexts (i.e., for politically engaged users, both trolls and controls).
“Overall, these results indicate that polarized language is associated with greater traction on social media, but only in political contexts.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“this association only holds for politically engaged users—both trolls and controls.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPolarized language is not only a marker for a static polarized state, but contributes to the polarization process and advances polarization rather than merely reflecting it.
“we take this as evidence that polarized language is not only a marker for a static polarized state, but contributes to the polarization process.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
“this finding suggests that polarized language advances polarization and not merely reflects it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationPrior work documented trolls' attempts to pollute the online environment with polarized content and sow discord among Americans.
“These results expand on prior work documenting trolls’ attempts to pollute the online environment with polarized content and sow discord among Americans (65).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [65] Golovchenko Y, Buntain C, Eady G, Brown M A, Tucker J A. 2020. Cross-platform state propaganda: Russian trolls on Twitter and YouTube during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Int J Press/Polit. 25: 357– 389. source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenThe dictionary was validated using 4 strategies.
“We validated this dictionary using 4 strategies”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationA study found that Russian trolls were trying to promote a progovernment agenda and dissolve government criticism, but were only successful at the latter.
“In a study that explored the domestic effect of Russian trolls (i.e. messages that were targeted inwards to Russian users), it was found that trolls were trying to promote a progovernment agenda and dissolve government criticism (69); nevertheless, trolls were only successful at the latter”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [69] Sobolev A. 2018. How pro-government “trolls” influence online conversations in Russia. Los Angeles (CA): University of California, Los Angeles. http://www.wpsanet.org/papers/docs/2019W-Feb-Anton-Sobolev-Trolls-VA.pdf
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationTrolls win twice: once when they share the polarized content, and then again when it is echoed on other media platforms, creating a polarizing loop.
“This way, trolls win twice: once when they share the polarized content, and then again when it is being echoed on other media platforms, creating a polarizing loop.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThere is evidence of growing polarization and partisan antipathy in the American public.
“Given the evidence on the growing polarization and partisan antipathy in the American public (5)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5] Iyengar S, Lelkes Y, Levendusky M, Malhotra N, Westwood S J. 2019. The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Ann Rev Polit Sci. 22(1): 129– 146. 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA recent paper followed over 1,200 American Twitter users for 1 month in late 2017 and found that only a small fraction of users interacted with Russian trolls, and they did not observe any change in partisan attitude during that time among these users.
“A recent paper followed over 1,200 American Twitter users for the course of 1 month in late 2017. The authors found that only a small fraction of users interacted with Russian trolls, and they did not observe any change in partisan attitude during that time among these users (68).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [68] Bail C A, et al. 2020. Assessing the Russian Internet Research Agency's impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of American Twitter users in late 2017. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 117(1): 243– 250. 10.1073/pnas.1906420116 31767743 PMC6955293 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPrior research has revealed that trolls are often found in the centroids of clusters of polarized topics, driving the partisan discourse on both ends.
“Prior research has revealed that when exploring the clusters of polarized topics, trolls are often found in the centroids of these clusters, driving the partisan discourse on both ends (37, 38, 55).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [37] Arif A, Stewart L G, Starbird K. 2018. Acting the part: examining information operations within# BlackLivesMatter discourse. Proc ACM Hum Comput Interact. 2(CSCW): 20. 10.1145/3274289. source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [38] Broniatowski D A, et al. 2018. Weaponized health communication: Twitter bots and Russian trolls amplify the vaccine debate. Am J Pub Health. 108(10): 1378– 1384. 30138075 PMC6137759 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [55] Walter D, Ophir Y, Jamieson K H. 2020. Russian Twitter accounts and the partisan polarization of vaccine discourse, 2015-2017. Am J Pub Health. 110: e1– e7. PMC7144436 32191516 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRecent evidence suggests that troll's messages propagate to mainstream media and are represented as "the voice of the people".
“recent evidence suggests that troll's messages propagate to mainstream media and are represented as “the voice of the people” (67).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [67] Lukito J, et al. 2019. The wolves in sheep's clothing: how Russia's Internet Research Agency tweets appeared in U.S. news as Vox Populi. Int J Press Polit. 25: 194016121989521.
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThe dictionary includes some terms that may not seem strictly polarized (e.g., people).
“it also includes some terms that may not seem strictly polarized (e.g. people).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe work has focused primarily on quasi-experimental manipulations or correlational methodology.
“this work has focused primarily on quasi-experimental manipulations or correlational methodology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenThe polarization dictionary was built on data collected in 2015 and on 3 polarized topics.
“The polarization dictionary has been built on data collected in 2015 and on 3 polarized topics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThese results are consistent with other findings that do not find evidence for increased polarization during this brief time frame.
“These results are consistent with other findings that do not find evidence for increased polarization during this brief time frame (70).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [70] Westwood S J, Peterson E, Lelkes Y. 2019. Are there still limits on partisan prejudice?. Pub Opin Quart. 83(3): 584– 597. 10.1093/poq/nfz034 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe dictionary is subject to bias about topics that were timely in 2015 and is potentially restricted in its scope.
“Therefore, it is subjected to bias about topics that were timely in 2015 and is potentially restricted in its scope.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningThe authors employed a weighted regression analysis that downweights the relatively sparse early messages.
“we employed a weighted regressions analysis that takes into account the relatively sparse nature of early messages (and therefore, downweights their importance).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningEarly data may not have originated with the nation in question for some Venezuelan or Iranian content, and may have biased the polarization over time analyses.
“Early data, therefore, may not have originated with the nation in question. While this was probably not the case with the Russian trolls dataset, it could be the case with some Venezuelan or Iranian content, and may have biased our polarization over time analyses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Some countries use hacked, purchased, or stolen social media accounts.
- Rests on an assumption: The Russian trolls dataset is authentic (not from hacked, purchased, or stolen accounts).
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe authors attempted to mitigate the dictionary's scope limitation by expanding the lexicon using word-embeddings and testing its validation over multiple time periods.
“We attempt to get around this limitation by expanding the lexicon using word-embeddings and testing its validation over multiple time periods.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
Ingroup bias in tweet diffusion is a valid marker of political polarization.
“The database included tweets about contentious political topics that showed a range of ingroup bias in their spread through social networks (i.e. they either were shared with only the political ingroup or spread to 1 or more outgroup members).”
The paper relies on this without support.
The Reddit communities selected as political have established ideologies that make them politically polarized.
“We extracted up to 1,000 messages from 36 political communities with established ideologies (18 from each political side).”
The paper relies on this without support.
NeutralPolitics is a neutral reference of respectful political discourse.
“We extracted messages from the popular subreddit NeutralPolitics (www.reddit.com/r/NeutralPolitics), a reddit community devoted to factual and respectful political discourse.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The Civiqs partisan difference score validly measures public opinion polarization about COVID-19.
“We calculated a “partisan difference score” from 2020 February 25th until 2020 April 14th by subtracting the daily Republican net concern from the daily Democratic net concern, as reported by Civiqs”
The paper relies on this without support.
English-language tweets from trolls are most likely aimed at an international or American audience.
“We only used original tweets that were posted in the English language and were most likely aimed for an international/American audience.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The countries examined (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) hold anti-American views.
“We provide novel evidence that this mission spans several countries that hold antiAmerican views.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some countries use hacked, purchased, or stolen social media accounts.
“Some countries use hacked, purchased, or stolen accounts.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The Russian trolls dataset is authentic (not from hacked, purchased, or stolen accounts).
“While this was probably not the case with the Russian trolls dataset”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Polarized rhetoric about the pandemic on Twitter was highly correlated with polarized beliefs about the risks of the pandemic several days later.
“For instance, polarized rhetoric about the pandemic on Twitter was highly correlated with polarized beliefs about the risks of the pandemic several days later (Simchon et al. 2022).”
From Social Media and Morality. (2024) · cites this paper as Simchon et al. 2022
The Dictionary validation section reports a strong correlation (r = 0.67) between polarized COVID-19 language on Twitter and partisan differences in pandemic concern at an eight-day offset. It does not clearly support the claimed direction of that offset: the passage specifies poll responses at t0 and Twitter language at t8, rather than beliefs occurring several days after the tweets. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredWhile more voices can be heard through social media, more extreme voices may be prioritized and propaganda can foster divisive content, which might distort the information people consume.
“Thus, while more voices can be heard through social media, more extreme voices may be prioritized (Bail 2022) and propaganda can foster divisive content (Simchon et al. 2022), which might distort the information people consume.”
From Social Media and Morality. (2024) · cites this paper as Simchon et al. 2022
Different examples of misinformation often make use of the same underlying tropes.
“different examples of misinformation often make use of the same underlying tropes (18, 19).”
From Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media (2022) · cites this paper as [19]
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Consistentt(3156) = 9.79reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (3156) = 9.79, p < .001”
- Consistentt(716.06) = 3.58reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (716.06) = 3.58, p < .001”
- Consistentr(48) = 0.45reported p = .001 · recomputed p = .001
“r (48) = 0.45, p = .001”
- Consistentr(40) = 0.67reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r (40) = 0.67, p < .001”
- Consistentχ²(1) = 5263reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(1) = 5263, p < .0001”
- Consistentχ²(7) = 373563reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(7) = 373,563, p < .0001”
- Consistentχ²(7) = 2223reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(7) = 2223, p < .0001”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Overview attributes the full sample size to trolls
MinorThe overview says nearly 2.3 million tweets came from trolls and were compared with American tweets. The preprocessing section says 2,306,233 is the total *including* 1,507,300 American control tweets.
“We conducted a high-powered study using nearly 2,300,000 tweets from trolls in multiple countries and compared the results to a random sample of American Twitter users.”
“Our sample size consisted of 2,306,233 original tweets in the English language (retweets were filtered out): 383,510 by Russian trolls, 329,453 by Iranian trolls, 85,970 by Venezuelan trolls, and 1,507,300 by American Controls (random sample from our Twitter database with no specific text search).”
Stated tweet-collection period conflicts with the control sample
MinorThe methods say tweets were extracted starting in November 2017, but Study 2 says its US control sample includes tweets posted starting in November 2016.
“We extracted tweets between November 2017 and December 2019.”
“To determine if polarized language is increasing over time, we sampled 1,507,300 tweets that were posted between November 2016 and December 2019 in the United States.”
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Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions
Stewart, A. J., Mosleh, M., Diakonova, M., Arechar, A. A., Rand, D. G., & Plotkin, J. B. (2019) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6 · Cited by 176 · see citing works
Acting the Part: Examining Information Operations Within #BlackLivesMatter Discourse
Arif, A., Stewart, L. G., & Starbird, K. (2018) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3274289 · Cited by 152 · see citing works
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Russian Twitter accounts and the partisan polarization of vaccine discourse, 2015-2017
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In-Group Love Versus Out-Group Hate: Which Is More Important to Partisans and When?
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A minimalistic model of bias, polarization and misinformation in social networks
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A Characterization of Political Communities on Reddit
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Are there still limits on partisan prejudice?
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Segmenting the Electorate: The Effects of Exposure to Political Extremism Online
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Emergence of metapopulations and echo chambers in mobile agents
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Fancy bears and digital trolls: Cyber strategy with a Russian twist
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Polarize and Conquer: Russian Influence Operations in the United States
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Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Klein, 2020, Why we're polarized
- Badawy, 2018, Analyzing the digital traces of political manipulation: The 2016 Russian interference Twitter campaign, 258
- Demszky, 2019, Analyzing polarization in social media: method and application to tweets on 21 mass shootings, 2970
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media
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GPT is an effective tool for multilingual psychological text analysis
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Algorithm-mediated social learning in online social networks
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- Authors
- Simchon, A., Brady, W. J., & Van Bavel, J. J.
- Affiliations
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Yale University (US)
- Department of Psychology, New York University , New York, NY 10003 , USA
- Corresponding author
- Simchon, Almog
- Venue
- PNAS Nexus
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-03
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- pgac019-pgac019
- ISSN
- 2752-6542 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC9802075
- OpenAlex
- W4221025338
- Semantic Scholar
- 5450f688fee4c654c5c1d4449a9356f1c54117c6
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 26.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PNAS Nexus (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation (61378)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
- Keywords
- online polarization, language dictionaries, partisan bias, social media engagement, political communication, intergroup conflict, #BlackLivesMatter, Reddit, Twitter
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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