The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 19 of the 43 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions
Open accessAbstract
Justice systems delegate punishment decisions to groups in the belief that the aggregation of individuals’ preferences facilitates judiciousness. However, group dynamics may also lead individuals to relinquish moral responsibility by conforming to the majority’s preference for punishment. Across five experiments (N = 399), we find Victims and Jurors tasked with restoring justice become increasingly punitive (by as much as 40%) as groups express a desire to punish, with every additional punisher augmenting an individual’s punishment rates. This influence is so potent that knowing about a past group’s preference continues swaying decisions even when they cannot affect present outcomes. Using computational models of decision-making, we test long-standing theories of how groups influence choice. We find groups induce conformity by making individuals less cautious and more impulsive, and by amplifying the value of punishment. However, compared to Victims, Jurors are more sensitive to moral violation severity and less readily swayed by the group. Conformity to a group’s punitive preference also extends to weightier moral violations such as assault and theft. Our results demonstrate that groups can powerfully shift an individual’s punitive preference across a variety of contexts, while additionally revealing the cognitive mechanisms by which social influence alters moral values.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Across five experiments, individuals’ punishment decisions were strongly swayed by group punitive preferences, with predicted punishment shifting by as much as 40 percentage points. Computational modeling showed this conformity arose from lowered decision thresholds and increased valuation of punishment, with differences between victims and jurors.
Key findings
- Group punitive preferences increased punishment endorsement in every experiment: predicted punishment shifted by as much as 30 percentage points in Experiment 1, 40 percentage points in Experiment 3, nearly 30 percentage points in Experiment 4, and also modulated crime-severity judgments in Experiment 5.
- Conformity scaled with the proportion of punishers in the group, and even a past group’s preferences influenced punishment when subjects decided first (Experiment 2), though this effect was attenuated relative to deciding last.
- In Experiments 3–4, group majority lowered decision thresholds (all posterior Ps < 0.001) and increased drift rate as the proportion of punishers rose, indicating greater valuation of punishment. Victims showed an overall bias toward compensation (average z = 0.42, 0.43, 0.44 for Mildly, Somewhat, Highly Unfair; all posterior Ps < 0.001), while Jurors were biased toward compensation only for Mildly Unfair offers (average z = 0.45, posterior P < 0.001).
- Victim versus Juror differences were mixed: Experiment 4 found conformity significantly weakened for Jurors relative to Victims (β = 0.50, SE = 0.13, z = −2.58, p = 0.010), whereas Experiment 5 found the overall conformity effect significantly stronger for Jurors than Victims (β = 2.06, SE = 0.69, z = 3.00, df = 224.00, p = 0.003).
Methods
- Experiments 1–4 recruited 176 subjects from Brown University and the surrounding community. Final analyzed samples were 41 (Experiment 1), 48 (Experiment 2), 41 with one partial dataset (Experiment 3), and 43 (Experiment 4). Subjects completed a Justice Game in which Player B could Accept, Compensate, or Reverse unfair splits from Player A; Experiments 1–2 varied whether subjects decided last or first in a five-person group, and Experiments 3–4 used Victim and Juror versions suitable for drift diffusion modeling.
- Experiment 5 recruited 300 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects, with final samples of 118 Victim-condition and 108 Juror-condition subjects after exclusions. Subjects read assault or theft vignettes crossed with high- versus low-intensity crime and rated punishment severity on a 100-point scale.
- Main analyses used mixed-effects logistic or linear regressions. Experiments 3–4 used hierarchical Bayesian estimation of the Drift Diffusion Model via HDDM, with model selection by Deviance Information Criterion, posterior predictive checks, and parameter recovery simulations.
Limitations
- The paper states that future work should examine repeated interactions with the same perpetrators, especially whether conformity ceases once a perpetrator is perceived as rehabilitated, and how social influence and attitude change operate as learning processes.
- The paper states that it is difficult to obtain field data quantifying how much conformity effects shift real jurors’ punitive inclinations, and notes that Experiment 5’s divergence from Experiments 3–4 may be due to hypothetical choices or to the vignettes involving more severe moral transgressions.
- Evident from the text: Experiments 1–4 relied on relatively small lab samples and computer-generated group responses under social deception, while Experiment 5 used hypothetical vignettes and excluded many MTurk responses for data-quality reasons; these features may limit generalizability to real-world punishment contexts.
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Claims the paper makes
13 Valid · 1 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 76 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This preference for compensation did not significantly vary as a function of offer unfairness (all posterior Ps > 0.10).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A formal comparison between Experiment 3 (Victim) and Experiment 4 (Juror) additionally finds that the conformity effect is significantly weakened for Jurors relative to Victims (β = 0.50, SE = 0.13, z = −2.58, p = 0.010; estimate and SE are in units of odds ratios).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As in Experiment 1, results indicate that increasing the proportion of punishers within a group significantly enhances punishment endorsement rates, even when accounting for offer unfairness and baseline punitive preferences (Table 2 ; Fig. 2 ).”
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Behavioral results indicate that the group’s punitive preferences significantly modulates punishment (Table 4 ), shifting predicted punishment by nearly 30 percentage points.”
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We additionally find that individuals are generally less cautious and more impulsive when choosing within a group majority, relative to when they are choosing alone (Fig. 4 ).”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
Random effects structure for confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013) · Journal of Memory and Language · doi:10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001 · Cited by 10,328
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0046408 · Cited by 4,819
Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority
Asch, S. E. (1956) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093718 · Cited by 4,267
The Diffusion Decision Model: Theory and Data for Two-Choice Decision Tasks
Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (2008) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.2008.12-06-420 · Cited by 3,059
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
The Chicago face database: a free stimulus set of faces and norming data
Ma, D. S., Correll, J., & Wittenbrink, B. (2015) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-014-0532-5 · Cited by 1,788
Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127333 · Cited by 1,771
Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment
Cialdini, R. B. (2003) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-8721.01242 · Cited by 1,553
Cited by
How peer influence shapes value computation in moral decision-making
Yu, H., Siegel, J. Z., Clithero, J. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2021) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104641 · Cited by 100
“Previous studies using the DDM to investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying conformity primarily investigated conformity to a group’s consensus (Germar et al., 2014; Son et al., 2019; Tump et al., 2020) rather than compliance or emulation, which may rely on different cognitive mechanisms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2…”
MethodPeople prefer coordinated punishment in cooperative interactions
Molleman, L., Kölle, F., Starmer, C., & Gächter, S. (2019) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-019-0707-2 · Cited by 63
Can Online Juries Make Consistent, Repeatable Decisions?
Hu, X. E., Whiting, M. E., & Bernstein, M. S. (2021) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3411764.3445433 · Cited by 65
“found that “over one-third of them would have reversed their jury’s decision if they had been given sole control over the trial’s outcome” [54].”
BackgroundDistinct neurocomputational mechanisms support informational and socially normative conformity
Mahmoodi, A., Nili, H., Bang, D., Mehring, C., & Bahrami, B. (2022) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3001565 · Cited by 51
“These domains include perceptual decision-making [14,36]; value-based decision-making [37,38]; object preference [10,39]; moral decision-making [40]; charitable giving [41]; and social punishment [42].”
Computational Social Psychology
Cushman, F. A. (2023) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-021323-040420 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Son, J.-Y., Bhandari, A., & FeldmanHall, O.
- Affiliations
- Brown University (US)
- Corresponding author
- FeldmanHall, Oriel
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2019-08-12
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 11625-11625
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC6690944
- OpenAlex
- W2968071192
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2025: 10 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 2.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (P20GM103645)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Law › Jury Decision Making Processes
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- punishment, reference groups, social influence, conformity, moral responsibility, restorative justice, group decision making, impulsivity, computational models of decision making, jury members
- MeSH terms
- Decision Making, Female, Humans, Male, Punishment, Crowdsourcing
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41598-019-48050-2
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- Son, J.-Y., Bhandari, A., & FeldmanHall, O. (2019). Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions. Scientific Reports. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-48050-2
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