Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 28 of the 54 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Understanding large language models demands distinguishing human projection from machine cognition

Open access
Li, Lingyu, Teng, Yan, Wang, Yingchun, Hu, Xia·2026·Communications Psychology

Abstract

Current efforts to understand Large Language Models (LLMs) are largely metaphorical. Researchers map LLMs onto familiar domains, from physics and neuroscience to psychology and sociology, each illuminating specific facets while obscuring others. We chart these metaphors across mechanistic, behavioral, and interactive scales and delineate their explanatory boundaries. Crucially, this metaphorical projection creates a recursive loop of anthropomorphism, fueling the “genuine understanding” versus “pattern matching” impasse. As an alternative approach, we propose machine experientialism, positing that LLMs build their own form of understanding from training corpora. The priority shifts from cataloging LLMs’ human-like traits to uncovering their distinct logic that emerges from this text-based world.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that research on large language models is overly driven by metaphor and anthropomorphism, which obscures the distinction between human projection and machine cognition. It proposes “machine experientialism” as a framework for understanding LLMs as systems that construct their own internal reality from training text rather than as human-like minds.

## Key findings

  • The authors map LLM research metaphors across mechanistic, behavioral, and interactive scales, and argue that each lens illuminates only a slice of the system while hiding others.
  • They identify a recursive anthropomorphism loop: treating LLMs as human-like encourages the “genuine understanding” vs. “pattern matching” debate and blurs machine capability with user projection.
  • They propose machine experientialism, extending experientialism to LLMs: the model’s “cognition” is framed as a subjective construction of understanding from its textual environment through its Transformer architecture.
  • The paper cites a recent temporal cognition study in which models rated year similarities from 1525 to 2524, found subjective temporal reference points and Weber-Fechner-law-like behavior, and identified “temporal-preferential neurons” plus a hierarchical reconstruction from numerical to abstract temporal representations.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical review rather than an empirical experiment: the paper synthesizes interdisciplinary metaphors used to study LLMs, including physics, neuroscience, psychology, sociology, economics, and behavioral science.
  • It organizes the literature into mechanistic, behavioral, and interactive scales and evaluates each metaphor’s explanatory reach and limits.
  • It uses one external empirical example on temporal cognition to illustrate the machine-experientialist interpretation.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that each metaphor “foregrounds a selective slice of LLM” and “backgrounds others,” so no single framework gives a complete account.
  • It notes that mechanistic approaches can be too specific, have poor transferability across model families, face computational explosion, and may reintroduce data complexity.
  • It also makes evident that the paper is largely argumentative and synthetic rather than an original empirical study; this is evident from the text.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s44271-026-00508-6

Cites

53 of 53 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 Overview of machine experientialism. From the view of machine experientialism, LLM constructs its internal reality from data through its representational system. Different disciplinary lenses metaphorically capture specific slices of this model at mechanistic, behavioral, and interactive scales. We partially created this figure using BioRender (BioRender.com).
Fig. 1 Overview of machine experientialism. From the view of machine experientialism, LLM constructs its internal reality from data through its representational system. Different disciplinary lenses metaphorically capture specific slices of this model at mechanistic, behavioral, and interactive scales. We partially created this figure using BioRender (BioRender.com).CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

22 Valid · 1 Not valid · 18 Not checked · 60 Own results and interpretations

24 more claims · 7 with their cited sources checked

Create a free account to see all 101 claims and every source verdict.

See all claims — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 64
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 18

Create a free account to see these claims.

Citations

Cites

Show all 39 references

Research works printed but not linked: 20

  1. Jimenez, C. E. et al. Swe-bench: Can language models resolve real-world github issues? In The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2024).
  2. Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago press, 2024).
  3. Ton, J.-F. et al. Understanding Chain-of-Thought in LLMs through Information Theory. In Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML, 2025).
  4. Li, L. et al. Reflection-Bench: Evaluating Epistemic Agency in Large Language Models. In Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML, 2025). It adopts a psychological perspective, utilizing a suite of cognitive tasks to analyze the epistemic agency and dynamic reflection capabilities of LLMs.
  5. Brown, T. et al. Language models are few-shot learners. Adv. Neural Inf. Process. Syst. 33, 1877–1901 (2020).
  6. Choromanska, A. et al. The loss surfaces of multilayer networks. In Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (PMLR, 2015).
  7. Carson, J. D. A Statistical Physics of Language Model Reasoning. In ICML 2025 Workshop on Reliable and Responsible Foundation Models (ICML, 2025).
  8. Zhao, Y. et al. Understanding and enhancing safety mechanisms of LLMs via safety-specific neuron. In The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR, 2025).
  9. Gurnee, W. & Tegmark, M. Language Models Represent Space and Time. In The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR, 2024).
  10. Alain, G. & Bengio, Y. Understanding intermediate layers using linear classifier probes. In The Fifth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR, 2017).
  11. Park, K. et al. The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Models. In International Conference on Machine Learning (PMLR 2024).
  12. Latour, B. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Harvard University Press, 1987).
  13. Sanborn, A. & Griffiths, T. Markov chain Monte Carlo with people. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 20 (NIPS, 2007).
  14. Zhu, J.-Q. et al. Recovering Mental Representations from Large Language Models with Markov Chain Monte Carlo. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Cognitive Science Society, 2024).
  15. Zhu, J.-Q. & Griffiths, T. Eliciting the Priors of Large Language Models using Iterated In-Context Learning. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Cognitive Science Society, 2025).
  16. Liu, R. et al. Mind Your Step (by Step): Chain-of-Thought can Reduce Performance on Tasks where Thinking Makes Humans Worse. In Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML, 2025).
  17. Shani, C. et al. From Tokens to Thoughts: How LLMs and Humans Trade Compression for Meaning. In The Fourteenth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2026).
  18. Binz, M. and Schulz, E. Turning large language models into cognitive models. In International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR, 2024).
  19. Zhou, X. et al. SOTOPIA: Interactive Evaluation for Social Intelligence in Language Agents. In The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR, 2024).
  20. Mirzadeh, S. I. et al. GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Models. In The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR, 2025).

Cited by

See all 1

Metadata

Authors
Li, L., Teng, Y., Wang, Y., & Hu, X.
Affiliations
Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CN)
Corresponding author
Teng, Yan
Venue
Communications Psychology
Published
2026-07-16
Volume
4
Issue
1
ISSN
2731-9121 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7169052305
Cited by
0
References
39
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Communications Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
Keywords
large language models, machine cognition, anthropomorphism, training corpus

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-01, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-01 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding large language models demands distinguishing human projection from machine cognition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s44271-026-00508-6
The paper
Li, L., Teng, Y., Wang, Y., & Hu, X. (2026). Understanding large language models demands distinguishing human projection from machine cognition. Communications Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-026-00508-6

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.