Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
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Citations
Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Self-citationCostly Punishment Across Human Societies
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127333 · Cited by 1,771
The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms1442 · Cited by 350
Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation
Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M., & Ohtsuki, H. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010 · Cited by 233
Serotonin Modulates Striatal Responses to Fairness and Retaliation in Humans
Crockett, M. J., Apergis-Schoute, A., Herrmann, B., Lieberman, M. D., Müller, U., Robbins, T. W., & Clark, L. (2013) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2761-12.2013 · Cited by 134 · cited 1×
“That is, subjects had to state their willingness to accept or reject each of the following proposals (proposer’s payoff [J], responder’s payoff [J]): (20, 0); (18, 2); (16, 4); (14, 6); (12, 8); (10, 10).”
BackgroundSelf-citationHonesty mediates the relationship between serotonin and reaction to unfairness
Takahashi, H., Takano, H., Camerer, C. F., Ideno, T., Okubo, S., Matsui, H., Tamari, Y., Takemura, K., Arakawa, R., Kodaka, F., et al. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1118687109 · Cited by 47
Cited by
Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable
Peysakhovich, A., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms5939 · Cited by 426
The Role of Compassion in Altruistic Helping and Punishment Behavior
Weng, H. Y., Fox, A. S., Hessenthaler, H. C., Stodola, D. E., & Davidson, R. J. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0143794 · Cited by 132
McCall, C., Steinbeis, N., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2014) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00424 · Cited by 59
Moral licensing, instrumental apology and insincerity aversion: Taking Immanuel Kant to the lab
Khalil, E. L., & Feltovich, N. (2018) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0206878 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Brañas-Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Herrmann, B.
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2014-08-12
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 6025-6025
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1964433021
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 37.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/srep06025
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- Brañas-Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Herrmann, B. (2014). Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game. Scientific Reports. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep06025
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