Evidence for surprise minimization over value maximization in choice behavior
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Classical economic models are predicated on the idea that the ultimate aim of choice is to maximize utility or reward. In contrast, an alternative perspective highlights the fact that adaptive behavior requires agents' to model their environment and minimize surprise about the states they frequent. We propose that choice behavior can be more accurately accounted for by surprise minimization compared to reward or utility maximization alone. Minimizing surprise makes a prediction at variance with expected utility models; namely, that in addition to attaining valuable states, agents attempt to maximize the entropy over outcomes and thus 'keep their options open'. We tested this prediction using a simple binary choice paradigm and show that human decision-making is better explained by surprise minimization compared to utility maximization. Furthermore, we replicated this entropy-seeking behavior in a control task with no explicit utilities. These findings highlight a limitation of purely economic motivations in explaining choice behavior and instead emphasize the importance of belief-based motivations.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures





Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“This marginal likelihood scores the plausibility of a particle pursuing this kind of path and is usually interpreted in terms of expected loss (i.e., negative expected reward or utility) [66, 63], and pragmatic affordance [153, 123].”
From The free energy principle made simpler but not too simple (2023) · cites this paper as [153]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Shannon, C. E. (1948) · Bell System Technical Journal · doi:10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x · Cited by 88,486
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Information theory and statistical mechanics
Jaynes, E. T. (1957) · Physical Review · doi:10.1103/physrev.106.620 · Cited by 12,931
Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
Bayesian model selection for group studies
Stephan, K. E., Penny, W. D., Daunizeau, J., Moran, R. J., & Friston, K. J. (2009) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.03.025 · Cited by 1,423
Self-citationBayesian surprise attracts human attention
Itti, L., & Baldi, P. (2009) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/j.visres.2008.09.007 · Cited by 1,224
Dayan, P., Hinton, G. E., Neal, R. M., & Zemel, R. S. (1995) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.1995.7.5.889 · Cited by 1,207
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Sun Y., Gomez F. & Schmidhuber J. Planning to Be Surprised: Optimal Bayesian Exploration in Dynamic Environments. Artif Intell 6830, 41– 51 (2011).
Cited by
Items 101–114 of 114
Proietti, R., Parr, T., Tessari, A., Friston, K. J., & Pezzulo, G. (2024) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/m87wk
Self-citationFujimi, T. (2024) · Japanese Journal of JSCE · doi:10.2208/jscejj.24-20097
Vidal, A., Damiani, F., Valyan, A., Soto‐Faraco, S., & Moreno‐Bote, R. (2025) · Journal of Cognition · doi:10.5334/joc.467
“These two aspects, that is minimising surprises and maximising entropy, are pivotal ingredients of the free energy principle (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015).”
Hierarchical active inference for cognitive architectures
Proietti, R. (2023) · AMS Dottorato Institutional Doctoral Theses Repository (University of Bologna) · doi:10.48676/unibo/amsdottorato/10920
Sakarya, L. (. (2024) · Research Repository (Delft University of Technology)
Bayesian cognitive modeling of the balancing between goal-directed and habitual behavior
Schwöbel, S. (2020) · Qucosa (Saxon State and University Library Dresden)
Autonomy in learning: Predictability modulates the beneficial effect of choice on memory
Zhang, Z., van Lieshout, L. L. F., & Bekkering, H. (2026) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-026-01863-9
“Moreover, previous research has shown that choice behavior facilitates the minimization of surprise and the maximization of precision in processing reward-related information (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015a, 2015b).”
Addressing the Subsumption Thesis: A Formal Bridge Between Microeconomics and Active Inference
Kuhn, N. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-16955-6_3
“Furthermore, computational simulations [16] and empirical studies [35] might flesh out the practical comparison between bounded expected utility and active inference; Computational efficiency has not remotely been addressed in this paper.”
Errors or Adaptations? A Critical Review of Predictive Processing in Psychiatry
Crippen, M. (2026) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs16071116
“…tool and that the brain evolved to minimize expected surprise, which does not always entail representing affairs accurately (Bruineberg et al., 2018; A. Clark, 2013, 2016; Facchin, 2021; Friston, 2010, 2011; Kiverstein et al., 2019; Hohwy, 2020; Parr et al., 2022; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015).”
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex acts as an integrative hub during information gatheringPreprint
Kadri, K., Marzuki, A. A., del Río, M., & Hauser, T. U. (2026) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.64898/2026.08.11.744102
Active Inference is Optimal ControlPreprint
Kaufmann, R. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7504418
The phantastic organ: predictive processing in the brain
Friston, K. J., & Parr, T. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1901293
Self-citationDutta, C. N., Christov-Moore, L., Ombao, H., & Douglas, P. K. (2022) · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.938501.s001
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H. B., Mathys, C., Dolan, R., Kronbichler, M., & Friston, K.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- University of Salzburg (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Schwartenbeck, Philipp
- ORCID
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2015-11-13
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 16575-16575
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4643240
- OpenAlex
- W2415954501
- Cited by
- 96
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 9
- FWCI
- 4.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (acceptedVersion)
- SDL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (091593, 091593/Z/10/, 098362, 098362/Z/12/Z, 091593/Z/10/Z, 098362/Z/12/)
- University College London (098362/Z/12/Z)
- Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
- Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (098362/Z/12/Z)
- Universität Salzburg
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- surprise minimization, entropy maximization, choice behavior, utility maximization, expected utility, adaptive behavior, binary choice, human decision-making
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Algorithms, Choice Behavior, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Male, Motivation, Psychomotor Performance, Reward, Linear Models, Models, Economic, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.