Cited by 23Software Engineering Techniques and PracticesWeb Application Security VulnerabilitiesInformation and Cyber Security

Revisit security in the era of DevOps: An evidence-based inquiry into DevSecOps industry

Open access
Zhou, Xin, Mao, Runfeng, Zhang, He, Dai, Qiming, Huang, Huang, Shen, Haifeng, Li, Jingyue, Rong, Guoping·2023·IET Software

Abstract

Abstract By adopting agile and lean practices, DevOps aims to achieve rapid value delivery by speeding up development and deployment cycles, which however lead to more security concerns that cannot be fully addressed by an isolated security role only in the final stage of development. DevSecOps promotes security as a shared responsibility integrated into the DevOps process that seamlessly intertwines development, operations, and security from the start throughout to the end of cycles. While some companies have already begun to embrace this new strategy, both industry and academia are still seeking a common understanding of the DevSecOps movement. The goal of this study is to report the state‐of‐the‐practice of DevSecOps, including the impact of DevOps on security, practitioners' understanding of DevSecOps, and the practices associated with DevSecOps as well as the challenges of implementing DevSecOps. The authors used a mixed‐methods approach for this research. The authors carried out a grey literature review on DevSecOps, and surveyed the practitioners of DevSecOps in industry of China. The status quo of DevSecOps in industry is summarized. Three major software security risks are identified with DevOps, where the establishment of DevOps pipeline provides opportunities for security‐related activities. The authors classify the interpretations of DevSecOps into three core aspects of DevSecOps capabilities, cultural enablers, and technological enablers. To materialise the interpretations into daily software production activities, the recommended DevSecOps practices from three perspectives—people, process, and technology. Although a preliminary consensus is that DevSecOps is regarded as an extension of DevOps, there is a debate on whether DevSecOps is a superfluous term. While DevSecOps is attracting an increasing attention by industry, it is still in its infancy and more effort needs to be invested to promote it in both research and industry communities.

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  • Zhou et al.'s industry-focused analysis reveals further issues such as vague definitions, skill gaps, inconsistent security practices, and a lack of consensus on DevSecOps standards.

    “Additionally, Zhou et al.'s industry-focused analysis reveals further issues such as vague definitions, skill gaps, inconsistent security practices, and a lack of consensus on DevSecOps standards, highlighting the continued fragmentation of approaches.”

    From Evolution of DevSecOps and Its Influence on Application Security: A Systematic Literature Review (2025) · cites this paper as [38]

    Section 5.3 says there is no commonly accepted definition of DevSecOps, and section 6.3 identifies a lack of DevSecOps experts. The survey results (section 4) and section 6.1.2 describe differing security concerns and practices across industries. The copy does not explicitly establish a lack of consensus on DevSecOps standards, as distinct from its definition or practices. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The literature identifies persistent limitations including tool incompatibility, challenges with legacy systems, fragmented security policies, and resistance to change within organisations.

    “yet the literature identifies persistent limitations including tool incompatibility, challenges with legacy systems, fragmented security policies, and resistance to change within organisations.”

    From Evolution of DevSecOps and Its Influence on Application Security: A Systematic Literature Review (2025) · cites this paper as [38]

    Section 6.3 (page not provided) identifies organisational culture resistance, complications with legacy resources, and the complexity of integrating security tools as DevSecOps challenges. It does not specifically identify tool incompatibility or fragmented security policies as persistent limitations. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Automation significantly boosts cybersecurity by enabling rapid vulnerability detection and more efficient compliance processes.

    “showing that automation significantly boosts cybersecurity by enabling rapid vulnerability detection and more efficient compliance processes”

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Modi, V., et al.: Impact evaluation of smoke-free mass media campaign on knowledge, attitude and behavior of the target audience in India. In: Proceedings of the 2012 National Conference on Health Communication Marketing and Media (2012)
  2. Bird, J.: DevOpsSec: Delivering Secure Software through Continuous Delivery. O'Reilly Media (2016)
  3. Zou, J., et al.: Which non-functional requirements do developers focus on? an empirical study on stack overflow using topic analysis. In: Pro- ceedings of the 12th Working Conference on Mining Software Re- positories, pp. 446-449. IEEE (2015)
  4. Fetterman, D.M.: Ethnography: Step-By-Step, vol. 17. Sage (2019)

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Authors
Zhou, X., Mao, R., Zhang, H., Dai, Q., Huang, H., Shen, H., Li, J., & Rong, G.
Affiliations
  • State Key Laboratory of New Technology of Computer Software (CN)
  • Huatai Securities Co., Ltd. Nanjing China
  • State Grid Nanjing Power Supply Company (China) (CN)
  • Australian Catholic University (AU)
  • Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NO)
Corresponding author
Zhang, He
Venue
IET Software
Published
2023-07-26
Volume
17
Issue
4
Pages
435-454
ISSN
1751-8806 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4385377587
Cited by
23
References
45
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 6
FWCI
5.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IET Software (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
National Natural Science Foundation of China (2019YFE0105500)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Techniques and Practices
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
DevSecOps, DevOps, software security, DevOps pipelines, security practices, technological enablers, practitioner perceptions

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