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Cited by 407

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption

Kunicová, Jana, Rose-Ackerman, Susan·2009·Corruption, Development and Institutional Design

Abstract

Elections serve two functions in representative democracies. First, they select political actors who enact public policies in the light of constituents’ preferences. Second, they permit citizens to hold their representatives accountable and to punish them if they enrich themselves in corrupt or self-serving ways. In other words, elections provide both incentives for politicians to enact certain kinds of policies and constraints on politicians’ malfeasance. In this chapter, we focus on the second of these two functions and investigate how different electoral systems constrain corrupt rent-seeking, holding constant other political, economic and social factors.

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Metadata

Authors
Kunicová, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S.
Venue
Corruption, Development and Institutional Design
Published
2009
Pages
3-23
OpenAlex
W2159855573
Cited by
407
References
1
FWCI
178.83
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1057/9780230242173_1
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Kunicová, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2009). Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption. Corruption, Development and Institutional Design. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230242173_1

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