Cited by 1,995Feminist Theory and Gender StudiesFeminism, Gender, and Sexuality StudiesGender, Health, and Social Inequality

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 50 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Re-Thinking Intersectionality

Open access
Nash, Jennifer C.·2008·Feminist Review

Abstract

Black feminist and legal studies scholar Jennifer C. Nash asks us to think critically about what has become the discourse and theory most commonly connected to feminism: intersectionality. As Nash puts it, intersectionality is now “the primary analytic tool that feminist and anti-racist scholars deploy for theorizing identity and oppression” (2008, 1). Nash outlines the limits to what she describes as the murky theory of intersectionality, including (1) the lack of a defined intersectional methodology (that is, how we do intersectionality); (2) the use of Black women as quintessential intersectional subjects; and (3) the vague definition of intersectionality. While intersectionality often gets deployed to talk about an individual’s race, class, and gender—which is often reduced to identity—Nash says we need to move beyond such understandings so that we can focus on racism, classism, sexism, and other forms of marginalization as interrelated forms of structural oppression.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Nash interrogates the assumptions underlying intersectionality as a feminist and anti-racist analytic, arguing that four unresolved tensions leave the paradigm theoretically and methodologically murky. She frames the critique as a constructive invitation to strengthen intersectionality rather than to abandon it.

Key findings

  • Nash identifies four unresolved tensions in intersectionality scholarship: the absence of a clearly defined intersectional methodology, the treatment of black women as the quintessential intersectional subject, the vagueness of the term's definition, and the question of whether the theory matches lived experience.
  • She argues that intersectional work often reproduces the cumulative logic it criticizes: Crenshaw's anti-discrimination analysis, while showing that black women's injuries exceed race-or-gender categories, still treats black women's identities as constituted only by race and gender, leaving class, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity largely unexamined.
  • The reliance on black women as a theoretical wedge treats them as a monolithic group and obscures differences among them; Nash also contends that intersectionality largely renames commitments already present in black feminism without specifying what new analytic tools it adds.
  • She notes an unresolved dispute over scope — whether all identities are intersectional or only multiply marginalized ones — citing Kwan's observation that straight white male identity would likely be resisted as intersectional, against Zack's claim that all women are intersectional subjects.
  • Nash calls for attention to how privilege and oppression are co-constituted within a single subject, and for treating race and gender as distinct, historically specific processes rather than as inextricably fused.

Methods

  • Conceptual and theoretical essay; no empirical data collection or sample. The argument proceeds through close reading and critique of key texts in intersectionality and critical race scholarship.
  • Draws on McCall's three intersectional methodologies — anticategorical, intracategorical, and intercategorical complexity — to show the gap between methodological prescription and actual intersectional practice.
  • Engages primarily with Crenshaw, alongside Wing, Williams, Matsuda, Kwan, Zack, Walcott, and Wacquant, to illustrate the paradoxes Nash identifies.

Limitations

  • Nash states explicitly that her aim is not to dismantle intersectionality but to expose its assumptions so scholars can build a more complex account of identity and oppression; she presents questions and challenges rather than a replacement framework.
  • Evident from the text: the critique rests on a limited set of canonical sources and offers no empirical test of the claims about lived experience, which Nash herself flags as an open question for the field.
  • Evident from the text: the essay diagnoses the missing methodology and theory of agency without supplying either, leaving the constructive program largely programmatic.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1057/fr.2008.4

Cites

29 of 29 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

7 of 50 cited sources checked · 4 supported · 2 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 16 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 48
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 25
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Citations

Cites

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Show all 28 references

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Chang R.S., 2002, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, 71, 485
  2. Crenshaw K., 1992, Raceing Justice, Engendering Power
  3. Kwan P., 1996, Hastings Law Journal, 48, 1257
  4. Matsuda M., 1992, Women's Rights Law Reporter, 14, 297
  5. Wacquant L., 1997, Political Power and Social Theory II, 221
  6. Wing A.K., 1990, Berkeley Women's Law Journal, 6, 181

Cited by

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Items 701–800 of 1,901

Metadata

Authors
Nash, J. C.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Nash, Jennifer C.
Venue
Feminist Review
Published
2008-06
Volume
89
Issue
1
Pages
1-15
ISSN
  • 0141-7789 (ISSN-L)
  • 1466-4380
OpenAlex
W2102167286
Cited by
1,995
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 119 · 2025: 114 · 2024: 163 · 2023: 116 · 2022: 155 · 2021: 202 · 2020: 184 · 2019: 180 · 2018: 142 · 2017: 115 · 2016: 91 · 2015: 100 · 2014: 85 · 2013: 81 · 2012: 73
FWCI
57.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Feminist Review (publishedVersion)
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Feminist Theory and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Feminism, Gender, and Sexuality Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Gender, Health, and Social Inequality
Keywords
intersectionality, critique of intersectionality, Black feminism, systemic oppression, racism, classism, sexism, marginalization, identity, anti-racism, Black women, feminist theory, race, class, and gender

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