Cited by 42Water Systems and OptimizationSmart Grid Security and ResilienceNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

Detection of Cyber Physical Attacks on Water Distribution Systems via Principal Component Analysis and Artificial Neural Networks

Abokifa, Ahmed A., Haddad, Kelsey, Lo, Cynthia S., Biswas, Pratim·2017·World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2017

Abstract

Automated monitoring and operation of modern water distribution systems (WDSs) are largely dependent on an interconnected network of computers, sensors, and actuators that are jointly coordinated by a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Although the implementation of such embedded systems enhances the reliability of the WDS, it also exposes it to cyber-physical attacks that can disrupt the system’s operation or compromise critical information. Hence, the development of attack detection algorithms that can efficiently diagnose and identify such assaults is crucial for the successful application of these automated systems. In this study, we developed an algorithm to identify anomalous behaviors of the different components of a WDS in the context of the Battle of the Attack Detection Algorithms (BATADAL). The algorithm relies on using multiple layers of anomaly detection techniques to identify both local anomalies that affect each sensor individually, as well as global anomalies that simultaneously affect more than one sensor at the same time. The first layer targets finding statistical outliers in the data using simple outlier detection techniques. The second layer employs a trained artificial neural networks (ANNs) model to detect contextual anomalies that does not conform to the normal operational behavior of the system. The third layer uses principal component analysis (PCA) to decompose the high-dimensional space occupied by the given set of sensor measurements into two sub-spaces representing normal and anomalous network operating conditions. By continuously tracking the projections of the data instances on the anomalous conditions subspace, the algorithm identifies the outliers based on their influence on the directions of the principal components. The proposed approach successfully predicted all of the pre-labeled attacks in the validation data set with high sensitivity and specificity. However, for all the detected attacks, the algorithm maintained a false “under attack” status for a few hours after the threat no longer existed.

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Crossref · 10.1061/9780784480625.063

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Authors
Abokifa, A. A., Haddad, K., Lo, C. S., & Biswas, P.
Affiliations
Washington University in St. Louis (US)
Venue
World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2017
Published
2017-05-18
Pages
676-691
OpenAlex
W2615438928
Cited by
42
References
14
Citations by year
2025: 5 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1
FWCI
11.60
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
World Environmental and Water Resources Congress (EWRI) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Water Systems and Optimization
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
cyber-physical attacks, water distribution systems, attack detection, SCADA, anomaly detection, outlier detection, contextual anomalies, principal component analysis, artificial neural networks, sensor measurements, false alarm reduction

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