Framing effects and risky decisions in starlings
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Animals are predominantly risk prone toward reward delays and risk averse toward reward amounts. Humans in turn tend to be risk-seeking for losses and risk averse for gains. To explain the human results, Prospect Theory postulates a convex utility for losses and concave utility for gains. In contrast, Scalar Utility Theory (SUT) explains the animal data by postulating that the cognitive representation of outcomes follows Weber's Law, namely that the spread of the distribution of expected outcomes is proportional to its mean. SUT also would explain human results if utility (even if it is linear on expected outcome) followed Weber's Law. We present an experiment that simulates losses and gains in a bird, the European Starling, to test the implication of SUT that risk proneness/aversion should extend to any aversive/desirable dimension other than time and amount of reward. Losses and gains were simulated by offering choices of fixed vs. variable outcomes with lower or higher outcomes than what the birds expected. The subjects were significantly more risk prone for losses than for gains but, against expectations, they were not significantly risk averse toward gains. The results are thus, in part, consistent with Prospect Theory and SUT and show that risk attitude in humans and birds may obey a common fundamental principle.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
(2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475 · Cited by 2,987
Cited by
Midbrain dopamine neurons encode a quantitative reward prediction error signal
Bayer, H. M., & Glimcher, P. W. (2005) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.05.020 · Cited by 1,304
Weber, E. U., Shafir, S., & Blais, A.-R. (2004) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.111.2.430 · Cited by 724
Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain
Rushworth, M. F. S., & Walton, M. E. (2009) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2009.07.005 · Cited by 658
Prospect theory on the brain? Toward a cognitive neuroscience of decision under risk
Trepel, C., Fox, C. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2005) · Cognitive Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.01.016 · Cited by 404
Risk-sensitive neurons in macaque posterior cingulate cortex
McCoy, A. N., & Platt, M. L. (2005) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1523 · Cited by 379
Metadata
- Authors
- Marsh, B., & Kacelnik, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2002-02-26
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 3352-3355
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2120717323
- Cited by
- 154
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Framing effects and risky decisions in starlings. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.042491999
- The paper
- Marsh, B., & Kacelnik, A. (2002). Framing effects and risky decisions in starlings. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.042491999
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.