Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.
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Citations
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Cited by
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Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
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Gossip and Ostracism Promote Cooperation in Groups
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“They are affected by rumors and gossip (13), which themselves can spread in a population and develop a life of their own.”
BackgroundMultiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0762 · Cited by 158
Self-citationDoes Observability Affect Prosociality?
Bradley, A., Lawrence, C., & Ferguson, E. (2018) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2018.0116 · Cited by 122
Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
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Walsh, J., Vaida, N., Coman, A., & Fiske, S. T. (2022) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/15291006231161337 · Cited by 26
“People often rely on gossip even when direct observations of prior behavior is available (Sommerfeld et al., 2007).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Semmann, D., & Milinski, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2007-10-30
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 44
- Pages
- 17435-17440
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2084116113
- Cited by
- 381
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 33.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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