Darwin's “strange inversion of reasoning”
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection unifies the world of physics with the world of meaning and purpose by proposing a deeply counterintuitive “inversion of reasoning” (according to a 19th century critic): “to make a perfect and beautiful machine, it is not requisite to know how to make it” [MacKenzie RB (1868) (Nisbet & Co., London)]. Turing proposed a similar inversion: to be a perfect and beautiful computing machine, it is not requisite to know what arithmetic is. Together, these ideas help to explain how we human intelligences came to be able to discern the reasons for all of the adaptations of life, including our own.
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Cites
On computable numbers, with an application to the entscheidungsproblem
Turing, A. M. (1937) · Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230 · Cited by 8,283
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and The Laws of Physics
Penrose, R., & Gardner, M. (1989) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198519737.001.0001 · Cited by 2,007
DENNETT, D. C. (1995) · The Sciences · doi:10.1002/j.2326-1951.1995.tb03633.x · Cited by 1,975
Self-citationPlantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Cited by
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
Self-citationAre we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12002440 · Cited by 158
Toward the neural implementation of structure learning
Tervo, D. G. R., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2016) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2016.01.014 · Cited by 106
“Although it is accepted that the ability to abstract structured relationships in the environment is at the core of human intelligence, whether animals perform similar cognitive feats or whether they are instead ‘competent without comprehending’ remains contentious [11,12].”
BackgroundArtificial cognition vs. artificial intelligence for next-generation autonomous robotic agents
Sandini, G., Sciutti, A., & Morasso, P. (2024) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2024.1349408 · Cited by 40
The multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) perspective on group cognition
Goldstone, R. L., & Theiner, G. (2017) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1295635 · Cited by 31
“…Huebner’s characterization that in order to build a wonderful termite mound, it is not necessary that any of the termites knows how to build one (see Dennett, 2009), and that the complex structure of the mound cannot in any straightforward manner be derived from the simple rules governing the…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dennett, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2009-06-16
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- supplement_1
- Pages
- 10061-10065
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2120055819
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 31.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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