Multiple strategies in structured populations
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many specific models have been proposed to study evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations, but most analytical results so far describe the competition of only two strategies. Here we derive a general result that holds for any number of strategies, for a large class of population structures under weak selection. We show that for the purpose of strategy selection any evolutionary process can be characterized by two key parameters that are coefficients in a linear inequality containing the payoff values. These structural coefficients, σ 1 and σ 2 , depend on the particular process that is being studied, but not on the number of strategies, n , or the payoff matrix. For calculating these structural coefficients one has to investigate games with three strategies, but more are not needed. Therefore, n = 3 is the general case. Our main result has a geometric interpretation: Strategy selection is determined by the sum of two terms, the first one describing competition on the edges of the simplex and the second one in the center. Our formula includes all known weak selection criteria of evolutionary games as special cases. As a specific example we calculate games on sets and explore the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and spatial selection. We show that for certain parameter values both repetition and space are needed to promote evolution of cooperation.
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“Within static networks [55] (and certain kinds of dynamic networks [56]), positive mutation rates lead to what is called a ' σ -rule' for selection to favor cooperators in mean abundance.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [55]
Citations
Cites
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Self-citationSMITH, J. M., & PRICE, G. R. (1973) · Nature · doi:10.1038/246015a0 · Cited by 5,089 · cited 1×
“theoretical framework that can be used to study many biological problems including host-parasite interactions, ecosystems, animal behavior, social evolution and human language [8-18].”
BackgroundEvolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463 · cited 1×
“More recently the framework was expanded to deal with stochastic dynamics, finite population size and structured populations [19-32].”
BackgroundSelf-citationSzabó, G., & Fáth, G. (2007) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004 · Cited by 2,974 · cited 1×
“More recently the framework was expanded to deal with stochastic dynamics, finite population size and structured populations [19-32].”
Background(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208
Self-citationSpatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
Hauert, C., & Doebeli, M. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02360 · Cited by 1,582 · cited 1×
“More recently the framework was expanded to deal with stochastic dynamics, finite population size and structured populations [19-32].”
BackgroundSocial diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., & Pacheco, J. M. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06940 · Cited by 1,442 · cited 1×
“More recently the framework was expanded to deal with stochastic dynamics, finite population size and structured populations [19-32].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- M van Veelen, J Garcia Repeated Games in Structured Populations: A Recipe for Cooperation, in press. (2010).
Cited by
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Self-citationDirect reciprocity in structured populations
van Veelen, M., García, J., Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1206694109 · Cited by 248
Self-citationNowak, M. A. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.014 · Cited by 232
“Tarnita et al. (2009b, 2011) provide general results for how any type of population structure affects evolutionary games in the limit of weak selection.”
Self-citationFu, F., Nowak, M. A., Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00845 · Cited by 153
Self-citationA bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
Metadata
- Authors
- Tarnita, C. E., Wage, N., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2011-01-21
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2334-2337
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC3038739
- OpenAlex
- W2120922679
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 39.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (37874)
- John Templeton Foundation
- National Institutes of Health
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- evolutionary game theory, structured populations, weak selection, multiple strategies, structural parameters, simplex geometry, direct reciprocity, spatial selection, evolution of cooperation, repeated games
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Biological Evolution, Models, Biological, Population Dynamics
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