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Multiple strategies in structured populations

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Tarnita, Corina E., Wage, Nicholas, Nowak, Martin A. · 2011 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Many specific models have been proposed to study evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations, but most analytical results so far describe the competition of only two strategies. Here we derive a general result that holds for any number of strategies, for a large class of population structures under weak selection. We show that for the purpose of strategy selection any evolutionary process can be characterized by two key parameters that are coefficients in a linear inequality containing the payoff values. These structural coefficients, σ 1 and σ 2 , depend on the particular process that is being studied, but not on the number of strategies, n , or the payoff matrix. For calculating these structural coefficients one has to investigate games with three strategies, but more are not needed. Therefore, n = 3 is the general case. Our main result has a geometric interpretation: Strategy selection is determined by the sum of two terms, the first one describing competition on the edges of the simplex and the second one in the center. Our formula includes all known weak selection criteria of evolutionary games as special cases. As a specific example we calculate games on sets and explore the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and spatial selection. We show that for certain parameter values both repetition and space are needed to promote evolution of cooperation.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1016008108

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Citations

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  1. M van Veelen, J Garcia Repeated Games in Structured Populations: A Recipe for Cooperation, in press. (2010).

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Metadata

Authors
Tarnita, C. E., Wage, N., & Nowak, M. A.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2011-01-21
Volume
108
Issue
6
Pages
2334-2337
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2120922679
Cited by
106
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 10
FWCI
39.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation
  • Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (37874)
  • John Templeton Foundation
  • National Institutes of Health
  • National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
evolutionary game theory, structured populations, weak selection, multiple strategies, structural parameters, simplex geometry, direct reciprocity, spatial selection, evolution of cooperation, repeated games
MeSH terms
Animals, Biological Evolution, Models, Biological, Population Dynamics

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Multiple strategies in structured populations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.1016008108
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Tarnita, C. E., Wage, N., & Nowak, M. A. (2011). Multiple strategies in structured populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1016008108

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