The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty
Open accessAbstract
How does uncertainty about “dangerous” climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners’ dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured. These results are robust to uncertainty about the impact of crossing a threshold, but uncertainty about the location of the threshold turns the game back into a prisoners’ dilemma, causing cooperation to collapse. Our research explains the paradox of why countries would agree to a collective goal, aimed at reducing the risk of catastrophe, but act as if they were blind to this risk.
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A safe operating space for humanity
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin, F. S., Lambin, E. F., Lenton, T. M., Scheffer, M., Folke, C., Schellnhuber, H. J., et al. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/461472a · Cited by 13,333
Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system
Lenton, T. M., Held, H., Kriegler, E., Hall, J. W., Lucht, W., Rahmstorf, S., & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0705414105 · Cited by 3,982
On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change
Weitzman, M. L. (2009) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.1.1 · Cited by 1,791 · cited 1×
“A final observation concerns attitudes toward risk, which can play a crucial role in the analysis of collective best outcomes (29).”
BackgroundVisualizing Uncertainty About the Future
Spiegelhalter, D., Pearson, M., & Short, I. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1191181 · Cited by 682 · cited 1×
“Probabilities can be difficult for people to comprehend and so must be communicated with care (24).”
Background
Cited by
Personality and prosocial behavior: A theoretical framework and meta-analysis.
Thielmann, I., Spadaro, G., & Balliet, D. (2020) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000217 · Cited by 689
Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?
Ehrlich, P. R., & Ehrlich, A. H. (2013) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.2845 · Cited by 445
A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
Communicating sentiment and outlook reverses inaction against collective risks
Wang, Z., Jusup, M., Guo, H., Shi, L., Geček, S., Anand, M., Perc, M., Bauch, C. T., Kurths, J., Boccaletti, S., et al. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1922345117 · Cited by 185
Cooperation in the Climate Commons
Carattini, S., Levin, S., & Tavoni, A. (2019) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/rez009 · Cited by 134
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, S., & Dannenberg, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2012-10-08
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 43
- Pages
- 17372-17376
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2039656410
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 51.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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