Perceptuo-motor, cognitive, and description-based decision-making seem equally good
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: Human decision-making seems fundamentally domain dependent. Sensory-motor decisions (e.g., where to put your feet on a rocky ridge) seem near-optimal, whereas decisions based on numerical information (e.g., choosing between financial options) seem suboptimal. Additionally, when people rely on information gained through experience, they make choices that are often the opposite of those they make when relying on described information. However, comparing results across domains on the basis of past results is difficult, because decision-making is studied very differently in different domains. We compared decision-making performance across domains under precisely matched conditions, finding evidence against the idea that fundamental dissociations exist. In fact, peoples’ ability to make decisions seem rather good, although not perfect, in both sensory-motor and cognitive domains.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundMethodLong-lasting modulation of feature integrationby transcranial magnetic stimulation
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Cited by
Confidence as Bayesian probability: From neural origins to behavior
Meyniel, F., Sigman, M., & Mainen, Z. F. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.039 · Cited by 349
Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
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A meta-analytic review of two modes of learning and the description-experience gap.
Wulff, D. U., Mergenthaler-Canseco, M., & Hertwig, R. (2018) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000115 · Cited by 271
Variance misperception explains illusions of confidence in simple perceptual decisions
Zylberberg, A., Roelfsema, P. R., & Sigman, M. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.05.012 · Cited by 97
Schulze, C., & Hertwig, R. (2021) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104580 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Jarvstad, A., Hahn, U., Rushton, S. K., & Warren, P. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2013-09-18
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 40
- Pages
- 16271-16276
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2109881712
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 4.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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