The DOI matches its Crossref record; 146 of the 148 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness.
Open accessAbstract
How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience. In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated and egocentric representation of the world from the animal’s perspective is sufficient for subjective experience. Structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions. Therefore, we argue the insect brain also supports a capacity for subjective experience. In both vertebrates and insects this form of behavioral control system evolved as an efficient solution to basic problems of sensory reafference and true navigation. The brain structures that support subjective experience in vertebrates and insects are very different from each other, but in both cases they are basal to each clade. Hence we propose the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian.
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“Elaborate neural connections and many behaviors emerged at this core-brain stage, but it is not conscious.”
From Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap (2020) · cites this paper as Klein and Barron, 2016
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“We deduce this because it is entirely reactive and therefore, reflexive. The invertebrates at this stage sense and follow stimuli that are essential to their survival, but if they lose the sensory trail — with no more stimuli to react to — they cannot go further and resort to systemic but untargeted searching to try to relocate the stimulus.”
From Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap (2020) · cites this paper as Klein and Barron, 2016
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“Similarly interacting brain centers, analogous or homologous to these vertebrate regions, are present in invertebrate phyla such as arthropods and some annelids (for details see Tomer et al., 2010; Strausfeld and Hirth, 2013; Barron and Klein, 2016; Klein and Barron, 2016).”
From The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning (2016) · cites this paper as Barron and Klein, 2016
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“We have argued all vertebrates and some invertebrates likely possess a basal form of consciousness [9,10]”
From Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
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Cites
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Wonderful life: the Burgess Shale and the nature of history
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Das Reafferenzprinzip: Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie
von Holst, E., & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950) · Naturwissenschaften · doi:10.1007/bf00622503 · Cited by 2,655
An information integration theory of consciousness
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Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529
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The nature of feelings: evolutionary and neurobiological origins
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Research works printed but not linked: 5
- C Klein, J Hohwy, Variability, convergence and dimensions of consciousness. Behavioral Methods. Consciousness Research, ed M Overgaard (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford), pp. 249–264 (2015).
- 10.1213/00000539-199608000-00016 · doi:10.1213/00000539-199608000-00016
- D Denton The Primordial Emotions (Oxford Univ Press, New York, 2006).
- 10.1037/0735-7044.111.2.354 · DOI
- I Kant Critique of Pure Reason: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999).
Cited by
Dimensions of Animal Consciousness
Birch, J., Schnell, A. K., & Clayton, N. S. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.007 · Cited by 406
The search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
“There are structures in insects analogous to the midbrain, as emphasized by Barron and Klein (2016), but these do not provide a convincing case for consciousness, for the reasons outlined in Section 3.”
Insects have the capacity for subjective experience
Klein, C., & Barron, A. B. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1113 · Cited by 243
“Acknowledgments In addition to those thanked in Barron & Klein (2016), thanks to Bruno van Swinderen and attendees at the 2016 SydPP meeting for additional feedback.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationHard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194
“…linked to consciousness including learning (Cleeremans, 2007; Cleeremans et al., 2019), body ownership (Faivre et al., 2015), language (Gazzaniga, 1970), integrated and egocentric encoding of the world (Barron & Klein, 2016) and homoeostatic bodily responses (Critchley et al., 2004), to name a few.”
BackgroundMinds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics
Mikhalevich, I., & Powell, R. (2020) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1527 · Cited by 175
Metadata
- Authors
- Barron, A. B., & Klein, C.
- Affiliations
- Macquarie University (AU)
- ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (AU)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2016-04-18
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 18
- Pages
- 4900-4908
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC4983823
- OpenAlex
- W2342226325
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 148
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 59 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 35 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 29
- FWCI
- 61.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (FT140100452, FT140100422)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurobiology and Insect Physiology Research
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- consciousness, subjective experience, insect brain, evolution of consciousness, invertebrate cognition, navigation, midbrain, egocentric representation, Cambrian, animal phylogeny
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Behavior, Animal, Consciousness, Insecta
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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