The DOI matches its Crossref record; 90 of the 90 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account
Open accessAbstract
Significance: In coming to understand minds, the greatest challenge for young children is understanding when others have a false belief. Why is that person searching for the toy over there when it is really over here? There is currently much controversy about when children come to this understanding because experiments of different types yield different results. This paper attempts to resolve the controversy by integrating theory and data in a different way. Specifically, the paper argues that young children do not just come to imagine what is in other minds on their own; rather, they come to this understanding through certain types of social and communicative interactions with others that require them to compare their respective perspectives.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Origins of Human Communication
Tomasello, M. (2008) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7551.001.0001 · Cited by 3,160
Self-citationDo 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1107621 · Cited by 2,350
Origins of human communication
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-3671 · Cited by 2,230
A Natural History of Human Thinking
Tomasello, M. (2014) · doi:10.4159/9780674726369 · Cited by 1,923
Self-citationTomasello, M. (2009) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8470.001.0001 · Cited by 1,896
Self-citationSPERBER, D., CLÉMENT, F., HEINTZ, C., MASCARO, O., MERCIER, H., ORIGGI, G., & WILSON, D. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x · Cited by 1,795
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198237537.001.0001 · Cited by 1,295
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0016923 · Cited by 1,261
Cited by
Using second-person neuroscience to elucidate the mechanisms of social interaction
Redcay, E., & Schilbach, L. (2019) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-019-0179-4 · Cited by 738
Artificial cognition vs. artificial intelligence for next-generation autonomous robotic agents
Sandini, G., Sciutti, A., & Morasso, P. (2024) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2024.1349408 · Cited by 40
Sacheli, L. M., Arcangeli, E., Carioti, D., Butterfill, S., & Berlingeri, M. (2022) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1177/17470218211050198 · Cited by 11
Re-evaluating Theory of Mind evaluation in large language models
Hu, J., Sosa, F., & Ullman, T. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0499 · Cited by 10
Odontocetes (‘toothed whales’): cognitive science and moral standing–are dolphins persons?
Pettit, S. G., & McCulloch, S. P. (2023) · Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research · doi:10.1163/25889567-bja10033 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Tomasello, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2018-08-13
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 34
- Pages
- 8491-8498
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2886577155
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 90
- FWCI
- 46.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.1804761115
- The paper
- Tomasello, M. (2018). How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804761115
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.