The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
Open accessAbstract
The method of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), in its current form, is confronted with a difficulty when it tries to explain how some social behaviors initiate their evolution. We show that this difficulty may be removed by changing the assumption made tacitly in game theory (and in ESS) of randomness of meetings or encounters. In reality, such randomness seems to be rare in nature. Family, population and social structure, customs, and habits impose various types of deviation from randomness. Introducing nonrandomness of meeting in a way formally similar to assortative mating, we show that the bar to initial increase of inherited cooperative or altruistic behaviors can be removed, provided there is sufficient assortment of meetings. Family structure may cause contacts predominantly between certain types of relatives, and one can reconstruct some results of classical kin selection in terms of evolutionary stable strategy with assortative meetings. Neighbor effects and group selection might be similarly treated. Assortment need not be a passive consequence of population and social structure, but it can also be actively pursued. Behaviors favoring the choice of cooperative companions will have the effect of favoring the evolution of cooperativeness. It can be shown that discrimination in the choice of companions, especially if combined with assortment, can favor the development of cooperativeness, making initial increase of cooperative behavior possible even at levels of assortment passively imposed which would not be adequate, per se , to guarantee the increase of cooperativeness. It is possible that, in some cases, cooperativeness and behavior favoring some type of assortment are coselected.
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Cites
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
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Self-citationOn the neighbor effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
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Self-citationConditions for the evolution of altruism under darwinian selection
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On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
Cohen, D., & Eshel, I. (1976) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/0040-5809(76)90020-4 · Cited by 147
Self-citation
Cited by
The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War
Choi, J.-K., & Bowles, S. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1144237 · Cited by 1,227
Sachs, J. L., Mueller, U. G., Wilcox, T. P., & Bull, J. J. (2004) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/383541 · Cited by 1,098
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The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Axelrod, R., & Dion, D. (1988) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.242.4884.1385 · Cited by 840
The evolution of cooperation and altruism – a general framework and a classification of models
Lehmann, L., & Keller, L. (2006) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01119.x · Cited by 810
Metadata
- Authors
- Eshel, I., & Cavalli-Sforza, L. L.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 1982-02
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1331-1335
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2065424085
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 23.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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