Cited by 29Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionVisual perception and processing mechanisms

From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience

Merker, Bjorn·2012·Advances in consciousness research

Abstract

A brain charged with guiding its body through a complex and lively world from a position of solitary confinement inside its opaque skull faces a set of functional challenges beset with inverse and ill-posed problems at every turn. Uncertainty and ambiguity therefore encumber all cortical labors, making probability distributions the natural medium of its disambiguating inferential operations. This chapter proposes that those operations take place unconsciously, in keeping with Helmholtz’ original suggestion, and that the functional logic of an inherently probabilistic cortex implies a need for an extracortical “global best estimate buffer” as a means to complete cortical sensory disambiguation through a definitive but ephemeral estimate of current sensory circumstances. It further proposes that the contents of that extracortical buffer are conscious, not by virtue of anything being “added” to buffer operations in order to “make them conscious”, but by virtue of the format of buffer contents alone: its dynamics issue in a nested arrangement placing an ego-center in perspectival relation to a neural model of body-world interactions. Finally, the organization of the higher order nuclei of the dorsal thalamus are scrutinized for their suitability to implement the putative global best estimate buffer, with particular attention to the possibility that the caudal reaches of the dorsal pulvinar might host its specifically sensory aspects, i.e. sensory awareness. Keywords: ambiguity; architecture of consciousness; best estimate buffer; constraint satisfaction; format of sensory awareness; phenomenal content; probabilistic operations; pulvinar

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Crossref · 10.1075/aicr.88.03mer

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  • In the PCM, immediate conscious experience that seems to be the visual presentation of an object is the projective framing of the brain's pre-personal, non-conscious, neurocomputational best guess as to what is causally responsible for current and just passed sensory data in a given context and relative to certain priors that constrain and bias perception.

    “your immediate conscious experience that seems to you to be the visual presentation of, for instance, a puppy curled up by the fire is the projective framing of your brain’s pre-personal, non-conscious, neurocomputational “best guess””

    From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Merker, 2012

  • Vision is the dominant sense in terrestrial vertebrates and the general framework with which the other senses are aligned.

    “to quote Merker (2012, pg. 48), that it is “the dominant sense in terrestrial vertebrates and the general framework with which the other senses are aligned.””

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Authors
Merker, B.
Corresponding author
Merker, Bjorn
Venue
Advances in consciousness research
Published
2012-06-25
Pages
37-80
ISSN
1381-589X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2489572893
Cited by
28
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2013: 2
FWCI
5.22
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Advances in consciousness research (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
constraint satisfaction, probabilistic inference, unconscious inference, Helmholtz, dorsal thalamus, pulvinar, sensory awareness, phenomenal content, ill-posed problems

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