From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience
Abstract
A brain charged with guiding its body through a complex and lively world from a position of solitary confinement inside its opaque skull faces a set of functional challenges beset with inverse and ill-posed problems at every turn. Uncertainty and ambiguity therefore encumber all cortical labors, making probability distributions the natural medium of its disambiguating inferential operations. This chapter proposes that those operations take place unconsciously, in keeping with Helmholtz’ original suggestion, and that the functional logic of an inherently probabilistic cortex implies a need for an extracortical “global best estimate buffer” as a means to complete cortical sensory disambiguation through a definitive but ephemeral estimate of current sensory circumstances. It further proposes that the contents of that extracortical buffer are conscious, not by virtue of anything being “added” to buffer operations in order to “make them conscious”, but by virtue of the format of buffer contents alone: its dynamics issue in a nested arrangement placing an ego-center in perspectival relation to a neural model of body-world interactions. Finally, the organization of the higher order nuclei of the dorsal thalamus are scrutinized for their suitability to implement the putative global best estimate buffer, with particular attention to the possibility that the caudal reaches of the dorsal pulvinar might host its specifically sensory aspects, i.e. sensory awareness. Keywords: ambiguity; architecture of consciousness; best estimate buffer; constraint satisfaction; format of sensory awareness; phenomenal content; probabilistic operations; pulvinar
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In the PCM, immediate conscious experience that seems to be the visual presentation of an object is the projective framing of the brain's pre-personal, non-conscious, neurocomputational best guess as to what is causally responsible for current and just passed sensory data in a given context and relative to certain priors that constrain and bias perception.
“your immediate conscious experience that seems to you to be the visual presentation of, for instance, a puppy curled up by the fire is the projective framing of your brain’s pre-personal, non-conscious, neurocomputational “best guess””
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Merker, 2012
Vision is the dominant sense in terrestrial vertebrates and the general framework with which the other senses are aligned.
“to quote Merker (2012, pg. 48), that it is “the dominant sense in terrestrial vertebrates and the general framework with which the other senses are aligned.””
From The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case (2026) · cites this paper as Merker (2012)
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Feinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667 · Cited by 158 · see citing works
“…an essentially neurological concept—the concept of “somatotopic,” “topographic,” and “isomorphic” sensory maps or representations—can be translated into simple ideas or terms that have a clear meaning from the standpoint of subjective awareness, without getting too deeply entrenched in the many…”
BackgroundThe integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity
Merker, B. H., Williford, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2021) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000881 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Self-citationHoming in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis
Morsella, E., Godwin, C. A., Jantz, T. K., Krieger, S. C., & Gazzaley, A. H. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000643 · Cited by 116 · see citing works
Merker, B. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00501 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
“The decision making machinery hypothetically incorporated into the schematic egocenter in my previous publications (see Merker, 2012, pp. 59, 68; Merker, 2013, pp. 19–22, and Figures 1.2 and 1.4 in particular) accordingly is the intrinsic collicular circuitry by which the priority target of the…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“…of your brain’s pre-personal, non-conscious, neurocomputational “best guess” as to what is causally responsible for your current and just passed sensory data in a given context and relative to certain priors (of varying flexibility) that constrain and bias your perception (cf., Merker, 2012).”
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Wiggins, G. A. (2018) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2018.05.001 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Jerath, R., Crawford, M. W., & Barnes, V. A. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01204 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
“…brainstem may be the medium for conscious function (Merker, 2007) but more recently he has discussed the possible role of thalamic nuclei in implementing a “global best estimate buffer” and implementing perspective and an ego-center for interactions with the body and external world (Merker, 2012).”
BackgroundLacalli, T. C. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0520 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
The Moon illusion explained by the projective consciousness model
Rudrauf, D., Bennequin, D., & Williford, K. (2020) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110455 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Bhangal, S., Merrick, C. M., & Morsella, E. (2015) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.04.006 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“First, it has been proposed that conscious contents, because of their very nature, can never be ambiguous at one moment in time (Merker, 2012).”
BackgroundWard, L. M., & Erra, R. G. (2022) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.874241 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
“This approach is consistent with that of Merker (2012), who argues that this occurs in a “best estimate buffer,” although he locates it in the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialModeling the subjective perspective of consciousness and its role in the control of behaviours
Rudrauf, D., Sergeant-Perthuis, G., Belli, O., Tisserand, Y., & Serugendo, G. D. M. (2021) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110957 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“From classical theories to more recent ones, much of consciousness research has brought to the fore the phenomenologically salient and central role of a ”subjective perspective”, as a non-trivial, viewpoint-dependent, unified internal representation of the world in perspective [57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 42, 63, 40, 3].”
BackgroundPassive frame theory: A new synthesis
Morsella, E., Godwin, C. A., Jantz, T. K., Krieger, S. C., & Gazzaley, A. H. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15002812 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Merker, B. H. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1062 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“…of the degree to which the “sensory world” of a given taxon has been augmented with an elaborate system for veridically reconstructing the sources of sensory afference based on prior learning — the basic function of neocortex in mammals and of telencephalic elaboration in birds (Merker 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe line drawn on pain still holds
Merker, B. H. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1104 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Meanwhile, that conjecture is far from being as secure as its adherents might think (see Merker, 2007, 2012, 2013), and requires one to ignore the fact that so far the strongest neural correlate of awareness has been recorded in a subcortical and not a cortical location (Wilke et al., 2009).”
BackgroundSelf-citationRudrauf, D., Sergeant-Perthuis, G., Tisserand, Y., Poloudenny, G., Williford, K., & Amorim, M. (2023) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci13101435 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
The genesis of the minimal mind: elements of a phenomenological and functional account
Marosán, B. P. (2023) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-023-09946-7 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Rudrauf, D., Sergeant-Perthuis, G., Tisserand, Y., Monnor, T., de Gevigney, V. D., & Belli, O. (2023) · ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems · doi:10.1145/3583886 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Unlimited associative learning and the origins of consciousness: the missing point of view
Rudrauf, D., & Williford, K. (2021) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-021-09819-w · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…sometimes under the notion of a first-person “egocenter”, as operating, in a pivotal manner, at the core of the inferential processing allowing organisms to adaptively relate multimodal sensory information and intentional action in the world (Merker 2013, p. 13; see also Merker 2012, p. 54).”
BackgroundKay, J. W., Phillips, W. A., Aru, J., Graham, B. P., & Larkum, M. E. (2019) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/604066 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Contextual disambiguation is crucial to cognition in general and perception in particular [1], as highlighted by the work of many artists such as René Magritte and Maurits Escher.”
BackgroundPhillips, W. A. (2018) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1177/1747021818816008 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Dynamical Emergence of Phenomenal Consciousness: an Outline of a Theory.
Moyal, R., & Edelman, S. (2019) · National Conference on Artificial Intelligence · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Why evolve consciousness? Neural credit and blame allocation as a core function of consciousness
Fitch, W. T. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21001953 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Rudrauf, D., Sergeant-Perthuis, G., Tisserand, Y., et al. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2104.07053 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Lacalli, T. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
“…2017; Pitts et al., 2018), but in particular that it is “through [gaze shifts] that the brain most immediately expresses its behavioral priority of the moment, and it is to them that it yokes the recruitment of the remainder of its motoric equipment in implementing actions” (Merker, 2012, pg. 46).”
Edelman, S. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-24012-6_2
Edelman, S. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-24012-6_1
Transcranial focused ultrasound for identifying the neural substrate of conscious perception
Freeman, D. K., Odegaard, B., Yoo, S., & Michel, M. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106485 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“In this latter view, prefrontal activity may well be the source of conscious contents, but it is not the site where the content becomes conscious (Merker, 2012).”
Attention, the homunculus, and the Greek theater effect
Morsella, E., Brauer, S., Wright-Wilson, L., et al. (2025) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x25000299
- Authors
- Merker, B.
- Corresponding author
- Merker, Bjorn
- ORCID
- Merker, Bjorn
- Venue
- Advances in consciousness research
- Publisher
- John Benjamins Publishing Company
- Published
- 2012-06-25
- Pages
- 37-80
- ISSN
- 1381-589X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2489572893
- Cited by
- 28
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 5.22
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Advances in consciousness research (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- constraint satisfaction, probabilistic inference, unconscious inference, Helmholtz, dorsal thalamus, pulvinar, sensory awareness, phenomenal content, ill-posed problems
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