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Cited by 92Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceVisual perception and processing mechanismsEmbodied and Extended Cognition

The efference cascade, consciousness, and its self: naturalizing the first person pivot of action control.

Open access
Merker, Bjorn·2013·Frontiers in Psychology
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00501PMC PMC3738861
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Abstract

The 20 billion neurons of the neocortex have a mere hundred thousand motor neurons by which to express cortical contents in overt behavior. Implemented through a staggered cortical "efference cascade" originating in the descending axons of layer five pyramidal cells throughout the neocortical expanse, this steep convergence accomplishes final integration for action of cortical information through a system of interconnected subcortical way stations. Coherent and effective action control requires the inclusion of a continually updated joint "global best estimate" of current sensory, motivational, and motor circumstances in this process. I have previously proposed that this running best estimate is extracted from cortical probabilistic preliminaries by a subcortical neural "reality model" implementing our conscious sensory phenomenology. As such it must exhibit first person perspectival organization, suggested to derive from formating requirements of the brain's subsystem for gaze control, with the superior colliculus at its base. Gaze movements provide the leading edge of behavior by capturing targets of engagement prior to contact. The rotation-based geometry of directional gaze movements places their implicit origin inside the head, a location recoverable by cortical probabilistic source reconstruction from the rampant primary sensory variance generated by the incessant play of collicularly triggered gaze movements. At the interface between cortex and colliculus lies the dorsal pulvinar. Its unique long-range inhibitory circuitry may precipitate the brain's global best estimate of its momentary circumstances through multiple constraint satisfaction across its afferents from numerous cortical areas and colliculus. As phenomenal content of our sensory awareness, such a global best estimate would exhibit perspectival organization centered on a purely implicit first person origin, inherently incapable of appearing as a phenomenal content of the sensory space it serves.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00501

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  • Similar integrated systems playing a similar role to the insect PI are found across phyla, especially vertebrate subcortical systems.

    “we emphasize [10] that one finds similar integrated systems, playing a similar role, across phyla, especially vertebrate subcortical systems [16,39].”

    From Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

    In “The key to collicular function” (page unavailable), Merker describes the vertebrate superior colliculus as an integrative hub that weighs information to guide orienting movements. The passages support the vertebrate subcortical example, but do not compare it with the insect PI or establish that similar systems play this role across phyla. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Minimal consciousness is characterized by self and embodiment: the animal rather than its nervous system is minimally conscious, and interactions of the brain with the body constitute the sense of self.

    “- (7)Self and embodiment – no account of consciousness is possible without addressing the obvious fact that there is an agent that is sentient: it is the animal rather than its nervous system that is minimally conscious (for an insightful and detailed discussion see Merker, 2007, 2013).”

    From The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning (2016) · cites this paper as Merker, 2013

    The Introduction says a theory of consciousness must account for first-person experience, and ‘The self that is excluded from but presupposed by the contents of consciousness’ defines a minimal self as the perceptual egocenter of awareness. These passages support the need to address a conscious subject, but our copy does not say that the animal, rather than its nervous system, is minimally conscious or that brain–body interactions constitute the sense of self. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Vision, considered as a format, has an inherent viewpoint that ensures the experience is perceived as external, i.e., referred to the outside world.

    “Take vision, for example, considered here as a format, where the inherent viewpoint ensures that the experience is perceived as external, i.e., it is referred to the outside world (Merker, 2013).”

    From Consciousness as a Product of Evolution: Contents, Selector Circuits, and Trajectories in Experience Space (2021) · cites this paper as Merker, 2013

  • It is the interaction between sensory representations and a self that generates an experiential state.

    “This accords with the idea that it is the interaction between sensory representations and a self that generates an experiential state (e.g., see Merker, 2013)”

    From The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case (2026) · cites this paper as Merker, 2013

  • Via recurrent loops, the mammalian PI is connected to the cortex, and the cortex adds input to the mammalian PI.

    “Merker [16,39,84] has emphasized subcortical structures in the mammalian brain PI, but via these recurrent loops the PI is connected to the cortex, and the cortex adds input to the mammalian PI.”

    From Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Anderson C. H. Van Essen D. C. (1994). Neurobiological computational systems, in Computational Intelligence Imitating Life, eds Zurada J. M. Marks R. J. 2nd. Robinson C. J. (New York, NY: IEEE Press), 213– 222
  2. Diamond I. T. (1979). The subdivisions of neocortex, a proposal to revise the traditional view of sensory, motor, and association areas, in Progress in Psychobiology and Physiological Psychology, Vol. 8, eds Sprague J. M. Epstein A. N. (London: Academic Press), 1– 43
  3. Edwards S. B. (1980). The deep layers of the superior colliculus. Their reticular characteristics and organization, in The Reticular Formation Revisited, eds Hobson A. Brazier M. A. B. (New York, NY: Raven Press), 193– 209
  4. Hume D. (1739/1888). Of personal identity, in A Treatise of Human Nature, ed Selby-Bigge L. A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 179– 187
  5. Jones E. G. (1984). Laminar distribution of cortical efferent cells, in Cerebral Cortex, Vol. 1. Cellular Components of the Cerebral Cortex, eds Peters A. Jones E. G. (New York, NY: Plenum Press), 521– 553
  6. Rock I. (ed.). (1997). Indirect Perception. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press/Bradford Books

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Authors
Merker, B.
Corresponding author
Merker, Bjorn
ORCID
Merker, Bjorn
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2013
Volume
4
Pages
501-501
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00501
PMC
PMC3738861
OpenAlex
W2143475077
Cited by
92
References
300
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 1
FWCI
10.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
consciousness, first-person perspective, action control, superior colliculus, gaze control, neocortex, constraint satisfaction, source localization

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