The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lay Foibles and Expert Fables in Judgments about Risk
Abstract
Public perceptions of risk are a focal point of many debates about the management of hazardous technologies. Different views about what the public knows and wants often lead to quite different beliefs about what policies should be adopted and even about how society's policy-making processes should be structured. Often these views about the public are based on speculation or anecdotal observation. In the interests of having better informed debates, the present paper reviews existing empirical evidence about public risk perceptions. In doing so, it reaches a number of interim conclusions and draws forth their implications for the respective roles of technical experts and lay people in technology management.
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Citations
Cites
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Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246
Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980
Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., & Phillips, L. D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.023 · Cited by 1,967
Self-citationThe statistical power of abnormal-social psychological research: A review.
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Fault trees: sensitivity of estimated failure probabilities to problem representation
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1978) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.4.2.330 · Cited by 708
Self-citationLichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1980) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(80)90052-5 · Cited by 375
Self-citation
Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Self-citationThe Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90010-6 · Cited by 1,649
Perception of Hazards: The Role of Social Trust and Knowledge
Siegrist, M., & Cvetkovich, G. (2000) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/0272-4332.205064 · Cited by 1,111
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.020 · Cited by 678
Metadata
- Authors
- Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S.
- Venue
- The American Statistician
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1982-08
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 3b
- Pages
- 240-255
- ISSN
- 0003-1305 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-2731
- OpenAlex
- W2112553430
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 20.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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