Evolution and Normative Scepticism
Abstract
It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted.
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Third-factor accounts appeal to an external factor taken both to causally help explain the belief that a given action is right and to metaphysically explain that the action is in fact right.
“What is characteristic of those accounts is that they appeal to an external,”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Schafer 2010
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Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703 · see citing works
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Street, S. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 · Cited by 1,247 · see citing works
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270 · see citing works
Tersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- Schafer, K.
- Venue
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-09
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 471-488
- ISSN
- 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6828
- OpenAlex
- W1989511306
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 5.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- normative realism, evolutionary theory, normative beliefs, normative epistemology
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