A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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In the citing paper
“Similarly, Street's (2006) challenge to robust moral realism rests on the descriptive claim that evolutionary pressures heavily influence moral judgments.”
From Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology (2019) · cites this paper as Street 2006
In the citing paper
“Arguments for moral relativism often appeal to considerations which are not straightforwardly linguistic.”
From Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism (2022) · cites this paper as Street 2006
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725 · cited 1×
“14 On this theory, see Hamilton (1963, 1964); Sober and Wilson (1998), chapter 2; and Buss (1999), chapters 7 8.”
BackgroundThe Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme
Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1979.0086 · Cited by 7,770 · cited 6×
“49 See Sturgeon (1985).”
InfluentialNielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,321
The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture
Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992) · Cited by 5,465
Korsgaard, C. M., & O'Neill, O. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554476 · Cited by 4,013
(2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511563836 · Cited by 3,562
SCANLON, T. M. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv134vmrn · Cited by 3,041
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment
Gibbard, A. (1990) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001 · Cited by 2,619
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- R. Boyd, 1988, Essays on Moral Realism, 181
- T. Nagel, 1986, The View from Nowhere
- N. Sturgeon, 1985, Morality, Reason and Truth, 49
Cited by
What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?
Street, S. (2010) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x · Cited by 354
Self-citationEvolutionary Debunking Arguments
Kahane, G. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x · Cited by 282
YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1
White, R. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x · Cited by 269
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
“This claim is assumed as well in Street (2006), passim.”
BackgroundOckham's Razors: A User's Manual
Sober, E. (2015) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107705937 · Cited by 356
Metadata
- Authors
- Street, S.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Street, Sharon
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2006-01
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 109-166
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2088724026
- Semantic Scholar
- 481777e56687500928c2cd6698925034cc6fa686
- Cited by
- 1,247
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 84 · 2025: 88 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 139 · 2022: 140 · 2021: 52 · 2020: 85 · 2019: 157 · 2018: 101 · 2017: 54 · 2016: 59 · 2015: 50 · 2014: 38 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 39.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- evolutionary ethics, moral realism, evolutionary theory
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6
- The paper
- Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.