Plantinga on functions and the theory of evolution
Abstract
(1997). Plantinga on functions and the theory of evolution. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 83-98.
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There is no evidence that evolution has fated us to theoretical error, particularly about evolution itself.
“This prompts Michael Levin (1997, 98) to conclude that 'there is no evidence that evolution has fated us to theoretical error, particularly about evolution itself' (our italics).”
From Natural Selection Does Care about Truth (2014) · cites this paper as Levin 1997
Even if our cognitive faculties mislead us, we can find this out and correct for it by comparing the predictions of our theories to observation.
“As Levin (1997, 97) points out, even if our cognitive faculties mislead us, 'we can find this out and correct for it by comparing the predictions of our theories to observation' .”
From Natural Selection Does Care about Truth (2014) · cites this paper as Levin 1997
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- Authors
- Levin, M.
- Affiliations
- City College of New York (US)
- Corresponding author
- Levin, Michael
- ORCID
- Levin, Michael
- Venue
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1997-03
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 83-98
- ISSN
- 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6828
- OpenAlex
- W1981545880
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2017: 1 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Evolution and Science Education
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Keywords
- Alvin Plantinga, functions, evolutionary theory, philosophy of biology, natural selection, teleology
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