The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cultural Variation In Probabilistic Thinking: Alternative Ways Of Dealing With Uncertainty
Abstract
This study reviews research on cultural differences in “probabilistic thinking” and presents some intra- and inter-cultural findings. Strong differences are shown to exist between people raised under Asian and British cultures on measures of this ability. These differences were found to out-weigh any influence of subculture, religion, occupation, arts/science orientation and sex. Generally, Asians were found to adopt a less finely differentiated view of uncertainty both numerically and verbally than did the British sample. Numerical probabilities assessed by the Asians were more extreme and less realistic than those assessed by the British sample. Possible antecedents of these differences are outlined, and cultural differences in probabilistic thinking are shown to be compatible with decriptions of cultural differences in business decision making. It is argued that there are qualitative cultural differences in ways of dealing with uncertainty.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Back-translation for cross-cultural research.
Brislin, R. W. (1970) · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1177/135910457000100301 · Cited by 14,091
Cultural differences in probabilistic thinking
Wright, G. N., Phillips, L. D., Whalley, P. C., Choo, G. T., Ng, K.-O., Tan, I., & Wisudha, A. (1978) · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1177/002202217893002 · Cited by 168
Self-citation
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298
Metadata
- Authors
- Wright, G. N., & Phillips, L. D.
- Venue
- International Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1980-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1-4
- Pages
- 239-257
- ISSN
- 0020-7594 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-066X
- OpenAlex
- W2002433343
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 1.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cultural Variation In Probabilistic Thinking: Alternative Ways Of Dealing With Uncertainty. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00207598008246995
- The paper
- Wright, G. N., & Phillips, L. D. (1980). Cultural Variation In Probabilistic Thinking: Alternative Ways Of Dealing With Uncertainty. International Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207598008246995
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.