Cited by 168Categorization, perception, and languageDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsCultural Differences and Values

Cultural differences in probabilistic thinking

Wright, George N., Phillips, Lawrence D., Whalley, Peter C., Choo, Gerry T., Ng, Kee-Ong, Tan, Irene, Wisudha, Aylene·1978·Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology

Abstract

Cultural differences in three aspects of "probabilistic thinking" were studied. The study re-presents part of earlier work in Hong Kong and Britain and combines it with the results from a further study in Indonesia and Malaysia. The largest cultural difference was found between Asian and British student groups. The British adopted a more finely differentiated view of uncertainty, both verbally and numerically, than the Asians in response to uncertain situations. These differences are predictable neither on the basis of the relative abundance of probability expressions in the Indonesian language nor by the Malay samples' ability to discriminate English probability words on a meaningful probability discrimination dimension. For numerical probabilities assigned to almanac questions, the British were less extreme and better calibrated than the Asian students. Potential cultural influences which could account for the cultural differences were examined, and the possibility that Asian ways of dealing with uncertainty do not involve the verbal or numeric response modes studied is presented.

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Crossref · 10.1177/002202217893002

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  • There are cultural and individual differences in the way that people think and conceptualize probabilities and uncertainty.

    “there are cultural and individual differences in the way that people think and conceptualize probabilities and uncertainty (Wright et al., 1978).”

    From Individual consistency in the accuracy and distribution of confidence judgments (2016) · cites this paper as Wright et al., 1978

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Authors
Wright, G. N., Phillips, L. D., Whalley, P. C., Choo, G. T., Ng, K.-O., Tan, I., & Wisudha, A.
Affiliations
Brunel University of London (GB)
Venue
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
Published
1978-09
Volume
9
Issue
3
Pages
285-299
ISSN
  • 0022-0221 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-5422
OpenAlex
W2114810361
Cited by
168
References
16
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 3
FWCI
1.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
Keywords
probabilistic reasoning, cultural differences, uncertainty, probability judgment, calibration, Asian students, British students, cross-cultural comparison

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