“Why Worry About Theory-Dependence? Circularity, Minimal Empiricality and Reliability”
Abstract
It is a widely shared view among philosophers of science that the theory‐dependence (or theory‐ladenness) of observations is worrying, because it can bias empirical tests in favour of the tested theories. These doubts are taken to be dispelled if an observation is influenced by a theory independent of the tested theory and thus circularity is avoided, while (partially) circular tests are taken to require special attention. Contrary to this consensus, it is argued that the epistemic value of theory‐dependent tests has nothing to do with the circularity or non‐circularity of the test, but is instead based on the minimal empiricality and reliability of observations. Since theory‐dependence does not in general prevent observations fulfilling these requirements, it should not be regarded as a phenomenon that is basically detrimental, but as neutral with respect to successful scientific knowledge gathering.
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Current evolutionary approaches to the human mind frequently appeal to observations that are not dependent on evolutionary theory itself, though dependent on other theories, and do not depend on the specific evolutionary hypotheses they test.
“But current evolutionary approaches to the human mind frequently appeal to observations that are not dependent on evolutionary theory itself-of course, they are dependent on other theories, but crucially, they do not depend on the specific evolutionary hypotheses they set out to test.”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Adam, 2004
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- Authors
- Adam, M.
- Corresponding author
- Adam, Matthias
- Venue
- International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2004-07
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 117-132
- ISSN
- 0269-8595 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-9281
- OpenAlex
- W2065210264
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 4.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- theory-ladenness, circularity, confirmation bias, scientific knowledge acquisition, philosophy of science
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