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Cited by 199Quantum Mechanics and ApplicationsPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of Science

On schizophrenic experiences of the neutron or why we should believe in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory

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Vaidman, Lev·1998·International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1080/02698599808573600
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Abstract

This is a philosophical paper in favor of the many‐worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum theory. The necessity of introducing many worlds is explained by analyzing a neutron interference experiment. The concept of the “measure of existence of a world” is introduced and some difficulties with the issue of probability in the framework of the MWI are resolved.

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Crossref · 10.1080/02698599808573600

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43 of 43 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The only way to introduce ignorance is the sleeping pill trick, leading an observer to split without being aware of the outcome.

    “The only way to introduce ignorance is to apply a 'sleeping pill' trick [3] which leads to a situation in which an observer splits according to the outcome of the measurement without being aware of the outcome.”

    From Why the Many-Worlds Interpretation? (2022) · cites this paper as [3]

    Section 7 uses the sleeping-pill story to explain how ignorance-type probability can arise when an observer does not yet know an outcome. But it explicitly says the pill is “hardly necessary”: in typical experiments, distinct states arise before observers become aware of the result. That contradicts the claim that the trick is the only way to introduce ignorance. (LLM, conf=0.90)

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  • We care for all future parallel worlds according to their measure of existence, which is proportional to the objective probabilities of the corresponding possible collapsing worlds.

    “The justification is very different: we care for all future parallel worlds according to their 'measure of existence' [3, 7] which is proportional to the objective probabilities of the corresponding possible collapsing worlds.”

    From Why the Many-Worlds Interpretation? (2022) · cites this paper as [3]

    Section 8 defines each future world's measure of existence and relates relative measures to probabilities; Section 11 says an MWI believer would bet according to those measures, just as a believer in Born-rule collapse would. The paper supports measure-weighted decisions, but it does not explicitly say that we should care for all future worlds in proportion to their measures. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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Cites

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1 of the 44 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. [12]12. Butterfield, J. (1995) 'Worlds, Minds and Quanta', in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 69, pp.113- 158.
  2. [15]15. De Broglie, L. (1927) 'La Mechanique Ondulatoire et al Structure Atomique de la Matiere et du Rayonnement', Journal de Physique et le Radium, Serie VI 8, 225-241.
  3. [16]16. Deutsch, D. (1985) 'Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Hypothesis, and Universal Quantum Computers', Proceedings of Royal Society of London 400, 97-117.
  4. [30]30. Kent, A. (1990) 'Against Many-Worlds Interpretation', International Journal of Modern Physics A5, 1745-1762.
  5. [32]32. Lockwood, M. (1989) Mind, Brain & the Quantum (Oxford, and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell).
  6. [33]33. Lockwood, M. (1996) "'Many Minds' Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 159-188.
  7. [36]36. Papineau, D. (1996) 'Many Minds No Worse than One', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 233-340.
  8. [37]37. Penrose, R. (1994) Shadows of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
  9. [44]44. Wigner, E.P. (1962) 'Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem', in I. J. Good (ed), The Scientist Speculates (London: Heinemann), pp. 284-302.

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Authors
Vaidman, L.
Venue
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
1998-10
Volume
12
Issue
3
Pages
245-261
ISSN
  • 0269-8595 (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-9281
DOI
10.1080/02698599808573600
OpenAlex
W1973893525
Semantic Scholar
1d5661e907bfab416f6cbef033147f70fdf046fe
Cited by
199
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 3
FWCI
2.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • CERN Document Server (European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Mechanics and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
many-worlds interpretation, quantum mechanics, probability in quantum mechanics, interpretation of quantum mechanics

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