The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moral Schemas and Tacit Judgement or How the Defining Issues Test is Supported by Cognitive Science
Abstract
Ideas from cognitive science are increasingly influential and provide insight into the nature of moral judgement. Three core ideas are discussed: modern schema theory, the frequency of automatic decision-making and implicit processes as the default mode of human information processing. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) measures the beginnings of moral understanding, which are largely non-verbal and intuitive, in contrast to the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI), which measures the highest level of verbal understanding. The positive attributes of the DIT and its conceptualisation of moral judgement schemas are more apparent in a time of increasing respect for implicit knowledge and processing. The DIT offers a means of measuring moral judgement that fits with current views in cognitive science. Although the MJI and interview techniques generally are worthwhile for measuring production competence, the DIT is better able to measure understanding at the level that drives most decisions for most people.
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Citations
Cites
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Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
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BackgroundPashler, H. (1997) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5677.001.0001 · Cited by 1,607
Cited by
Motivation and justification: a dual process model of culture in action.
Vaisey, S. (2009) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/597179 · Cited by 1,279
Zeidler, D. L. (2016) · Cultural Studies of Science Education · doi:10.1007/s11422-014-9578-z · Cited by 340
Myyry, L., Siponen, M., Pahnila, S., Vartiainen, T., & Vance, A. (2009) · European Journal of Information Systems · doi:10.1057/ejis.2009.10 · Cited by 273
Reconsidering the Trade-off Between Expertise and Flexibility: a Cognitive Entrenchment Perspective
Dane, E. (2010) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.35.4.zok579 · Cited by 603
“There must be a reason”: Osama, Saddam, and inferred justification
Prasad, M., Perrin, A. J., Bezila, K., Hoffman, S. G., Kindleberger, K., Manturuk, K., & Powers, A. S. (2009) · Sociological Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1475-682x.2009.00280.x · Cited by 97
Metadata
- Authors
- Narvaez, D., & Bock, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Moral Education
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-09
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 297-314
- ISSN
- 0305-7240 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-3877
- OpenAlex
- W2138026435
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 14.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Narvaez, D., & Bock, T. (2002). Moral Schemas and Tacit Judgement or How the Defining Issues Test is Supported by Cognitive Science. Journal of Moral Education. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724022000008124
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