On dual processing and heuristic approaches to moral cognition
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We examine the implications of dual‐processing theories of cognition for the moral domain, with particular emphasis upon ‘System 1’ theories: the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt), moral heuristics (Sunstein), fast‐and‐frugal moral heuristics (Gigerenzer), schema accessibility (Lapsley & Narvaez) and moral expertise (Narvaez). We argue that these theories differ from each other in important ways and should be carefully distinguished. We examine these theories in the light of the ‘Berkowitz Rule’ with respect to educational practice and conclude with some thoughts about the implications of this work for resetting the boundary between ethical theory and moral psychology.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048 · cited 2×
“Moral intuition is defined as ‘the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good–bad, like–dislike) without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence or inferring a conclusion’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).”
BackgroundFalsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1976) · Can Theories be Refuted? · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_14 · Cited by 3,915
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 2×
“…involving rational calculation that is deliberative, effortful and conscious—collides with empirical research that shows that much of human decision making is not like this at all and that, indeed, much social behaviour is under ‘non-conscious control’ (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, 2005).”
BackgroundThe self-importance of moral identity
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423 · Cited by 3,522 · cited 1×
“Moreover, something like post‐conscious automaticity underlies the spreading activation assumptions of Aquino and Reed's ( 2002 ) approach to assessing moral identity.”
BackgroundRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476 · cited 2×
“One way that heuristics work is through attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).”
BackgroundOn making the right choice: the deliberation-without-attention effect.
Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Nordgren, L. F., & van Baaren, R. B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1121629 · Cited by 1,159
Not yet human: Implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary consequences.
Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M. J., & Jackson, M. C. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.292 · Cited by 880 · cited 2×
“( 2008 ) showed that manipulations that prime implicit, dehumanising racial stereotypes introduce visual bias in attention and visual perception and alter participants' judgments about whether violence against a Black person is justified (findings that are not moderated by explicit measures of racial prejudice—so much…”
BackgroundGigerenzer, G. (1998) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354398082006 · Cited by 196 · cited 1×
“Moreover, these ‘surrogates for theories’ typically fail to generate testable models of cognitive processes (Gigerenzer, 1998).”
Background
Cited by
Christner, N., Pletti, C., & Paulus, M. (2020) · Cognitive Development · doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100893 · Cited by 71
Social Constructivism, Mental Models, and Problems of Obedience
Werhane, P. H., Hartman, L. P., Moberg, D., Englehardt, E., Pritchard, M., & Parmar, B. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0767-3 · Cited by 50
Kim, M., & Sankey, D. (2009) · Journal of Moral Education · doi:10.1080/03057240903101499 · Cited by 32
“One prevailing theme in the Special Issue papers and, indeed, running through much of the discussion at AME, is captured by Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill ( 2008 ) when they say that, from the perspective of developmental psychology, the Kohlbergian ‘Standard Model now looks a bit shop worn’ and ‘there is increasing…”
BackgroundRevisiting the Moral Self-Construct: Developmental Perspectives on Moral Selfhood
Krettenauer, T. (2013) · Self-Regulation and Autonomy · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139152198.010 · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Lapsley, D. K., & Hill, P. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Moral Education
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 313-332
- ISSN
- 0305-7240 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-3877
- OpenAlex
- W2077087639
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On dual processing and heuristic approaches to moral cognition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/03057240802227486
- The paper
- Lapsley, D. K., & Hill, P. L. (2008). On dual processing and heuristic approaches to moral cognition. Journal of Moral Education. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240802227486
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.